§0"τεῖδ’ ἔνεστι πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα, τοῖς χρήσαιό κα πστὶ φίλον, ποτ’ ἐχθρόν, ἐν δίκαι λέγων, ἐν ἁλίαι, ποτὶ πονηρόν, ποτὶ καλόν τε κἀγαθόν, ποτὶ ξένον, πστὶ δύσηριν, ποτὶ πάροινον, ποτὶ βάναυσον, εἴτε τις ἄλλ’ ἔχει κακόν τι.
"Herein are many and various things, which you might use towards a friend, towards an enemy, speaking in court, in the assembly, against a rascal, against a gentleman, towards a guest, against a quarrelsome person, against a drunkard, against a vulgar artisan, or if anyone has any other bad trait.
καὶ τούτοισι κέντρα τεῖδ’ ἐνό, ἐν δὲ καὶ γνῶμαι σοφαὶ τεῖδ(ε), αἷσιν εἰ πίθοιτό τις, δεξιώτερός τέ κ’ εἴη βελτίων τ’ ἐς πάντ’ ἀνήρ.
And in these there are stings here, and herein are also wise maxims, obeying which a man would be more clever and better in everything.
κοὔ τι πολλὰ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἓμ μόνον, τοῦτ’ ὦν ἔπος ποτὸ πρᾶγμα ποτιφέροντα τῶνδ’ ἀεὶ τὸ συμφέρσν.
And there is no need to speak many words, but only one; applying this word to the matter, always bringing that which is useful from these.
αἰτίαν γὰρ ἦχον, ὡς ἄλλως μὲν εἴην δεξιός, μακρολόγος δ’ οὔ κα δυναίμαν ἐμ βραχεῖ γνώμας λέγειν.
For I had the accusation that, though I was clever in other ways, I was long-winded and could not express maxims in brief.
ταῦτα δὴ γῶν εἰσακούσας συντίθημι τὰν τέχναν τάνδ’ ὅπως εἴπηι τι〈ς〉. Ἐπῖχαρμος σοφός τις ἐγένετο, 〈πόλλ’ ὃς εἶ〉π’ ἀστεῖα καὶ παντοῖα καθ’ ἓν 〈ἔπος〉 λέγων, 〈πεῖραν〉 αὐταυτοῦ διδούς, ὡς καὶ β〈ραχέα λέγειν ἔχει〉. " §1_61—6 (9) πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρ’ Ἐπιχάρμου τοῦ κυμωιδιοποιοῦ προσωφέληται τὰ πλεῖστα μεταγράψας, καθά φησιν Ἄλκιμος ἐν Τοῖς πρὸς Ἀμύνταν, ἃ ἐστι τέτταρα, ἔνθα καὶ ἐν τῷι πρώτωι φησι ταῦτα· ῾φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Πλάτων πολλᾶ τῶν Ἐπιχάρμσυ λέγων·
Hearing these things indeed, I compose this art so that someone may say: 'Epicharmus was a wise man, who said many witty and diverse things, speaking in a single word, giving proof of himself, that he is also able to speak briefly.'" 1—6 (9) And Plato is greatly assisted in many things by Epicharmus the comic poet, having transcribed most of them, as Alcimus says in his "To Amyntas", which are four books, where in the first book he says this: "And Plato also appears to say many of Epicharmus' words; but we must examine this.
σκεπτέσν δὲ. ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν αἰσθητὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ μηδέποτε ἐν τῷι ποιῶι μηδὲ ποσῶι διαμένον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ῥέσν καὶ μεταβάλλον· (10) ὡς ἐξ ὦν ἔν τις ἀνέληι τὸν ἀριθμόν, τούτων οὔτε ἴσων οὔτε τινῶν οὔτε ποσῶν οὔτε ποιῶν ὄντων, ταῦτα δ’ ἑστὶν ὦν ἀεὶ γένεσις, οὐσία δὲ μηδέποτε πέφυκε.
