§504ἔστι μὲν οὐ σμικρὸν, ὦ ἄνδρες Σμυρναῖοι, πλεονέκτημα τῷ μέλλοντι πείσειν τὸ πρὸς ἡδονὴν εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἀκούουσι· τῶν δʼ ἐθελόντων νουθετεῖν μὴ ὅτι χρῶνται ταῖς γνώμαις οἱ πολλοὶ ῥᾳδίως, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἀνέχονται
It is no small advantage, O men of Smyrna, for one who intends to persuade, that his words should be pleasing to his hearers; whereas, of those who wish to admonish, the multitude are so far from readily adopting their opinions that they do not even tolerate them at all.
§505τὸ παράπαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὅσα μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτὰ ἐφʼ αὑτῶν παρακαλεῖ σπουδάζειν, οὐ δεῖ συμβούλου περὶ τούτων, ἀλλʼ ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἄγει πανταχοῦ, ἃ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δεῖ διδαχθέντας ἢ διώκειν ἢ φυλάττεσθαι, ταῦτα δὲ τῷ συμβούλῳ καταλείπεται.
Nevertheless, for all those affairs which themselves by their own nature urge earnest attention, there is no need of an adviser; rather, nature everywhere leads towards one's own interest. But those things which we must pursue or guard against after being instructed by reason, these are left to the adviser.
ὥστʼ ἄν τις ἀκούειν μὴ βούληται, τὸ συμβουλεύειν ἀναιρεῖ τῷ καθʼ αὑτὸν μέρει.
So, if anyone is unwilling to listen, he invalidates the giving of advice on his own part.
ἔτι δʼ ἄλλους μέν τινας εἰκὸς ἀγροικίζεσθαι, ὑμᾶς δὲ, οἳ καὶ συνέσει καὶ τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τοσοῦτον προέχειν δοκεῖτε, μὴ πρῶτον μὲν ὅλως εὐμενῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἀκροάσεις τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ἄν τις τὰ βέλτιστα παραινῇ, μὴ κεχρῆσθαι μετὰ τοῦ χάριν πρὸς ἔχειν, ἕν γέ τι τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ κρῖναι.
Moreover, while it is reasonable for some others to behave rudely, it is, in my judgment at least, one of the most absurd things that you, who seem to excel so much both in intelligence and in education, should not first of all be altogether well-disposed towards listening to speeches, and then, if someone recommends what is best, should not make use of it and feel grateful.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἢ πόνους τινὰς ἢ πραγματείας ἔμελλον εἰσηγήσεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγῶνος ἴσως ἂν ἔδει, ἔπειτα διδάσκειν ἐπειρώμην ἂν ὡς τῆς παραχρῆμα ψυχαγωγίας αἱρετώτερον τὸ συνοῖσον τοῖς ὅλοις.
If, then, I were about to introduce some labors or troubles, first of all, there would perhaps have been need of a struggle, and then I would have tried to teach that what is beneficial to the whole is preferable to immediate entertainment.
νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἀπέχω τοῦ δυσχερὲς εἰσηγεῖσθαί τι, ὡς ταὐτὰ δὴ ταῦτα καὶ συμβουλεύσων ἥκω, μήτε λέγειν μήτʼ ἀκούειν δυσχερὲς μηδὲν, οὕτω πολλοῦ δέω πράττειν γέ τι ἢ συμβουλεύειν τῶν δυσχερῶν.
But as it is, I am so far from proposing anything difficult that I have come to advise these very things, of which nothing is difficult either to say or to hear; so far am I from doing or advising anything of a difficult nature.
ἄρξομαι δὲ ὅθεν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἄριστʼ ἂν ἀκολουθήσαιτε καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ συνηθείας.
And I shall begin from where you would most easily follow, and from my own custom.
φημὶ δὴ χρῆναι τῷ μὲν Διονύσῳ τὴν ἑορτὴν ποιεῖν καὶ νὴ Δία τῇ γε Ἀφροδίτῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι θεοῖς, σπένδοντας καὶ θύοντας καὶ παιωνίζοντας καὶ στεφανηφοροῦντας καὶ τῶν εἰς εὐσέβειαν μηδὲν ἐλλείποντας.
I say, then, that we must celebrate the festival for Dionysus, and by Zeus, for Aphrodite too, and for all the other gods, offering libations and sacrifices, singing paeans, wearing wreaths, and omitting nothing that pertains to piety.
ἓν δὲ τούτοις ὃ πρόσεστι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἐπιεικῶς κεχαρισμένον, τοῖς δʼ ἐπιεικέσι πάντων ἀνιαρότατον, τοῦτʼ ἐκποδὼν ἀνελεῖν, λέγω τὰς βλασφημίας καὶ τοὺς κώμους τουτουσὶ τοὺς μεθημερίνους, καὶ νὴ Δία γε τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς παννυχίσι, καὶ μήτε ποιητὰς εἶναι τούτων μήτε ἀγωνιστὰς, μηδὲ παίζειν ἃ μὴ βέλτιον.
But one thing which is associated with these, which is reasonably pleasing to the multitude but most painful of all to the decent, we must remove out of the way; I mean these blasphemies and these daytime revels, and by Zeus, those at the all-night festivals, and that there should be neither poets nor performers of these, nor should we play at what is not for the better.
