§388καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς εὐαρμοστίας, καὶ οὔτε Συρακοσίων οὔτε Σελινουντίων οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐκεῖ κομπάσεται καθʼ ἡμῶν οὐδʼ ὡς ἐξήλασεν ἕξει λέγειν.
and of our adaptability to circumstances; and neither the Syracusans nor the Selinuntines nor anyone else of those there will boast against us, nor will they be able to say that they drove us out.
πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι συνήσονται, ὅσον μὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς κἀκείνους ἧκεν, οὐδὲ μικρὸν αὐτοὺς ἀντᾶραι δυνηθέντας, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ καὶ Κορινθίων ἐπελθόντων καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολεμίων οὕτως ἡμᾶς δόντας λογισμὸν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα.
For all men will understand that, as far as we and they were concerned, they were unable to withstand us even in the slightest, but that because the Lacedaemonians and Corinthians and our ancient enemies came upon us, we have thus taken counsel for ourselves in the face of the present circumstances.
ὥστʼ οὐ μόνον ἀσφάλεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξα ἀγαθὴ τῇ γνώμῃ προσγίγνεται.
So not only safety but also good reputation is added to our decision.
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν φοβοῦνται μὴ φεύγειν δοκῶμεν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπεύχομαι μὲν τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὸν ἐναντίον δὲ φοβοῦμαι φόβον μὴ πλεονάζοντες, εἶτʼ οὐ δυνηθῶμεν φεύγειν, ἀλλὰ πάθωμεν ταυτὸν τοῖς περὶ τοὺς κύβους φιλονεικοῦσιν, οἷς ἐξὸν παριδεῖν ὅσον ἐζημιώθησαν, εἶτα ἀθώοις εἶναι τοῦ πλείονος, ἡ μετὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ἔρις τὴν εἰς τοὔσχατον ἤνεγκε βλάβην.
These men, then, fear lest we seem to flee, but while I pray that their words may not be true, I fear the opposite fear, lest by persisting excessively we may then not even be able to flee, but suffer the same as those who quarrel over dice, who, though it was possible to overlook what they lost and thus be free from greater loss, their angry rivalry brought them to ultimate ruin.
δοκεῖ δʼ ἔμοιγε τοὐναντίον εἶναι οὐκ ἐν μὲν τῷ πέμπειν τὴν βοήθειαν ἢ λαβεῖν Σικελίαν ἢ κομίσασθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας πάλιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλεῖν ἤδη διεφθάρθαι τἀκεῖ πράγματα, ὥσπερ ἀρτίως ἠκούετε.
And to me, on the contrary, it seems not to be the case that, by sending aid, or capturing Sicily, or bringing back the men, the affairs there are already ruined by our recalling them, as you were just hearing.
ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς ἕως ἐστὶ καιρὸς εἰ μὲν μεταπεμψόμεθα καὶ γενησόμεθα πάντες ἐν ταὐτῷ, φημὶ θεῶν ἵλεων ὄντων ἐλπίδας καταλείπεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον συνέβη πέμψασι κατὰ καιροὺς, ἔπειθʼ ὕστερον μειζόνως ἐπιθέσθαι δυνηθῆναι.
But I say that, as long as there is time, if we recall them and we all join in the same place, with the gods being propitious, hopes are left for the affairs there, just as it happened before when we sent aid in season, and that later we shall be able to attack on a larger scale.
ἂν δʼ ὠθιζώμεθα πρὸς τὸ ἀδύνατον, φημί τινʼ ἡμῶν κέρδος τὴν ζημίαν ἡγήσεσθαι, εἰ μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων συμβαίη διαμαρτεῖν καὶ πλέον μηδὲν προσυπάρξει παθεῖν.
But if we push against the impossible, I say that some of us will consider the loss a gain, if only we should happen to fail in our affairs and suffer nothing further.
ἔπειτα καὶ τίς τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, θαρρήσει καθʼ αὑτὸν δεῦρο ἀνάγειν ἀθρόαν τὴν δύναμιν, ὅταν ὑμῖν προσαγγελθὲν ἀπεψηφισμένοι φαίνησθε, μηδὲ τοὺς ἐλάττους ἐπανήκειν πρὶν πρᾶξαι περὶ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν·
And then, O Athenians, who of the generals will have the courage on his own authority to bring the entire force back here, when, upon it being reported to you, you appear to have voted against it, decreeing that not even the smaller detachments should return before achieving what they were sent for?
καὶ ὅπου νῦν ὤκνησε Νικίας τὰ παρʼ ὑμῶν, τί ποθʼ ἡγήσεται πείσεσθαι δευτέρας ἐλπίδος ὑμῶν ἁμαρτόντων;
And where Nicias even now shrank from your reaction, what on earth will he expect to suffer when you make them miss a second hope?
