§11.16.1ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην ἅμα τῷ παραπεσεῖν κατὰ τῶν ὑπεναντίων τὸν ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ἑωραμένον ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καιρόν, τότε πᾶσιν ἐπάγειν τοῖς φαλαγγίταις καταβαλοῦσι τὰς σαρίσας παρήγγειλε.
But Philopoemen, as soon as the opportunity which he had long foreseen presented itself against the enemy, then ordered all the phalanx-soldiers, lowering their sarissas, to charge.
§11.16.2τῶν δʼ Ἀχαιῶν ὁμοθυμαδὸν καὶ μετὰ καταπληκτικῆς κραυγῆς ποιησαμένων τὴν ἔφοδον, οἱ μὲν προδιαλελυκότες τὰς τάξεις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῇ τῆς τάφρου καταβάσει πάλιν ἀναβαίνοντες πρὸς ὑπερδεξίους τοὺς πολεμίους ἀποδειλιάσαντες ἐτρέποντο·
When the Achaeans made their charge with one accord and with a terrifying shout, those of the Lacedaemonians whose ranks had already been broken in the descent of the trench, as they climbed up again, lost courage and turned to flight before the enemy who held the commanding position.
§11.16.3τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλῆθος ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τάφρῳ διεφθείρετο, τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, τὸ δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων.
But the great mass was destroyed in the trench itself, partly by the Achaeans and partly by their own men.
§11.16.4συνέβαινε δὲ τὸ προειρημένον οὐκ αὐτομάτως οὐδʼ ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν τοῦ προεστῶτος, ὃς εὐθέως προεβάλετο τὴν τάφρον.
And this aforesaid result did not happen by chance nor by accident, but through the sagacity of the leader, who had straightway made use of the trench as a defense.
§11.16.5ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην οὐ φυγομαχῶν, ὥς τινες ὑπελάμβανον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἀκριβῶς καὶ στρατηγικῶς ἕκαστα συλλογισάμενος, ὅτι παραγενόμενος ὁ Μαχανίδας, εἰ μὲν προσάξει τὴν δύναμιν οὐ προϊδόμενος τὴν τάφρον, οὕτω συμβήσεται παθεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν φάλαγγα τὸ προειρημένον νῦν, γινόμενον δὲ τότʼ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· §11.16.6εἰ δὲ συλλογισάμενος τὴν δυσχρηστίαν τῆς τάφρου, κἄπειτα μεταμεληθεὶς καὶ δόξας ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἐκ παρατεταγμένων ἀπολύσει καὶ μακρὰν αὑτὸν ἐν πορείᾳ διδόναι μέλλει, διότι χωρὶς ὁλοσχεροῦς ἀγῶνος αὐτῷ μὲν τὸ νικᾶν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ τἀναντία περιέσται.
But Philopoemen, not because he was avoiding a battle, as some supposed, but having calculated everything very accurately and strategically, [foresaw] that, when Machanidas arrived, if on the one hand he should lead his force without having foreseen the trench, it would happen that his phalanx would suffer what has just been described—which would then indeed actually take place in reality; and if on the other hand, having calculated the difficulty of the trench, and then changing his mind and fearing to appear cowardly, he should break up his battle formation and commit himself to a long march, then without a general engagement, victory would remain with himself, and the opposite with the enemy.
πολλοῖς γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν, §11.16.7οἵτινες παραταξάμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἀξιόχρεως δὲ νομίσαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τινὲς μὲν διὰ τόπους, §11.16.8οἱ δὲ διὰ πλῆθος, οἱ δὲ διʼ ἄλλας αἰτίας, μακρὰν ἑαυτοὺς δόντες ἐν πορείᾳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν διʼ αὐτῶν τῶν οὐραγούντων ἤλπισαν οἱ μὲν προτερήσειν, οἱ δʼ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπολυθήσεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων.
For this has already happened to many, who, having drawn up their forces, but not thinking themselves capable of contending with their opponents, some on account of the terrain, others on account of numbers, and others for other reasons, having committed themselves to a long march, hoped during the retreat, by means of their rearguard alone, some to get the upper hand, and others to escape safely from the enemy.
§11.16.9ἐν οἷς δὴ καὶ μέγιστα συμβαίνει τοὺς ἡγουμένους
In which situations indeed, it happens that the leaders [suffer] the greatest [errors]...