§561ἔπειθʼ ἃ ποιεῖ πάσχουσα ἀναφαίνεται, καὶ τὴν δίκην ἐπʼ αὐτῶν δίδωσι τῶν πραγμάτων.
Secondly, what it does, it is revealed to suffer itself, and it pays the penalty in the very events themselves.
ἅ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ Ἡσίοδος προορώμενος τὰς ἔριδας πάσας πόρρωθεν κωλύειν, ἥτις μὴ πρὸς ἔργον παρακαλεῖ· εἰκότως.
Which things Hesiod also seems to me to have foreseen and to prevent all strifes from afar, which do not urge to work; and with good reason.
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐ σίδηρος, οὐ χαράκωμα, οὐχ ὅπλον οὐδὲν φοβερὸν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἂν εὖ φρονεῖν ἐθέλωσι μόνον· ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνοίας καθʼ αὑτῶν ἰσχυρὰ ποιοῦσιν οἱ πολλοί.
For there is no iron, no palisade, no weapon that is fearful to cities, if only they wish to be of good mind; but even these things, through their folly, the many make strong against themselves.
τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα παροφθέντα ἐπίκαιρον ποιεῖ τὴν ζημίαν καὶ οὐ πάσαις ταῖς ψήφοις ἡμάρτηται, τὸ δʼ ἐπʼ ἀλλήλους τρέπεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ σωτηρίᾳ κατοικίαν γενομένην ταύτην διαλύοντας καὶ διασπῶντας τὰ αὑτῶν εὖ τίθεσθαι νομίζειν ἑκάστους ἐξαίρει πᾶσαν ἀνθρώπων ἄνοιαν· τοσοῦτον ὑπερβάλλει.
Now, other things being overlooked bring a temporary loss, and the error is not by all votes, but to turn against one another, and, while dissolving and tearing apart this habitation which was established for common safety, for each to think they are managing their own affairs well, surpasses all human folly; so greatly does it exceed.
καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ Σόλωνος ἔξω τοῦ καιροῦ ποιεῖν ἄν μοι δοκῶ μνησθεὶς, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὗ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας ἐξετασμός.
And indeed, I do not think I would be speaking out of season in mentioning Solon, especially as we are examining laws and constitution.
ἐκεῖνος τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις διεξιὼν περὶ τῶν αὑτῷ πεπολιτευμένων ἐπὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα πάντων σεμνύνεται, τῷ καταμῖξαι τὸν δῆμον πρὸς τοὺς δυνατοὺς, ὅπως ἂν μιᾷ γνώμῃ τὴν πόλιν οἰκῶσι, μηδέτεροι πλεῖον ἰσχύοντες ἢ κοινῇ συμφέρει.
He, then, in his elegies, recounting his political acts, prides himself most of all on this: on having mingled the people with the powerful, so that they might inhabit the city with one mind, neither side having more power than is of common benefit.
καίτοι τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον προτρέποντος εἰς ὁμόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεικνύντος ὅπως αὐτὴν κτᾶσθαι προσήκει.
And yet this belongs not only to one urging to concord, but also to one showing how it is fitting to acquire it.
καὶ τί δεῖ καθʼ ἑκάστους λέγειν;
And why must I speak of each individually?
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐ ποιητὴς, οὐ νομοθέτης, οὐ ῥήτωρ, ὅστις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἄρχεται, οὐδʼ ἄλλο τι πρεσβεύει τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίας καὶ πίστεως· εἰκότως καὶ ἀναγκαίως.
For there is no poet, no lawgiver, no orator who, so to speak, begins from anywhere else, or honors anything else above mutual friendship and trust; naturally and necessarily.
εἰ γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων οὗτοι πιστότατοι καὶ ἀναγκαιότατοι οἵτινες ἂν τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον νομίζωσιν, ἦ που σφᾶς γε αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐχθροὺς προσορᾶν οὐ σωτήριον.
For if those allies are most faithful and necessary who regard the same person as enemy and friend, surely to look upon themselves as enemies is not salvific.
τίσι γὰρ καὶ χρῆσθαι τῶν ἔξω δυνατὸν τοὺς αὑτοῖς οὐκ ἔχοντας;
For with whom among those outside is it possible for those to deal who do not have themselves on their side?
γνοίη δʼ ἄν τις καὶ τῇ προσηγορίᾳ τεκμαιρόμενος, μόνον γοῦν τοῦτο νόσημα πόλεως κέκληται.
And one might know this also judging from the name; at any rate, this alone has been called the 'disease' of a city.
καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον τῶν μὲν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἀρρωστημάτων, ἃ μέρει τινὶ λυμαίνεται, τοσαύτην πρόνοιαν ἔχειν ὥστε τάχιστα παύεσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἀπολλύντων δημοσίᾳ τὰς πόλεις μὴ τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλαγὴν ζητεῖν, §562ἀλλʼ ὅπως ὅτι πλεῖστα γενήσεται, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίων ἀποτροπὰς αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς, οἷον λιμοῦ καὶ λοιμοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἃ δὲ μείζω μὲν τούτων κακοῖ, τῷ δʼ εὖ φρονεῖν ἔστι θεραπεῦσαι, ταῦτα μὴ βούλεσθαι;
And yet how is it not absurd to have so much foresight for bodily sicknesses, which damage some part, so that they may cease as quickly as possible, but for those which publicly destroy cities, not to seek the speediest deliverance, but that they may become as numerous as possible, and while asking the gods for averting of involuntary evils, such as famine and plague and the like, yet as to those which harm more than these but can be cured by being wise, not to wish for these?
