§139Ι Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. (ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένων, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς. )
ΙΙ Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς·
I A blessed and indestructible being has no troubles itself and brings no trouble upon any other being, so it is free from anger and partiality, for all such things imply weakness. (In other writings he says that the gods are graspable by reason, some existing individually, others in virtue of the similarity of the form arising from the continuous influx of similar images directed to the same spot, being anthropomorphic.) II Death is nothing to us.
τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ’ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
For all that has been dissolved is without sensation, and that which is without sensation is nothing to us.
ΙΙΙ Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις.
III The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful.
ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.
Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both together.
§140ΙV Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμμένει.
IV Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is present for the shortest time, and that which merely exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not persist for many days.
αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.
Long-lasting illnesses offer a surplus of pleasure in the flesh rather than pain.
V Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως 〈οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως〉 ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως.
V It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and honorably and justly, 〈and impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly〉 without living pleasantly.
ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, [οὐ ζῇ φρονίμως. καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὑπάρχει] οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν.
And whoever lacks this, [cannot live wisely, honorably and justly, and] cannot live pleasantly.
VΙ Ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τ’ ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.
VI In order to obtain security from other men, any power and royalty was a natural good, from which one was able to procure this for himself.
§141VΙΙ Ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι.
VII Some wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win security from other men.
ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλής, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν.
If, then, the life of such men is secure, they have attained the natural good; but if it is not secure, they do not possess that for which they originally strived according to the affinity of nature.
VΙΙΙ Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν.
VIII No pleasure is in itself bad, but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.
§142ΙX Εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονή, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί.
IX If every pleasure were condensed, and were present both in duration and about the whole organism or the most principal parts of nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.
X Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐθαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν.
X If the things which produce the pleasures of profligate men dissolved the fears of the mind concerning celestial phenomena and death and pain, and moreover taught the limit of desires, we should never have anything to blame them for, since they would be filled with pleasures from every source and have no pain from any quarter.
XIΕἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι, ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας.
XI If our suspicions about celestial phenomena and those about death did not trouble us at all, as though they were nothing to us, and if we did not fail to understand the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural philosophy.
§143XΙΙ Οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων 143 μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ’ ὑποπτεύοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους.
XII It was impossible to dissolve fear about the most principal matters 143 without knowing what the nature of the universe is, but rather suspecting something from the myths.
ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν.
Hence, without natural philosophy it was not possible to receive pleasures unalloyed.
XΙΙΙ Οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.
XIII There was no advantage in procuring security from men when things above were suspected, and things beneath the earth, and in general those in the boundless universe.
XΙV Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστέρα γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.
XIV Although security from men is obtained up to a certain point by a power of expelling others and by abundance, the security that comes from quietness and withdrawal from the crowd is more unalloyed.