§1.61.1ρον κατέστησε τοῖς πολεμίοις τὸν στόλον.
...prow to prow, he drew up his fleet against the enemy.
οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τὸν διάπλουν αὐτῶν προκατέχοντας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, καθελόμενοι τοὺς ἱστοὺς καὶ παρακαλέσαντες κατὰ ναῦν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς συνέβαλλον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.
The Carthaginians, seeing that the Romans had already occupied their crossing, lowered their masts and, after encouraging one another ship by ship, engaged the enemy.
§1.61.2τῆς δʼ ἑκατέρων παρασκευῆς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐχούσης διάθεσιν τῇ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα γενομένῃ ναυμαχίᾳ, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκατέροις τῆς μάχης εἰκότως ἐναντίον ἀπέβη.
As the preparation on both sides was in a state contrary to that of the naval battle at Drepana, the result of the battle also naturally turned out the opposite for each of them.
§1.61.3Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν γὰρ τήν τε ναυπηγίαν μετειλήφεσαν καὶ τὰ βάρη πάντα χωρὶς τῶν πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπιτηδείων ἐξετέθειντο· τά τε πληρώματα συγκεκροτημένα διαφέρουσαν αὐτοῖς τὴν χρείαν παρείχετο, τούς τʼ ἐπιβάτας κατʼ ἐκλογὴν ἄνδρας ἀπαραχωρήτους ἐκ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων εἶχον.
For the Romans had improved their shipbuilding and had cleared their ships of all heavy cargo except what was necessary for the naval battle; and their well-drilled crews rendered them excellent service, while they had as marines selected men from the land forces who would not yield.
§1.61.4περὶ δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τἀναντία τούτοις ὑπῆρχεν.
But with the Carthaginians the case was the exact reverse.
αἱ μὲν γὰρ νῆες γέμουσαι δυσχρήστως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, τὰ δὲ πληρώματα τελέως ἦν ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καιρὸν ἐμβεβλημένα, τὰ δʼ ἐπιβατικὰ νεοσύλλογα καὶ πρωτόπειρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ παντὸς δεινοῦ.
For their ships, being heavily laden, were in a state unmanageable for danger, and their crews were completely untrained and put on board for the occasion, and their marines were newly levied and inexperienced in every hardship and danger.
§1.61.5διὰ γὰρ τὸ μηδέποτʼ ἂν ἔτι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐλπίσαι τῆς θαλάττης ἀντιποιήσασθαι καταφρονήσαντες ὠλιγώρουν τῶν ναυτικῶν δυνάμεων.
For, because they never expected that the Romans would again lay claim to the sea, they had held them in contempt and neglected their naval forces.
§1.61.6τοιγαροῦν ἅμα τῷ συμβαλεῖν κατὰ πολλὰ μέρη τῆς μάχης ἐλαττούμενοι ταχέως ἐλείφθησαν, καὶ πεντήκοντα μὲν αὐτῶν ναῦς κατέδυσαν, ἑβδομήκοντα δʼ ἑάλωσαν αὔτανδροι·
Consequently, as soon as they engaged, they were worsted in many parts of the battle and were quickly defeated; fifty of their ships were sunk, and seventy were captured with their crews.
§1.61.7τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος ἐπαράμενον τοὺς ἱστοὺς καὶ κατουρῶσαν αὖθις ἀπεχώρει πρὸς τὴν Ἱερὰν νῆσον, εὐτυχῶς καὶ παραδόξως ἐκ μεταβολῆς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργήσαντος.
The remaining multitude of ships, raising their masts and running before the wind, retreated again to the island of Hiera, the wind luckily and unexpectedly changing and cooperating with them at the critical moment.
§1.61.8ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἀποπλεύσας πρὸς τὸ Λιλύβαιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλοίων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οἰκονομίαν ἐγίνετο, μεγάλην οὖσαν· οὐ γὰρ πολὺ τῶν μυρίων ἔλειπε σωμάτων τὰ ληφθέντα ζωγρίᾳ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον.
The Roman commander, sailing back to Lilybaeum and the legions, occupied himself with the disposal of the captured ships and prisoners, which was a great business; for the numbers taken alive in the action fell not far short of ten thousand.