§18.31.1τίς οὖν αἰτία τοῦ νικᾶν Ῥωμαίους καὶ τί τὸ σφάλλον ἐστὶ τοὺς ταῖς φάλαγξι χρωμένους;
What then is the reason for the Romans conquering, and what is the cause of failure for those who use the phalanx?
§18.31.2ὅτι συμβαίνει τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἀορίστους ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τοὺς τόπους τοὺς πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τῆς δὲ φάλαγγος ἕνα καιρὸν εἶναι καὶ τόπων ἓν γένος, ἐν οἷς δύναται τὴν αὑτῆς χρείαν ἐπιτελεῖν.
It is because it happens that war has indefinite times and places for its needs, whereas for the phalanx there is but one time and one kind of place in which it can perform its proper service.
§18.31.3εἰ μὲν οὖν τις ἦν ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἀντιπάλοις εἰς τοὺς τῆς φάλαγγος καιροὺς καὶ τόπους συγκαταβαίνειν, ὅτε μέλλοιεν κρίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων, εἰκὸς ἦν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ἀεὶ φέρεσθαι τὸ πρωτεῖον τοὺς ταῖς φάλαγξι χρωμένους·
If, then, there were some necessity for opponents to descend to the times and places of the phalanx when they are about to decide the whole issue, it would be natural, according to our recent argument, that those who use the phalanx should always carry off the victory.
§18.31.4εἰ δὲ δυνατὸν ἐκκλίνειν καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν ῥᾳδίως, πῶς ἂν ἔτι φοβερὸν εἴη τὸ προειρημένον σύνταγμα;
But if it is possible to avoid this, and to do so easily, how can the aforementioned formation still be formidable?
§18.31.5καὶ μὴν ὅτι χρείαν ἔχει τόπων ἐπιπέδων καὶ ψιλῶν ἡ φάλαγξ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἐχόντων, λέγω δʼ οἷον τάφρους, ἐκρήγματα, συναγκείας, ὀφρῦς, ῥεῖθρα ποταμῶν, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι.
Moreover, it is universally admitted that the phalanx requires level and bare ground, and furthermore, ground that has no obstacles, by which I mean such things as ditches, gullies, ravines, ridges, and river beds.
§18.31.6πάντα γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα παραποδίζειν καὶ λύειν τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν ἱκανὰ γίνεται.
For all the aforementioned obstacles are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation.
§18.31.7διότι δʼ εὑρεῖν τόπους ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ σταδίους εἴκοσι, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλείους, ἐν οἷς μηδέν τι τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει, σχεδόν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τελέως σπάνιον, καὶ τοῦτο πᾶς ἄν τις ὁμολογήσειεν.
And that to find ground extending sometimes for twenty stades, sometimes even more, where nothing of this sort exists, is, so to speak, almost impossible, or at least extremely rare, everyone would also agree.
§18.31.8οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔστω τόπους εὑρῆσθαι τοιούτους.
However, let it be that such places can be found.
ἐὰν οὖν οἱ [μὲν] πολεμοῦντες εἰς μὲν τούτους μὴ συγκαταβαίνωσι, περιπορευόμενοι δὲ πορθῶσι τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν τῶν συμμάχων, τί τῆς τοιαύτης ὄφελος ἔσται συντάξεως;
If, then, the enemy do not descend into them, but go round and ravage the cities and territory of the allies, what will be the use of such a formation?
§18.31.9μένουσα μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις αὑτῇ τόποις οὐχ οἷον ὠφελεῖν δύναιτʼ ἂν τοὺς φίλους, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἑαυτὴν σῴζειν.
For by remaining in the places suitable to itself, it would not only be unable to assist its friends, but could not even save itself.
§18.31.10αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων παρακομιδαὶ κωλυθήσονται ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ὅταν ἀκονιτὶ κρατῶσι τῶν ὑπαίθρων·
For the transport of provisions will be easily prevented by the enemy, when they hold undisputed command of the open country.
§18.31.11ἐὰν δʼ ἀπολιποῦσα τοὺς οἰκείους τόπους βούληταί τι πράττειν, εὐχείρωτος ἔσται τοῖς πολεμίοις.
And if, leaving its proper ground, it wishes to undertake any action, it will be easy prey for the enemy.
§18.31.12οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰς τοὺς ἐπιπέδους συγκαταβάς τις τόπους μὴ πᾶν ἅμα τὸ σφέτερον στρατόπεδον ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν τῆς φάλαγγος καὶ τὸν ἕνα καιρὸν ὑποβάλῃ, βραχέα δὲ φυγομαχήσῃ κατʼ αὐτὸν τὸν τοῦ κινδύνου καιρόν, εὐθεώρητον γίνεται τὸ συμβησόμενον ἐξ ὧν
Furthermore, even if one descends to the level ground, but does not expose one's whole army at once to the charge of the phalanx and to its single favorable moment, but instead avoids battle slightly at the very moment of danger, what will happen becomes easy to see from the following considerations.