Plato says that the sensible is that which never remains in quality or quantity, but is always flowing and changing; (10) so that if one were to remove number from these things, they being neither equal nor of any kind nor of any quantity or quality, these are the things of which there is always becoming, but essence never exists.
νοητὸν δὲ ἐξ οὗ μηθὲν ἀπογίνεται μηδὲ προσγίνεται.
But the intelligible is that from which nothing is lost and to which nothing is added.
τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀιδίων φύσις, ἣν ὁμοίαν τε καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι.
And this is the nature of eternal things, which always happens to be like and the same.
καὶ μὴν ὅ γε Ἐ. περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ νοητῶν ἐναργῶς εἴρηκεν· §1"— ἀλλ’ ἀεί τοι θεοὶ παρῆσαν, χὐπέλιπον οὐ πώποκα, τάδε δ’ ἀεὶ πάρεσθ’ ὁμοῖα διά τε τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεί. — ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὰν χάος πρᾶτον γενέσθαι τῶν θεῶν. — πῶς δέ κα;
And indeed Epicharmus has spoken clearly about the sensible and the intelligible:" "— But indeed the gods were always present, and never failed, and these things are always present in the same way and through the same things always. — But indeed it is said that Chaos was born first of the gods. — But how could that be?
μὴ ἔχον γ’ ἀπὸ τίνος μηδ’ ἐς ὃ τι πρᾶτον μόλοι.
Since it had neither whence nor whither it might first come.
— οὐκ ἄρ’ ἔμολε πρᾶτον οὐθέν; — οὐδὲ μὰ Δία δεύτερον τῶνδέ τ’ ὧν ἁμὲς νῦν ὧδε λέγομες, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τάδ’ ἦς. "
καί· §2"〈αἰ〉 πὸτ ἀριθμόν τις περισσόν, αἰ δὲ λῆις, πὸτ ἄρτιον, (11) ποτθέμειν λῆι ψᾶφον ἢ καὶ τᾶν ὑπαρχουσᾶν λαβεῖν, ἧ δοκεῖ κά τοί γ’ 〈ἔθ’〉 ωὑτὸς εἶμεν;
¦5 — Did nothing then come first? — No, nor by Zeus second of these things which we now thus speak of, but these things always were." And: "If to an odd number, or if you wish, to an even one, (11) one wishes to add a pebble, or even to take away from those existing, does it seem to you that it is still the same?
οὐκ ἐμίν γά κα. — οὐδὲ μὰν οὐδ’ αἰ ποτὶ μέτρον παχυαῖον ποτθέμειν λῆι τις ἕτερον μᾶκος ἢ τοῦ πρόσθ’ ἐόντος ἀποταμεῖν, ἔτι χ’ ὑπάρχοι κῆνο τὸ μέτρον; — οὐ γάρ. — ὧδε νῦν ὅρη καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὔξεθ’, ὁ δὲ γα μὰν φθίνει, ἐν μεταλλαγᾶι δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον.
Not to me, indeed. — Nor indeed if to a measure of a cubit one wishes to add ¦5 another length, or to cut off from what was there before, would that measure still exist? — No, indeed. — Now look at men in this way too: for one grows, and another indeed declines, and all are in change all the time.
ὃ δὲ μεταλλάσσει κατὰ φύσιν κοὔποκ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι μένει, ἕτερον εἴη κα τόδ’ ἤδη τοῦ παρεξεστακότος, καὶ τὺ δὴ κἀγὼ χθὲς ἄλλοι καί νυν ἄλλοι τελέθομες, καὖθις ἄλλοι κοὔποχ’ ωὑτοὶ καττὸν 〈αὐτὸν αὖ〉 λόγον. ’"
[ ὁ τοίνυν περὶ αὐξήσεως λόγος ἐστὶ μὲν ἀρχαῖος· ἠρώτηται γάρ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, ὑπ’ Ἐπιχάρμου.
And that which changes in its nature and never remains in the same state, ¦10 would already be different from what has changed, and indeed you and I were others yesterday, and are others now, and will be others again, and never the same according to this same argument." [ Now the argument about growth is ancient; for it was asked, as Chrysippus says, by Epicharmus.
