§9.1.1Ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀσεβεῖ·
He who acts unjustly commits impiety.
τῆς γὰρ τῶν ὅλων φύσεως κατεσκευακυίας τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα ἕνεκεν ἀλλήλων, ὥστε ὠφελεῖν μὲν ἄλληλα κατ’ ἀξίαν βλάπτειν δὲ μηδαμῶς, ὁ τὸ βούλημα ταύτης παραβαίνων ἀσεβεῖ δηλονότι εἰς τὴν πρεσβυτάτην τῶν θεῶν.
For since the nature of the whole has constituted rational animals for one another, so that they should assist each other according to their worth but in no way harm each other, he who transgresses her will clearly commits impiety against the oldest of the deities.
καὶ ὁ ψευδόμενος δὲ ἀσεβεῖ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν θεόν· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὄντων ἐστὶ φύσις· τὰ δέ γε ὄντα πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα οἰκείως ἔχει.
And he who lies also commits impiety regarding the same goddess; for the nature of the whole is the nature of existing things, and things that exist are closely akin to all things that subsist.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀλήθεια αὕτη ὀνομάζεται καὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν ἁπάντων πρώτη αἰτία ἐστίν.
Furthermore, this nature is also called Truth and is the first cause of all things that are true.
§9.1.2ὁ μὲν οὖν ἑκὼν ψευδόμενος ἀσεβεῖ, καθόσον ἐξαπατῶν ἀδικεῖ· ὁ δὲ ἄκων, καθόσον διαφωνεῖ τῇ τῶν ὅλων φύσει καὶ καθόσον ἀκοσμεῖ μαχόμενος τῇ τοῦ κόσμου φύσει·
Therefore, he who lies voluntarily commits impiety, insofar as he acts unjustly by deceiving; but he who lies involuntarily also commits impiety, insofar as he is in discord with the nature of the whole and orderless in fighting against the nature of the universe.
μάχεται γὰρ ὁ ἐπὶ τἀναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσι φερόμενος παρ’ ἑαυτόν· ἀφορμὰς γὰρ προειλήφει παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, ὧν ἀμελήσας οὐχ οἷός τέ ἐστι νῦν διακρίνειν τὰ ψευδῆ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν.
For he fights against it who is carried of his own accord in the direction contrary to the truth; for he had previously received faculties from nature, by neglecting which he is now unable to distinguish falsehood from truth.
καὶ μὴν ὁ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὡς ἀγαθὰ διώκων, τοὺς δὲ πόνους ὡς κακὰ φεύγων ἀσεβεῖ·
Moreover, he who pursues pleasures as goods and avoids pains as evils commits impiety.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον μέμφεσθαι πολλάκις τῇ κοινῇ φύσει ὡς παῤ ἀξίαν τι ἀπονεμούσῃ τοῖς φαύλοις καὶ τοῖς σπουδαίοις, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις τοὺς μὲν φαύλους ἐν ἡδοναῖς εἶναι καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τούτων κτᾶσθαι, τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πόνῳ καὶ τοῖς ποιητικοῖς τούτου περιπίπτειν.
For such a person must necessarily often blame common nature as assigning things contrary to desert to the bad and the good, because the bad are often in pleasures and possess the things that produce them, while the good fall into pain and the things that produce it.
§9.1.3ἔτι δὲ ὁ φοβούμενος τοὺς πόνους φοβηθήσεταί ποτε καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων τι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη ἀσεβές·
Furthermore, he who fears pains will sometimes also fear something of what is to happen in the universe, and this is already impious.
ὅ τε διώκων τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐκ ἀφέξεται τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἐναργῶς ἀσεβές·
And he who pursues pleasures will not abstain from injustice, and this is manifestly impious.
χρὴ δὲ πρὸς ἃ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις ἐπίσης ἔχει (οὐ γὰρ ἀμφότερα ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ πρὸς ἀμφότερα ἐπίσης εἶχε), πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τοὺς τῇ φύσει βουλομένους ἕπεσθαι, ὁμογνώμονας ὄντας, ἐπίσης διακεῖσθαι·
But toward those things to which common nature is indifferent (for she would not have made both if she were not indifferent to both), those who wish to follow nature, being of one mind with her, must also be indifferently disposed.
ὅστις οὖν πρὸς πόνον καὶ ἡδονὴν ἢ θάνατον καὶ ζωὴν ἢ δόξαν καὶ ἀδοξίαν, οἷς ἐπίσης ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις χρῆται, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐπίσης ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἀσεβεῖ.
Whosoever, therefore, is not indifferently disposed toward pain and pleasure, or death and life, or glory and ignominy, which the nature of the whole uses indifferently, clearly commits impiety.
§9.1.4λέγω δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἐπίσης τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ συμβαίνειν ἐπίσης κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς τοῖς γινομένοις καὶ ἐπιγινομένοις ὁρμῇ τινι ἀρχαίᾳ τῆς προνοίας, καθ’ ἣν ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν, συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ δυνάμεις γονίμους ἀφορίσασα ὑποστάσεών τε καὶ μεταβολῶν καὶ διαδοχῶν τοιούτων.
And by saying that common nature uses these things indifferently, I mean that they happen indifferently in sequence to those things which come into existence and succeed them by a certain ancient impulse of providence, according to which, from a certain beginning, she impelled herself toward this cosmic order, having conceived certain principles of what was to be, and having defined generative powers for such substances, changes, and successions.