§12.25i.1ὅτι δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἱκανὸν ὑπόδειγμα πρὸς πίστιν ὁ ποιητής, παρʼ ᾧ πολὺ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐμφάσεως ἴδοι τις ἂν ὑπάρχον.
And that what is said is not impossible, the poet is a sufficient example for belief, in whose work one would see much of such vividness existing.
§12.25i.2ἐξ ὧν πᾶς ἂν εἰκότως συγκατάθοιτο τρίτον εἶναι μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ τρίτην ἔχειν τάξιν τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων πολυπραγμοσύνην.
From which everyone would reasonably agree that the inquiry from records is the third part of history and holds the third rank.
§12.25i.3ὡς δʼ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ νυνὶ λεγόμενον καὶ ἐκφανέστατον γένοιτʼ ἂν ἐπί τε τῶν συμβουλευτικῶν καὶ παρακλητικῶν, ἔτι δὲ πρεσβευτικῶν λόγων, οἷς κέχρηται Τίμαιος.
And how true what is now said is, would become most manifest in the deliberative, hortatory, and indeed embassy speeches which Timaeus employs.
§12.25i.4ὀλίγοι μὲν γὰρ καιροὶ πάντας ἐπιδέχονται διαθέσθαι τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι βραχεῖς [καί] τινας τῶν ὑπόντων, καὶ τούτων τινὰς μὲν οἱ νῦν, ἄλλους δʼ οἱ προγεγονότες, καὶ τινὰς μὲν Αἰτωλοὶ προσίενται, τινὰς δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, τινὰς δʼ Ἀθηναῖοι.
For few occasions admit of treating all the arguments that are present, but most admit only of some brief ones among those underlying, and of these, some are accepted by the men of today, others by those of former times, and some indeed the Aetolians accept, others the Peloponnesians, and others the Athenians.
§12.25i.5καὶ τὸ μὲν ματαίως καὶ ἀκαίρως [καὶ] πρὸς πάντα πάντας διεξιέναι τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους, ὃ ποιεῖ Τίμαιος πρὸς πᾶσαν ὑπόθεσιν εὑρεσιλογῶν, τελέως ἀνάληθες καὶ μειρακιῶδες καὶ διατριβικόν — ἅμα καὶ πολλοῖς ἀποτυχίας αἴτιον ἤδη τοῦτο γέγονε καὶ καταφρονήσεως — τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἁρμόζοντας καὶ καιρίους ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν, τοῦτʼ ἀναγκαῖον.
And to go through all the possible arguments on all occasions, uselessly and out of season—which Timaeus does by inventing arguments for every subject—is completely untrue, childish, and pedantic (belonging to the schoolroom)—and this has already been the cause of failure and contempt for many—whereas to always choose the appropriate and timely ones, this is necessary.
§12.25i.6ἀστάτου δὲ τῆς χρείας οὔσης καὶ πόσοις καὶ ποίοις τῶν ἐνόντων χρηστέον, ἀλλοιοτέρου τινὸς δεῖ ζήλου καὶ παραγγέλματος, εἰ μέλλομεν μὴ βλάπτειν, ἀλλʼ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας.
But since the need is unstable, and it is uncertain how many and what kind of the available arguments must be used, some different kind of effort and instruction is needed, if we intend not to harm but to benefit our readers.
§12.25i.7ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὁ καιρὸς ἐν πᾶσι δυσπαράγγελτος, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατος εἰς ὑπόνοιαν ἀχθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοπαθείας καὶ τριβῆς θεωρημάτων· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος μάλιστʼ ἂν ὑπονοηθείη τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τούτων.
Now, the proper season is indeed difficult to prescribe in all things, but it is not impossible to be brought to apprehension through principles derived from personal experience and training; and at present, what is said would be best understood from the following.
§12.25i.8εἰ γὰρ οἱ συγγραφεῖς ὑποδείξαντες τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν βουλευομένων, κἄπειτα τοὺς κατʼ ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντας λόγους ἐκθέντες διασαφήσαιεν ἡμῖν τὰς αἰτίας, διʼ ἃς ἢ κατευστοχῆσαι συνέβη τοὺς εἰπόντας ἢ διαπεσεῖν, γένοιτʼ ἄν τις ἔννοια τοῦ πράγματος ἀληθινή, καὶ δυναίμεθʼ ἂν ἅμα μὲν διακρίνοντες, ἅμα δὲ μεταφέροντες ἐπὶ τὰ παραπλήσια κατευστοχεῖν ἀεὶ τῶν προκειμένων.
For if historians, having shown the occasions, the impulses, and the dispositions of those deliberating, and then having set forth the speeches actually delivered, should make clear to us the causes for which it happened that the speakers either succeeded or failed, some true understanding of the matter would arise, and we would be able, partly by distinguishing and partly by transferring to similar cases, to always hit the mark in the matters before us.
§12.25i.9ἀλλʼ ἔστιν, οἶμαι, τὸ μὲν αἰτιολογεῖν δυσχερές, τὸ δὲ ῥησικοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς βυβλίοις ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀλίγα καιρίως εἰπεῖν καὶ τούτου παραγγελίαν εὑρεῖν ὀλίγοις ἐφικτόν, τὸ δὲ πολλὰ διαθέσθαι καὶ ματαίως τῶν ἐν μέσῳ κειμένων καὶ κοινόν.
But it is, I think, difficult to assign causes, but easy to babble in books; and to say a few things in a timely manner and to find instruction for this is attainable by few, whereas to set forth many things uselessly is common and within reach of anyone.