πότερον οὖν οὐδʼ εὔχεσθαι φήσετε ὑπὲρ τῆς ὁμονοίας;
Will you then say that you do not even pray for concord?
τί ποτʼ οὖν ἄλλο ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν συνεύξεσθε;
What other good then will you pray for yourselves?
ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία τοῦτό γε ποιεῖν προθύμως;
But, by Zeus, you do this eagerly?
οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἐνοχλεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βούλεσθαι πράττειν ἅ γʼ ἐφʼ ὑμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς θεοῖς αὐτοῖς;
Is it not then absurd to trouble the gods, but not to wish yourselves to do those things which seem to the gods themselves to be in your power?
καὶ μὴν εἴ γε τοῖς σώμασιν αὗται βαρύταται τῶν νόσων καὶ πλείστης δέονται τῆς ἐπιμελείας αἵτινες ἂν τῶν ἐντὸς ἅψωνται, πῶς οὐ καὶ πόλει ταῦτʼ εἶναι τῶν ἀτυχημάτων ἔσχατα χρὴ δοκεῖν ὑφʼ ὧν εἴσω φθείρεται;
And indeed, if in bodies those are the heaviest of diseases and require the most care which touch the internal parts, how must it not be thought that for a city also those are the ultimate of misfortunes by which it is corrupted from within?
ἢ πολεμίους μὲν εἴσω τείχους παρελθόντας φοβερωτέρους κρίνομεν, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πόλει πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλοις μικρόν τι νομιοῦμεν εἶναι;
Or do we judge enemies who have passed inside the wall to be more fearful, but think that fighting each other in the middle of the city is something of little importance?
καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνον ἀποδέξομαι τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἄρα στάσις ἐμφύλιος τοσούτῳ πολέμου χαλεπώτερον, ὅσῳ πόλεμος εἰρήνης.
And indeed, I will not even accept that argument, that civil faction is as much more difficult than war as war is than peace.
ὁρῶ γὰρ πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης πολλάκις αἱρετώτερον συμβαίνοντα, στάσιν δὲ ὁμονοίας οὐδέποτε.
For I see that war often happens to be more preferable than peace, but faction never than concord.
πολεμήσασι μὲν γὰρ ἤδη πολλοῖς συνήνεγκε καὶ εἰς χρημάτων κτῆσιν καὶ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ πρὸς ἰσχὺν καὶ πάνθʼ ὅσʼ ἂν εἴποι τις, στάσει δὲ καὶ μίσει πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι οὐδένες πώποτε τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθῶν ἀπώναντο, τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχον τοῦ προσκτήσασθαί γε ἕτερα.
For to many who have waged war, it has already been beneficial both for the acquisition of wealth and for glory and for strength and all things that one might say, but none who used faction and mutual hatred ever enjoyed any of the existing goods, so far were they from acquiring others besides.
συνελόντι δʼ εἰπεῖν εἰρήνης μὲν ὑπαρχούσης τοσούτῳ χεῖρον στασιάζειν ἢ πολεμεῖν ἐπαρθῆναι, ὅσῳ χεῖρον ἑαυτοὺς κακῶς ποιεῖν ἢ ἑτέρους.
To speak in brief, when peace exists, it is as much worse to engage in faction than to be incited to war, as it is worse to do harm to oneself than to others.
ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοσούτῳ χεῖρον, ὅσῳ πόλεμος εἰρήνης.
And in war, this very same thing is as much worse as war is than peace.
καὶ μὴν οὐ νῦν μὲν δοκεῖ, πρότερον δʼ οὐκ ἐδόκει τῶν κακῶν ἔσχατον εἶναι.
And indeed, it does not seem so now, but did not seem formerly to be the ultimate of evils.
τοσούτῳ γὰρ μετριώτερον στάσεως ἡ τυραννὶς, ὅσῳ πρῶτον μὲν κουφότερον εἷς κακῶς ποιῶν πόλιν ἢ πάντες κύκλῳ, ἔπειτα ἐλευθερῶσαι μὲν πόλιν ὥστε στασιάζειν οὐδεὶς πώποτʼ εὖ φρονῶν ἠξίωσεν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ μὴ στασιάζειν τυράννους ἤδη τινὲς ἐξεπίτηδες ἐστήσαντο.
For tyranny is as much more moderate than faction, as, first, it is lighter for one person to do harm to a city than for everyone all around, secondly, while no one of good sense ever thought it right to free a city so that it might engage in faction, yet for the sake of not engaging in faction, some have already deliberately established tyrants.
καὶ μετὰ μέν γε τυράννου καὶ νόμους θεῖναι τῶν νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν ἤδη τινὲς εἶπον προσφέρειν,
And indeed, some of the lawgivers themselves have already said that it is useful to establish laws even with a tyrant,