§12.12.1καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κανόνων, κἂν ἐλάττων ᾖ τῷ μήκει κἂν τῷ πλάτει ταπεινότερος, μετέχῃ δὲ τῆς τοῦ κανόνος ἰδιότητος, κανόνα φησὶ δεῖν προσαγορεύειν ὅμως, ὅταν δὲ τῆς εὐθείας καὶ τῆς πρὸς ταύτην οἰκειότητος ἐκπέσῃ, πάντα μᾶλλον δεῖν ἢ κανόνα καλεῖν, §12.12.2τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ὅσα μὲν ἂν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ κατὰ τὸν χειρισμὸν ἢ κατʼ ἄλλο τι διαμαρτάνηται τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, ἀντέχηται δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας, προσίεσθαί φησι τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ὄνομα τὰς βύβλους, ὅταν δὲ ταύτης παραπέσῃ, μηκέτι καλεῖσθαι δεῖν ἱστορίαν.
For just as in the case of rulers, even if one be shorter in length or lower in breadth, yet shares the character of a ruler, he says we must still call it a ruler; but when it falls away from straightness and its affinity to this, we must call it anything rather than a ruler, in the same manner also, of writings, as many as fail in their individual parts either in style or in treatment or in some other point, yet hold fast to truth, he says the books admit the name of history, but when they fall away from this, they must no longer be called history.
§12.12.3ἐγὼ δὲ διότι μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων συγγραμμάτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁμολογῶ, καὶ κατὰ τὴν πραγματείαν αὐτός που κέχρημαι λέγων οὕτως, ὅτι, καθάπερ ἐμψύχου σώματος τῶν ὄψεων ἐξαιρεθεισῶν ἀχρειοῦται τὸ ὅλον, οὕτως ἐξ ἱστορίας ἐὰν ἄρῃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀνωφελὲς γίνεται διήγημα.
And for my part, I agree that one must regard truth as the leading element in such writings, and in my treatise I myself have elsewhere made use of this saying, that just as when the eyes are removed from a living body the whole becomes useless, so if you take away truth from history, what is left of it becomes a useless narrative.
—
δύο μέντοι τρόπους ἔφαμεν εἶναι ψεύδους, §12.12.4ἕνα μὲν τὸν κατʼ ἄγνοιαν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, §12.12.5καὶ τούτων δεῖν τοῖς μὲν κατʼ ἄγνοιαν παραπαίουσι τῆς ἀληθείας διδόναι συγγνώμην, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀκαταλλάκτως ἔχειν.
We said, however, that there are two kinds of falsehood, one indeed through ignorance, and the other through deliberate choice, and of these, we must grant pardon to those who stray from the truth through ignorance, but we must be implacable towards those who do so through deliberate choice.
—
τούτων δʼ ἡμῖν ὁμολογουμένων, §12.12.6αὐτοῦ τούτου τοῦ ψεύδους μεγάλην ὑπολαμβάνω διαφορὰν εἶναι τοῦ κατʼ ἄγνοιαν γινομένου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιδέχεσθαι συγγνώμην καὶ διόρθωσιν εὐμενικήν, τὸ δʼ ἀπαραιτήτου δικαίως ἂν τυγχάνειν κατηγορίας· §12.12.7ᾧ γένει μάλιστʼ ἂν εὕροι τις ἔνοχον αὐτὸν ὄντα τὸν Τίμαιον· διότι δʼ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος σκοπεῖν ἤδη πάρεστιν. —
These points being agreed upon by us, I assume that there is a great difference in this falsehood itself between that which arises through ignorance and that through deliberate choice, and that whereas the one admits of pardon and kindly correction, the other would justly meet with relentless accusation; with which latter kind one would find Timaeus himself to be especially chargeable; and why he is of such a character, it is now possible to observe.