§74δῆλον οὖν ὡς καὶ * * (〈καὶ ἐν τῇ.
Therefore, it is clear that the worlds are also destructible * * (〈and in Book...
. Περὶ φύσεως〉 φθαρτούς φησι τοὺς κόσμους, μεταβαλλόντων τῶν μερῶν. καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, τὴν γῆν τῷ ἀέρι ἐποχεῖσθαι.
'On Nature'〉 he says that the worlds are destructible, since their parts change; and in other places, that the earth rides upon the air).
) Ἔτι δὲ τοὺς κόσμους οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ νομίζειν ἕνα σχηματισμὸν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ * * (καὶ διαφόρους αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ ῑβ̄ Περὶ φύσεως φησιν· οὓς μὲν γὰρ σφαιροειδεῖς, καὶ ᾠοειδεῖς ἄλλους, καὶ ἀλλοιοσχήμονας ἑτέρους· οὐ μέντοι πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχειν. οὐδὲ ζῷα εἶναι ἀποκριθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου.
Furthermore, we must not believe that the worlds of necessity have one and the same shape, but rather * * (and he says they are diverse in Book 12 of 'On Nature'; for some are spherical, others egg-shaped, and others of different shapes; however, they do not have every shape; nor are they living creatures separated off from the infinite) * *.
) * * οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἀποδείξειεν οὐδείς, ὡς 〈ἐν〉 μὲν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐμπεριελήφθη τὰ τοιαῦτα σπέρματα, ἐξ ὧν ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα 〈τὰ〉 θεωρούμενα συνίσταται, ἐν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνήθη. (ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐντραφῆναι.
For no one could prove that in such a world indeed those seeds, from which animals and plants and all the other things observed are constituted, could not have been included, while in such another world they could not have been. (And likewise also for their being nourished).
) τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς νομιστέον * * §75Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι, τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν ἐν μέν τισι θᾶττον, ἐν δέ τισι βραδύτερον καὶ ἐν μέν τισι περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις [ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου] 〈κατὰ μείζους ἐπιδόσεις〉, ἐν δέ τισι κατ’ ἐλάττους.
And in the same way we must think also regarding the earth * * Moreover, we must suppose that nature also was taught and constrained to do many and various things by the very circumstances, and that reason later refined and further discovered what was handed over by nature, in some cases more quickly, in others more slowly, and in some periods and times 〈with greater advances〉, and in others with smaller ones.
Ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ’ ἑκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων, ὡς ἄν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν διαφορὰ ᾖ· §76ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἧττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας· τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ συνορώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς συνειδότας παρεγγυῆσαί τινας φθόγγους τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἑλομένους κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν οὕτως ἑρμηνεῦσαι.
Hence also names did not come into being originally by convention, but the very natures of men, undergoing particular feelings and receiving particular images according to each nation, uniquely expelled the air shaped by each of the feelings and images, in accordance with the differences of the locations of the nations; and later, by common consent in each nation, the particular names were established so that their meanings might become less ambiguous to one another and more briefly expressed; and those who were aware of certain things that were not visible introduced them, presenting certain sounds which they were compelled to utter, and others, selecting them by reason, interpreted them in this way in accordance with the most prevalent cause.
Καὶ μὴν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φορὰν καὶ τροπὴν καὶ ἔκλειψιν καὶ ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτοις μήτε λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ διατάττοντος ἢ διατάξοντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας §77— οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἀσθενεία καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίνεται —, μήτε αὖ πῦρ ἅμα ὄντα συνεστραμμένον τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας λαμβάνειν· ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ σέμνωμα τηρεῖν κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενα ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννοίας, ἐὰν μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον ἐξ αὐτῶν τῷ σεμνώματι δόξῃ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει.
Furthermore, we must not believe that the motion, turning, eclipse, rising, and setting of the heavenly bodies, and things coordinate with these, take place because some being is administering and arranging them, or will arrange them, while at the same time possessing all happiness together with incorruptibility— —for occupations, anxieties, angers, and favors do not agree with happiness, but these arise in weakness, fear, and dependence on neighbors—nor again must we believe that they, being collected fire, have acquired happiness and assume these motions by their own will; but we must preserve all dignity in all names applied to such conceptions, so that nothing contrary to dignity may seem to arise from them; otherwise, this very contradiction will produce the greatest disturbance in souls.
ὅθεν δὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναπολήψεις τῶν συστροφῶν τούτων ἐν τῇ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσει δεῖ δοξάζειν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην ταύτην καὶ περίοδον συντελεῖσθαι.
Therefore, we must believe that this necessity and period are accomplished in accordance with the original entrapments of these aggregations at the generation of the world.
§78Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τῇ περὶ μετεώρων γνώσει ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναι καὶ ἐν τῷ τίνες φύσεις αἱ θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτί, καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοῦτο ἀκρίβειαν· ἔτι τε οὐ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μηθέν.
Moreover, we must believe that to refine the cause of the most important things is the task of natural philosophy, and that happiness in the knowledge of heavenly phenomena depends on this: namely, what natures are observed in these heavenly phenomena, and whatever is akin to precision in this respect; and furthermore, that in such matters there is no place for multiple explanations or for the possibility of things being otherwise, but simply that there is nothing in an incorruptible and happy nature which suggests doubt or any disturbance.
καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἶναι·
And it is possible to grasp this with the mind, that it is simply so.