§401χαρίεντές γέ εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἵνʼ εὐφήμως ἄρξωμαι, τοὺς ἀκροατὰς αἰτιώμενοι καὶ λέγοντες ὡς ἄρα τούτου χάριν ἐκβαίνουσι τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ καὶ τῆς ὀρθότητος, ἵνʼ ὡς πλείστους ἀρέσαι δυνηθῶσι.
Delightful indeed—to start with a polite euphemism—are those who, concerning the virtues of their own writings, blame the audience and say that it is actually for this reason that they deviate from rhythm and correctness, in order that they may be able to please as many as possible.
καίτοι εἰ μὲν συγγνώμην αἰτοῦντες ταύτῃ τῇ σκήψει §402καταχρῶνται, πῶς ἐπαινεῖσθαί γʼ ἀξιοῦσι;
And yet, if they make use of this pretext in asking for pardon, how do they deem themselves worthy of praise?
χωρὶς γὰρ ἔπαινός τε καὶ συγγνώμη, καὶ ὅτε μηδʼ αὐτοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπαινοῦσι, σχολῇ γʼ ἂν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰκότως ἐπαινοῖντο.
For praise and pardon are distinct, and when they do not even praise themselves, they would hardly be praised with good reason by others.
εἰ δʼ αὖ μηδέν ἐστι τοῦ τρόπου δυσχερὲς, ἀλλʼ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, τί δεῖ τοὺς πολλοὺς αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν παραίτησιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν τρόπον ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχει δεικνύναι;
If, on the other hand, there is nothing objectionable in their style, but it is correct, why must they blame the multitude and flee to this excuse, instead of showing that their style is correct?
ἀλλʼ οἶμαι, κομψοί τινές εἰσι καὶ διπλᾶ κρούουσιν, ἵνʼ ἐὰν μὲν ἕλωσι, ταύτῃ κεκρατηκότες ὦσιν, ἂν δὲ φωράσῃ τις, ἔχωσιν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ λέγωσιν ὡς οὐδʼ αὐτοὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἠγνόουν, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρων ἕνεχʼ ἡμάρτανον.
But, I think, they are clever folk and play a double game, so that if they succeed, they may have triumphed by this means, but if anyone detects them, they may have a retreat and say that they themselves were not ignorant of what is better, but erred for the sake of others.
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἡ πρώτη καὶ μεγίστη ψῆφος, ἣν αὐτοὶ καθʼ αὑτῶν διʼ ὑπερβολὴν σοφίας φέρουσιν.
This is the first and greatest vote which they, through excessive wisdom, cast against themselves.
ἐγὼ γὰρ εὐξαίμην ἂν μάλιστα μὲν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν εὐδοκιμεῖν, τὴν δʼ οὖν ἀρχὴν ἀφʼ ἑστίας εἶναί μοι καὶ πείθειν ἐμαυτὸν πρῶτον, καὶ μὴ τὸ τῆς κυνὸς τῆς ἐν τῷ μύθῳ παθεῖν, μηδʼ ἐν ὅσῳ τὴν ἔξωθεν συλλέγω δόξαν, ἣν αὐτῷ μοι περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ προσῆκεν ἔχειν διαφθεῖραι, μηδὲ φθάσαι τὴν τοῦ φαῦλος εἶναι πίστιν κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ λαβὼν, πρὶν τὴν τοῦ σπουδαῖος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις βεβαιώσασθαι.
For my part, I would pray above all to be well-regarded by all others as well, but at all events that my beginning should be from the hearth and that I should convince myself first, and not suffer the fate of the dog in the fable, nor, while gathering external glory, destroy the reputation which it befitted myself to have of myself, nor preventively receive the conviction of being worthless against myself, before confirming that of being excellent among others.
τοσοῦτον δʼ ἔμοιγε ἀπολογίας ἀπέχειν δοκοῦσιν, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγωσιν, ὥστε δύʼ ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς ποιεῖν τὰ ἐγκλήμαθʼ ἑαυτοῖς, ἓν μὲν εἰ τοιαῦτʼ ἀσελγαίνουσι περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἕτερον δὲ εἰ τούτου χάριν, ὡς ταύτῃ βελτίους κριθήσεσθαι μέλλοντες.
So far do they seem to me from making a defense when they say these things, that they bring two charges against themselves instead of one: one, if they behave so outrageously regarding their writings; the other, if they do so for this reason, as though they were going to be judged better on this account.
καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε ὡς ἡμᾶς εὐθέως πιστεύσοντας οἷς πλάττονται καὶ τἀληθὲς οὐχὶ συνήσοντας παράγειν ζητῶσιν, ἄλλην αὖ τρίτην ταύτην ἀμαθίαν ἐμφανίζουσιν, εἰ μὴ νομίζουσι φωρᾶσθαι.
Moreover, when they seek to mislead us as if we would immediately believe their fabrications and not perceive the truth, they display this other third folly, unless they think they are not being detected.
τὸ δʼ, οἶμαι, τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.
But the matter, I think, is like this.
οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν μεθίησι τὸ βέλτιστον·
No one willingly lets go of the best.
ἀλλὰ Πλάτων καὶ Πίνδαρος πολλαχῆ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ σοφοὶ, καὶ δὴ καὶ κατὰ τόνδε τὸν λόγον οὐχ ἥκιστα, ὁ μὲν οὑτωσὶ λέγων
οὔτις ἑκὼν κακὸν εὕρετο
καὶ πάλιν
But Plato and Pindar, wise in many other ways, are not least so in respect to this saying, the former speaking thus: "No one willingly chose what is evil" and again...