§6.10.1νῦν δʼ ἐπὶ βραχὺ ποιησόμεθα μνήμην ὑπὲρ τῆς Λυκούργου νομοθεσίας· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀνοίκειος ὁ λόγος τῆς προθέσεως. §6.10.2ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων συννοήσας ἀναγκαίως καὶ φυσικῶς ἐπιτελούμενα καὶ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι πᾶν εἶδος πολιτείας ἁπλοῦν καὶ κατὰ μίαν συνεστηκὸς δύναμιν ἐπισφαλὲς γίνεται διὰ τὸ ταχέως εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν καὶ φύσει παρεπομένην ἐκτρέπεσθαι κακίαν· §6.10.3καθάπερ γὰρ σιδήρῳ μὲν ἰός, ξύλοις δὲ θρῖπες καὶ τερηδόνες συμφυεῖς εἰσι λῦμαι, διʼ ὧν, κἂν πάσας τὰς ἔξωθεν διαφύγωσι βλάβας, ὑπʼ αὐτῶν φθείρονται τῶν συγγενομένων, §6.10.4τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν συγγεννᾶται κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάστῃ καὶ παρέπεταί τις κακία, βασιλείᾳ μὲν ὁ μοναρχικὸς λεγόμενος τρόπος, ἀριστοκρατίᾳ δʼ ὁ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, §6.10.5δημοκρατίᾳ δʼ ὁ θηριώδης καὶ χειροκρατικός, εἰς οὓς οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ οὐ πάντα τὰ προειρημένα σὺν χρόνῳ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταστάσεις κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον. §6.10.6ἃ προϊδόμενος Λυκοῦργος οὐχ ἁπλῆν οὐδὲ μονοειδῆ συνεστήσατο τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοῦ συνήθροιζε τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἰδιότητας τῶν ἀρίστων πολιτευμάτων, §6.10.7ἵνα μηδὲν αὐξανόμενον ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον εἰς τὰς συμφυεῖς ἐκτρέπηται κακίας, ἀντισπωμένης δὲ τῆς ἑκάστου δυνάμεως ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων μηδαμοῦ νεύῃ μηδʼ ἐπὶ πολὺ καταρρέπῃ μηδὲν αὐτῶν, ἀλλʼ ἰσορροποῦν καὶ ζυγοστατούμενον ἐπὶ πολὺ διαμένῃ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀντιπλοίας λόγον ἀεὶ τὸ πολίτευμα, §6.10.8τῆς μὲν βασιλείας κωλυομένης ὑπερηφανεῖν διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου φόβον, δεδομένης καὶ τούτῳ μερίδος ἱκανῆς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, §6.10.9τοῦ δὲ δήμου πάλιν μὴ θαρροῦντος καταφρονεῖν τῶν βασιλέων διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν γερόντων φόβον, οἳ κατʼ ἐκλογὴν ἀριστίνδην κεκριμένοι πάντες ἔμελλον ἀεὶ τῷ δικαίῳ προσνέμειν ἑαυτούς, §6.10.10ὥστε τὴν τῶν ἐλαττουμένων μερίδα διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐμμένειν, ταύτην ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι μείζω καὶ βαρυτέραν τῇ τῶν γερόντων προσκλίσει καὶ ῥοπῇ. §6.10.11τοιγαροῦν οὕτως συστησάμενος πλεῖστον ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν χρόνον διεφύλαξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. §6.10.12ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν λόγῳ τινὶ προϊδόμενος πόθεν ἕκαστα καὶ πῶς πέφυκε συμβαίνειν, ἀβλαβῶς συνεστήσατο τὴν προειρημένην πολιτείαν· §6.10.13Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τὸ μὲν τέλος ταὐτὸ πεποίηνται τῆς ἐν τῇ πατρίδι καταστάσεως, §6.10.14οὐ μὴν διὰ λόγου, διὰ δὲ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων, ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀεὶ τῆς ἐν ταῖς περιπετείαις ἐπιγνώσεως αἱρούμενοι τὸ βέλτιον, οὕτως ἦλθον ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ μὲν Λυκούργῳ τέλος, κάλλιστον δὲ σύστημα τῶν καθʼ ἡμᾶς πολιτειῶν. [ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 60 εχξ. αντ. π. 174. ]
But now we shall make a brief mention of the legislation of Lycurgus; for the discussion is not foreign to our purpose. For that man, having perceived that each of the aforementioned things is accomplished by necessity and according to nature, and having reasoned that every simple form of constitution, established according to a single power, becomes precarious because it quickly turns into its own inherent and naturally accompanying vice; for just as rust is an inherent bane to iron, and wood-worms and ship-worms to wood, by which, even if they escape all external damage, they are destroyed by these inborn evils, in the same way, a certain vice is naturally born with and accompanies each of the constitutions: with kingship, the so-called monarchical way; with aristocracy, that of oligarchy; and with democracy, the brutal and rule-of-force way, into which it is impossible that all the aforementioned constitutions should not, in course of time, undergo their transitions according to the recent argument. Having foreseen these things, Lycurgus did not establish a simple or uniform constitution, but gathered together all the virtues and characteristics of the best constitutions, so that no part, by growing beyond what is proper, should turn into its inherent vices, but the power of each being pulled back by the others, none of them should incline or sink too far in any direction, but the constitution, being balanced and counterpoised, should always remain for a long time according to the principle of sailing against the wind, the kingship being prevented from arrogance through fear of the people, a sufficient share in the constitution having been given also to the latter, and the people, on the other hand, not daring to treat the kings with contempt through fear of the elders, who, having been selected by merit, were all always bound to side with justice, so that the share of the weaker side, by abiding by the customs, should always become greater and heavier by the inclination and weight of the elders. Therefore, by establishing it in this way, he preserved freedom for the Lacedaemonians for the longest time of any of whom we know. He, then, having foreseen by some reason whence and how each thing is naturally produced, established the aforementioned constitution without harm; but the Romans have achieved the same end in the establishment of their own country's system, not indeed through reason, but through many struggles and troubles, always choosing the better course from the knowledge gained in actual reverses, they thus arrived at the same end as Lycurgus, and at the best system of constitutions in our time. [ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 60 εχξ. αντ. π. 174.]