§3.107.1τὸν μὲν οὖν χειμῶνα καὶ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν διέμειναν ἀντιστρατοπεδεύοντες ἀλλήλοις·
Thus they remained during the winter and the spring season encamped opposite to each other.
ἤδη δὲ παραδιδόντος τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐπετείων καρπῶν χορηγίαν, ἐκίνει τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον χάρακος Ἀννίβας.
But when the season was already offering the supply from the yearly crops, Hannibal moved his army from the camp near Gerunium.
§3.107.2κρίνων δὲ συμφέρειν τὸ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναγκάσαι μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, καταλαμβάνει τὴν τῆς Κάννης προσαγορευομένης πόλεως ἄκραν.
Judging that it was advantageous to force the enemy to fight by every means, he seized the citadel of the city called Cannae.
§3.107.3εἰς γὰρ ταύτην συνέβαινε τόν τε σῖτον καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χορηγίας ἁθροίζεσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐκ τῶν περὶ Κανύσιον τόπων· ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον παρακομίζεσθαι.
For into this city, it happened that the corn and other provisions were gathered for the Romans from the districts around Canusium, and from it they were constantly conveyed to the camp as need arose.
§3.107.4τὴν μὲν οὖν πόλιν ἔτι πρότερον συνέβαινε κατεσκάφθαι, τῆς παρασκευῆς δὲ καὶ τῆς ἄκρας τότε καταληφθείσης, οὐ μικρὰν συνέπεσε ταραχὴν γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις· §3.107.5οὐ γὰρ μόνον διὰ τὰς χορηγίας ἐδυσχρηστοῦντʼ ἐπὶ τῷ κατειλῆφθαι τὸν προειρημένον τόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πέριξ εὐφυῶς κεῖσθαι χώραν.
Now the city itself had already been destroyed before this, but when the provisions and the citadel were captured at this time, no small confusion arose among the Roman forces; for they were distressed by the capture of the aforementioned place not only because of the provisions, but also because it was advantageously situated with respect to the surrounding country.
§3.107.6πέμποντες οὖν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην συνεχῶς ἐπυνθάνοντο τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐὰν ἐγγίσωσι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐ δυνησόμενοι φυγομαχεῖν, τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων πάντων μετεώρων ὄντων ταῖς διανοίαις,
Sending therefore constantly to Rome, they kept inquiring what they ought to do, since, if they approached the enemy, they would not be able to avoid a battle, while the countryside was being laid waste and the minds of all the allies were in suspense.
§3.107.7οἱ δʼ ἐβουλεύσαντο μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις.
But they resolved to fight and engage the enemy.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἐπισχεῖν ἔτι διεσάφησαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἐξαπέστελλον.
They sent instructions to Gnaeus and his colleague to hold on still, and they themselves dispatched the consuls.
§3.107.8συνέβαινε δὲ πάντας εἰς τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπερείδεσθαι τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας διά τε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ βίου καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ μικροῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ἀνδρωδῶς ἅμα καὶ συμφερόντως δοκεῖν κεχειρικέναι τὸν πρὸς Ἰλλυριοὺς πόλεμον.
Now it happened that everyone looked to Aemilius and placed their chief hopes in him, both because of the noble character of his past life and because he was believed to have conducted the war against the Illyrians, only a short time before, in a courageous as well as advantageous manner.
§3.107.9προέθεντο δὲ στρατοπέδοις ὀκτὼ διακινδυνεύειν, ὃ πρότερον οὐδέποτʼ ἐγεγόνει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἑκάστου τῶν στρατοπέδων ἔχοντος ἄνδρας εἰς πεντακισχιλίους χωρὶς τῶν συμμάχων.
And they purposed to risk the battle with eight legions, a thing which had never happened before among the Romans, each of the legions having about five thousand men, exclusive of the allies.
§3.107.10Ῥωμαῖοι γάρ, καθά που καὶ πρότερον εἰρήκαμεν, ἀεί ποτε τέτταρα στρατόπεδα προχειρίζονται.
For the Romans, as we have said somewhere before, always mobilize four legions.
τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον πεζοὺς μὲν λαμβάνει περὶ τετρακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους.
Each legion takes about four thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry.
§3.107.11ἐπὰν δέ τις ὁλοσχερεστέρα προφαίνηται χρεία, τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐν ἑκάστῳ στρατοπέδῳ ποιοῦσι περὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς τριακοσίους.
But whenever some more serious need appears, they make the infantry in each legion about five thousand, and the cavalry three hundred.
§3.107.12τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὸ μὲν τῶν πεζῶν πλῆθος πάρισον ποιοῦσι τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ὡς ἐπίπαν τριπλάσιον.
Of the allies, they make the number of infantry equal to the Roman legions, but that of the cavalry generally three times as many.
§3.107.13τούτων δὲ τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ δύο στρατόπεδα δόντες ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐξαποστέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις.
Giving half of these allies and two legions to each of the two consuls, they dispatch them for active operations.
§3.107.14καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀγῶνας διʼ ἑνὸς ὑπάτου καὶ δύο στρατοπέδων καὶ τοῦ προειρημένου πλήθους τῶν συμμάχων κρίνουσι, σπανίως δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς ἕνα καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς ἕνα χρῶνται κίνδυνον.
And they decide most of their campaigns by means of one consul and two legions, along with the aforementioned number of allies, and they rarely use all of them at one time and for a single hazard.
§3.107.15τότε γε μὴν οὕτως ἐκπλαγεῖς ἦσαν καὶ κατάφοβοι τὸ μέλλον ὡς οὐ μόνον τέτταρσιν, ἀλλʼ ὀκτὼ στρατοπέδοις Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ὁμοῦ προῄρηντο διακινδυνεύειν.
At that time, however, they were so panic-stricken and terrified of the future that they resolved to risk the battle with not only four, but eight Roman legions together.