ταῦτά γε τοῖς Ἐπηαρμείοις ἔοικεν, ἐξ ὥν ὁ αὐξόμενος ἀνέφυ τοῖς σοφισταῖς λόγος· ὁ γὰρ λαβὼν πάλαι τὸ χρέος νῦν οὐκ ὀφείλει γεγονὼς ἕτερος· ὁ δὲ κληθεὶς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐχθὲς ἄκλητος ἥκει τήμερον·
These things at least resemble the Epicharmean works, from which the 'growing argument' grew for the sophists; for he who received a debt long ago does not owe it now, having become another; and he who was invited to dinner yesterday comes uninvited today, for he is another.
ἄλλος γάρ ἐστι. καὶ ἑκωμώιδησεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπαιτουμένου συμβολὰς καὶ ἀρνουμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν προσγεγενῆσθαι τὰ δὲ ἀπεληλυθέναι, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ἀπαιτῶν ἐτύπτησεν αὐτὴν καὶ ἐνεκαλεῖτο, πάλιν κακείνου φάσκοντος ἕτερον μὲν εἶναι τὸν τετυπτηκότα, ἓτερον δὲ τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον].
And he comicised this in the case of one who was asked for contributions and denied being the same person because some things had been added and others had departed, and when the creditor beat him and was prosecuted, that man in turn claimed that the one who had beaten was one person, and the one being prosecuted was another. ] (12) Alcimus further says also these things: "The wise say that the soul perceives some things through the body, such as hearing and seeing, but thinks other things by itself, using the body not at all.
(12) ἔτι φησὶν ὁ Ἄλκιμος καὶ ταυπί· ῾φασὶν οἱ σοφοὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ μὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἷον ἀκούουσαν, βλέπουσαν· τὰ δ’ αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐνθυμεἶσθαι, μηδὲν τῶι σώματι χρωμένην. διὸ καὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ νοητά.
Therefore, of existing things, some are sensible, others intelligible.
ὦν ἕνεκα καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς συνιδεῖν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὰς ἐπιθυμοῦντας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὰς καθ’ αὑτὰς διελέσθαι τὰς ἰδέας, οἶον ὁμοιότητα καὶ μονάδα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ μέγεθος καὶ στάσιν καὶ νησιν’ δεύ– τερον αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποθέσθαι. τρίτον τῶν ἰδεῶν συνιδεῖν ὅσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν, οἷον ἐπιστήμην ἢ μέγεθος ἤ δεσποτείαν, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν ἐκείνων ὁμώνυμα ἐκείναις ὑπάρχει· λέγω δὲ οἷον δίκαια μὲν ὅσα τοῦ δικαίου, καλὰ δὲ ὅσα τοῦ καλοῦ.
For which reason Plato also said that those who desire to understand the principles of the universe must first divide the ideas themselves by themselves, such as likeness and unity and multiplicity and magnitude and rest and motion; secondly, to assume by itself the beautiful, the good, the just, and such things. thirdly, to understand how many of the ideas are related to one another, such as knowledge or magnitude or mastery, considering that the things in our realm, by participating in those, exist homonymously with them; I mean, for example, that whatever is just participates in the Just, and whatever is beautiful in the Beautiful.
ἔστι δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕν ἕκαστον ἀίδιόν τε καὶ νόημα καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀπαθές· διὸ καὶ φησιν ἐν τῆι φύσει τὰς ἰδέας ἑστάναι καθάπερ παραδεῖγματα, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ταύταις ἐοικέναι τούτων ὁμοιώματα καθεστῶτα. (13) ὁ τοίνυν Έ. περί τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν οὕτω λέγει·
And each of the forms is both eternal and a thought, and moreover unaffected; wherefore he also says that the ideas stand in nature like paradigms, and other things resemble them, being constituted as images of them. (13) Epicharmus, then, speaks thus about the good and about the ideas:"