§2.10.1Φιλοσόφως ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῇ συγκρίσει τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ὡς ἄν τις κοινότερον τὰ τοιαῦτα συγκρίνειε, φησὶ βαρύτερα εἶναι τὰ κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν πλημμελούμενα τῶν κατὰ θυμόν.
Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad deeds—as one would compare such things in a more common way—says philosophically that offenses committed through desire are more serious than those committed through anger.
ὁ γὰρ θυμούμενος μετά τινος λύπης καὶ λεληθυίας συστολῆς φαίνεται τὸν λόγον ἀποστρεφόμενος· ὁ δὲ κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἁμαρτάνων, ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἡττώμενος ἀκολαστότερός πως φαίνεται καὶ θηλύτερος ἐν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις.
For the man who is angry seems to turn away from reason with a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through desire, being overcome by pleasure, appears somehow more licentious and more effeminate in his offenses.
ὀρθῶς οὖν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἀξίως ἔφη μείζονος ἐγκλήματος ἔχεσθαι τὸ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἁμαρτανόμενον ἤπερ τὸ μετὰ λύπης· ὅλως τε ὁ μὲν προηδικημένῳ μᾶλλον ἔοικε καὶ διὰ λύπης ἠναγκασμένῳ θυμωθῆναι· ὁ δὲ αὐτόθεν πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖν ὥρμηται, φερόμενος ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶξαί τι κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν.
Correctly, then, and in a manner worthy of philosophy, he said that the offense committed with pleasure is subject to greater blame than that committed with pain; and on the whole, the former is more like one who has been previously wronged and is forced to be angry through pain, whereas the latter has set out of his own accord to do wrong, being carried away to do something through desire.