ὡς ἔχει γε οὕτως, κακηγορίας ἄκοντας μὲν ἀκούειν οὐ τερπνὸν, ἑκόντας δὲ ἀνέχεσθαι μελέτη κακοηθίας· τοῦτο δὲ τῶν πρώτων εἰς μοχθηρίαν §506καὶ οὔτε ἰδιώτου μεῖζον οὐδὲν ἄν τις κατηγορήσειεν οὔτε πόλεως ἢ ὅτι χαίρει κακοῖς.
For the case stands thus: to hear ill-speaking against one's will is not pleasant, but to tolerate it willingly is a practice of malice; and this is among the first steps toward depravity, and one could bring no greater accusation against either an individual or a city than that they rejoice in evils.
ὃ γὰρ ἔσχατον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἁμαρτημάτων ὁ φθόνος, οὐκ ἔχων παραίτησιν, τούτου μετέχειν ἀνάγκη, καὶ τοῦτον αὔξειν ἐν αὑτῷ τὸν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ταύτης ἐλάττω, σημεῖον δέ·
For envy, which seems to be the ultimate of human sins, having no excuse, must be shared by one who is inferior to this desire, and he must nurture it in himself.
οὐδεὶς γοῦν οὓς ἀγαπᾷ καὶ οἷς ἀγαθόν τι συμβούλεται, τούτοις κακῶς ἀκούουσιν ἐφήδεται.
And here is proof: no one, at least, rejoices when those whom he loves and for whom he wishes good things are spoken ill of.
περὶ μὲν οὖν αἰκίας καὶ βλάβης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἄκων τις ἔπραξε, τὸ δὲ τῆς κακοηθίας τοσοῦτον διενήνοχεν ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ἐπώνυμόν ἐστι τῆς κακίας, ὡς οὐδεμίαν συγγνώμην ἐνδεχόμενον, ἔπειτʼ οὐδενὸς πράγματός ἐστι πρόσρημα, ἀλλὰ φύσεως μηδὲν ἄν τῳ χρηστὸν εἶναι συμβουλομένης.
Now, concerning assault and damage and such things, it is possible to say that one acted unwillingly; but the nature of malice is so different that, first, it is named after vice, as admitting no forgiveness, and second, it is not the designation of any single action, but of a disposition that wishes nothing good to anyone.
ὥσπερ δʼ αὐτὸ πλεῖστον μετέχει κακίας ἀπὸ τῆς προσηγορίας ἀρξάμενον, οὕτως ἡ κακηγορία πάλιν αὐτοῦ πλεῖστον μετέχει μέρος ἐκ τῆς παρισώσεως ἀρξάμενον τῆς περὶ τοὔνομα·
And just as malice itself has the greatest share of vice, starting from its very name, so ill-speaking in turn has the greatest share of malice, starting from the similarity of its name.
οὕτως ἄμφω κακῶν καὶ φαύλων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων.
Thus both belong to evil and base men.
ἀεὶ μὲν οὖν οἶμαι τὰ βέλτιστα προαιρετέον καὶ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἱερομηνίαις καὶ ταῖς ἑορταῖς πῶς οὐκ εἰκὸς ἅπασαν μὲν εὐφημίαν εἶναι προθυμεῖσθαι, πᾶσαν δὲ γνώμην ἀστειοτάτην, πάντας δὲ ὡς οἰκειότατα ἀλλήλοις ἔχειν, ὡς τῶν θεῶν ταύτην τὴν φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν βραβευόντων, καὶ νομίζειν γε τὰς ἑορτὰς σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν φιλίας συνθήματα, καὶ μήτε θυσίαν οὕτω λαμπρὰν μήτε σπονδὰς κεχαρισμένας, ὧν οὐχ ἥδιον ἂν εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ εἰ τὴν γνώμην ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ὡς βελτίστην παρεχοίμεθα.
Therefore, I think one should always choose to think and say what is best, but during the holy months and festivals, how is it not reasonable to strive for all auspicious speech, and for every thought to be most refined, and for everyone to be on the most friendly terms with one another, as if the gods were officiating over this friendship and concord, and indeed to consider the festivals almost, so to speak, as covenants of friendship? And there is no sacrifice so splendid, nor libations so pleasing, which could be more acceptable to the gods than if we offer our minds as good as possible to the extent of our ability.
καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε αἰδεῖσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς τί μεῖζον ἂν εἴη σύμβολον ἢ μηδὲν ἀπηχὲς μήτε λέγειν μήτε ἀκούειν ἐναντίων αὐτῶν;
Moreover, what greater sign of reverence for the gods could there be than neither to say nor to hear anything discordant in their presence?
ἢ φίλου μὲν αἰδεσίμου παρόντος πολλὰ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμεν εἰπεῖν, κἂν εἴ τῳ δικαίως ἔχοιμεν λοιδορήσασθαι, τὰς δὲ τῶν θεῶν ἀκοὰς προστησάμενοι ῥᾳδίως οἱ μὲν ἐροῦμεν, οἱ δὲ ἀκουσόμεθα ἃ μηδʼ αὐτοὶ φαῖμεν ἂν εἶναι τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλʼ ὡς αἰσχρῶς ἔχοντα οὕτω διασύρομεν;
Or is it that, when a respected friend is present, we would hesitate to say many things, even if we had just cause to abuse someone, yet using the ears of the gods as a shield, we will readily speak, and some of us will listen to, things which we ourselves would not say are beautiful, but which we disparage as being shameful?
ἵνα δὲ
But in order that...