§319καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις] μή πω τοσούτου μηδὲν ἄξιον ἔστω νικητήριον, ἀλλʼ ἅ τε αὐτὸς ἔπραξε καὶ τίνων ἔπραξε χάριν καὶ ἃ αὐτὸς καθαρῶς εἴρηκε, ταῦτα συμβαίνειν φημὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς ῥητορικῆς λόγοις·
[and in these very things] — let there be as yet no token of victory of so much value. But what he himself did, and for whose sake he did them, and what he himself clearly said, these things, I claim, agree with the arguments in defense of rhetoric.
καὶ τοσούτῳ δέω κακίζειν ἐκεῖνον τούτοις, ὥστε εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις σεμνύνειν αὐτὸν ἡγοῦμαι, εἰ τούτων ἐκείνοις ὑπεναντίως ἐχόντων μὴ τὰ ἔργα μηδὲ τὰς πράξεις αὐτοῦ διαβάλλω, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν ἔργων, ἃ μεθʼ ἡμῶν καὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι τίθημι, ταῦθʼ ἑτέρως ἔχοντα ἢ ὡς ἄν τις πιστεύσειεν ἀποφαίνω.
And I am so far from speaking ill of him in these matters that, if it is necessary to say this also, I consider that I honor him in these very things. For even if these things are contrary to their assertions, I do not slander his deeds or his actions, but from his life and deeds, which I set down as being on our side and of the sort we deem worthy, I show these things to be otherwise than as one might believe.
δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα κακίζοντος ἐκεῖνον εἶναι, ἤ τινος αὐθαδείας ἢ προπετείας μετασχεῖν;
Does this seem to you to be the talk of one who speaks ill of him, or to partake of any arrogance or rashness?
ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶμαι.
I indeed do not think so.
ἀλλʼ εἰ δεῖ τι τούτοις ἔγκλημα ἐνεγκεῖν, μᾶλλον ἄν τις καλέσειε δικαίως εὐλάβειαν πλείω τῆς προσηκούσης.
But if one must bring any charge against these things, one might rather and justly call it a caution greater than what is fitting.
καίτοι ἐκεῖνός γε ὅπου καὶ μικρὸν ἐλέγχειν ἔχει τινὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, ἢ καὶ τῶν καθʼ ἑαυτὸν ἐνδόξων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ὑφίεται.
And yet he himself, whenever he is able to refute even in a small degree any of the elders, or even of the famous men of his own time, yields nothing.
ἀλλὰ μή πω περὶ τούτων.
But let us say no more of these things for now.
ἀλλὰ τί χρῆν με ποιεῖν ὦ πρὸς Διός;
But what ought I to have done, by Zeus?
πότερον μὴ μνησθῆναι τὸ παράπαν τῆς εἰς Σικελίαν ἀποδημίας ὥσπερ τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων μέλλοντα ἐρεῖν;
Was I not to mention at all his journey to Sicily, as if about to speak of something unspeakable?
ἀλλʼ οὔτε ψήφισμα συνῄδειν ἀπαγορεῦον καὶ τῷ λόγῳ συνέφερε, καὶ ἅμα ἀληθὲς ἦν· καὶ γὰρ ἔπλευσεν οὐχ ἅπαξ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Δίωνι γενέσθαι τὰ δίκαια.
But neither did I know of any decree forbidding it, and it was useful for the argument, and at the same time it was true; for indeed he sailed not once, and that for the sake of justice being done to Dion.
ἔστω δὲ ταῦτα·
Let these things be so.
ἐφαίνετο δὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Γοργίου εἰρηκὼς οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
But he seemed in the dialogues to have said in the Gorgias that not to be wronged is of little value.
εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀσθενῆ καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἄξια, ἐν μέσῳ μὲν δὴ πρόκειται, λυόντων δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ, εἰ βούλονται, καὶ κακῶς λέγοντες ἐμέ.
If then these arguments are weak and of no value, they lie before us in public; let the wise refute them if they wish, even while speaking ill of me.
πάντως συνηθέστερον κακῶς λέγειν ἢ εὖ.
In any case, it is more customary to speak ill than well.
ἀλλὰ σύν τινι ἔθει πρᾳοτέρῳ καὶ σχήματι χρῆν μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν;
But ought I to have mentioned them with some gentler habit and manner?
οὐκοῦν ἤκουσας τῆς παραιτήσεως εἰ μὴ τότε, ἀλλὰ νῦν.
Surely you have heard the apology, if not then, at least now.
ὅτι δὲ οὐ τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ταύτας αἰτίας δείσαντες ὕστερον εἰσεποιήσαμεν ταῦτα, ἀλλʼ ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ἐνῆν, κάλει τούτων μάρτυρας, εἰ βούλει, τοὺς ἀκούοντας.
And that we did not insert these things later out of fear of these charges of yours, but that they were there from the beginning, call as witnesses of this, if you wish, those who heard.
ἀλλὰ νὴ Δίʼ ἀνιαρὸν τοῦτο τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἑταίροις. ἕτερος λόγος οὗτος, οὐ πρὸς ἐμὲ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὁντιναδήποτε.
But, by Zeus, "this is painful to Plato's companions." This is another argument, not against me, but against anyone whosoever.
ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδικῶ ὅτι τὰ ἐκ τῶν Νόμων §320αὐτοῦ παρεγραψάμην;
Or do I also do wrong because I cited the passage from his Laws?
καὶ ὅπως γε, ἐπεὶ καὶ δυσχεραίνουσι, κἀκεῖνο ἐπιδείξουσιν ὡς οὐ τοῖς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ περιπίπτει λόγοις, ἐπειδάν τι φάσκῃ.
And how indeed, since they are displeased, will they also show that he does not contradict his own words when he asserts something?
ἐκ τῶν Νόμων
τοῖς δʼ εὐδαιμόνως ζῶσιν ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκη πρῶτον τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἄλλους, μήτε αὐτοὺς ὑφʼ ἑτέρων ἀδικεῖσθαι.
From the Laws: "For those who live happily, it is necessary first not to wrong others, nor themselves to be wronged by others.
τούτοιν δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι κτήσασθαι δύναμιν παγχάλεπον· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸ τελέως ἔχειν ἄλλως ἢ τελέως γενόμενον ἀγαθόν. ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ τοῖς ῥήμασι τί ἡμεῖς ἐφθεγξάμεθα ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ;
Of these two, the former is not very difficult, but to acquire the power of not being wronged is exceedingly difficult; and it is not possible to have it completely except by becoming completely good." Upon these words, in turn, what did we cry out in the book?
ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου
ἰοῦ ἰοῦ τῆς μαρτυρίας.
From the book: "Oh! Oh! What a testimony!
τούτων ἐδεόμην.
These were the things I needed.
ταῦτα λέγει Πλάτων, ὁ τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος μετέχων καὶ διʼ ὃν τὸ Ἀρίστωνος γένος θεῖον ὡς ἀληθῶς.
Plato says this—he who shares in the epigram and because of whom the family of Ariston is truly divine.
τελέως ἄρα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ῥητορικὴ καλὸν καὶ οὐ πρὸς παντὸς οὔτε λαβεῖν οὔτε κτήσασθαι.
Completely then, my good sir, rhetoric is a beautiful thing, and not for everyone either to receive or to acquire.
φαίνει γὰρ καὶ σὺ τοῦτό γε συγχωρῶν, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι τέτακται.
For you also seem to concede this much, that it is appointed for not being wronged.
οὐκοῦν ὅτε ἀδικεῖν μὲν οὐ προσηνάγκαζεν, ἀδικεῖσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐᾷ, ὡς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου συνέβαινεν, οὐδέτερον τούτων ἐᾷ, οὔτε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀδικεῖσθαι, εἰ μὲν καὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ὅρος, φιλοσοφία τις οὖσα ἡ ῥητορικὴ φαίνεται, εἰ δὲ ἐξαρκεῖ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἡ ῥητορικὴ τελεώτερον·
Therefore, when it did not compel to do wrong, and does not permit to be wronged, and, as followed from the argument, permits neither of these, neither to do wrong nor to be wronged—if indeed the definition of philosophy is the same, rhetoric appears to be a kind of philosophy; but if it is sufficient for philosophy not to do wrong, rhetoric is more complete.
τὸ γὰρ χαλεπώτερον κτήσασθαι καὶ μεῖζον ἤδη προστίθησιν, ὅπως μηδʼ αὐτὸς ὑπʼ ἄλλων ἀδικήσεται.
For it adds what is harder to acquire and greater, namely, that one shall not himself be wronged by others.
πῶς οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα μὲν τελέως ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἅμα δʼ ἔσχατον τῶν κακῶν καὶ κολακεία;
How then is the same thing at once completely good and the greatest of goods, and at the same time the last of evils and flattery?
ἢ πῶς ἐλάχιστον οἱ ῥήτορες δύνανται, εἴ γε οὗ παγχάλεπον κτήσασθαι δύναμιν, τοῦτʼ αὐτοῖς περίεστιν;
Or how can rhetoricians do so very little, if indeed they possess this power which is exceedingly difficult to acquire?
ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω συμβαλεῖν.
I for my part cannot understand.
εὐδαίμονες ἄρα, οὐκ ἄθλιοι, κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνος λόγον οἱ ῥήτορες, εἴ γε ὁ μὲν τελέως ἀγαθὸς εὐδαίμων, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστι κτήσασθαι μὴ τελέως ἀγαθὸν γενόμενον. πότερον ταῦτα ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀναγκαίως ἔχει ἐνεγκεῖν εἰς μέσον, ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδικοῦμεν καὶ περιεργαζόμεθα, εἰ μὴ προσκυνοῦμεν, ὡσπερεὶ κίστην ἀπόρρητα κρύπτουσαν;
Happy then, not wretched, according to Plato's argument, are the rhetoricians, if indeed the completely good man is happy, and it is not possible to acquire this without becoming completely good." Is it right and necessary to bring these things into the open, or do we also do wrong and meddle in things that do not concern us, if we do not worship them as if they were a chest concealing secret mysteries?
ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ τοῦτο ᾤμην εἶναι τὸ τἀπόρρητα
But I did not think this was the nature of secret things...