οὕτως ἢ νικήσοντας πέμπετε, ἢ θάτερον οὐ βούλομαι προσθεῖναι.
Thus, either send them to conquer, or the other alternative I do not wish to add.
ἐν οἷς δὲ ἐγὼ λέγω πάντα ἐφʼ ὑμῖν §389μετὰ τοῦ καιροῦ γίγνεται, καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν Σικελίαν, ἐὰν ἐξῇ, καὶ τὸ αὐτούς γε εἶναι σῶς, ἐὰν ἄρα ἐκεῖνο μόνον μὴ συμβῇ.
But in the plan I propose, everything is in your hands with the opportunity, both to capture Sicily, if it is possible, and for the men themselves to be safe, if by chance that former thing does not happen.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τἀνταῦθα καταστήσασθαι, χρησαμένους ἁπάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει, ῥᾴδιον πλεῖν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνα· εἰ δέ ἐστι μείζων ἡ πραγματεία, τί τοῖς ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανῶς ἀνταρκεῖν ὑπερορίους ταραχὰς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐξευρίσκομεν;
For if indeed it is easy to settle affairs here, using our entire force, it is easy to sail from a fresh start against those things; but if the business is greater, why, when we are unable to adequately withstand things here, do we seek out foreign troubles for ourselves?
ὑπερβολὴν δὲ ποιήσομαι· εἰ γὰρ ἴσα καὶ κοινὰ θείημεν εἶναι τἀν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα, ὃ πολλῷ πλεονεκτεῖν ἡμᾶς ἔγωγʼ ἂν φαίην εἶναι, εἴπερ οὕτως εἶχεν, ἐκεῖνό γε δή που πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα, ὅτι οὐ τοσοῦτον κέρδος λαβεῖν Σικελίαν εἰ προχωροῖ, ὁπόσον τι κακὸν τοσαύτῃ δυνάμει σφαλῆναι.
And I will make an exaggeration: for if we should suppose the affairs in Sicily to be equal and balanced—which I for my part would say means we are far superior, if indeed it were so—we surely all know this, that it is not so great a gain to capture Sicily if it succeeds, as it is an evil to fail with so great a force.
ὅτε τοίνυν μείζων ὁ φόβος τῆς ἐλπίδος, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον φυλάξασθαι;
When, therefore, the fear is greater than the hope, how is it not worthy to be on our guard?
θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν φοβουμένων μὲν Συρακοσίους μὴ δεῦρʼ ἐπιπλεύσωσιν, αὐτοὺς δʼ ἐπʼ ἐκείνους πλεῖν κελευόντων, ὥσπερ ἄδειαν οὖσαν.
And I wonder at those who, while fearing the Syracusans lest they sail here, yet bid us to sail against them, as if there were safety.
ἐγὼ δʼ ἡγοῦμαι μὲν Συρακοσίους οὐχ οὕτω παραφρονεῖν ὥστʼ ἀγαπητῶς καὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀπαλλαγέντας πραγμάτων αὑτοῖς κινεῖν ἕτερα, ἄλλως τε καὶ παρʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐγνωκότας ὡς οὐ λυσιτελὲς τοσαύτην ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ῥᾳδίως κινεῖσθαι, εὐξαίμην δʼ ἂν ἅπασι τοῖς θεοῖς ἐνταυθοῖ λαβεῖν αὐτούς.
But I think that the Syracusans are not so mad as to stir up other troubles for themselves after having been unexpectedly and beyond expectation delivered from their difficulties, especially since they have learned from our own example that it is not profitable to move so great a force easily from one's own country; and I would pray to all the gods to catch them here.
ἅμα μὲν γὰρ οὐ πρὸς ἴσας ναῦς προσοισόμεθʼ αὐτῶν, ὅσας περ ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν σωτηρίας ἐκεῖ παρέξονται, ἅμα δʼ οἶμαι τὸν νόμον εἴσονται τῶν ὑπερορίων καὶ μεγάλων στρατειῶν· ᾧ περιέπεσε μὲν ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς ὁ δεῦρο στρατεύσας, περιέπεσον δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι διαβάντες εἰς Σικελίαν μυριάσι πολλαῖς καὶ πεζῆς καὶ ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως.
For on the one hand, we shall not face an equal number of their ships, as many as they will provide there for their own safety, and on the other hand, I think they will learn the law of distant and great expeditions, which overtook the Persian king who marched here, and overtook the Carthaginians who crossed into Sicily with many tens of thousands of both land and sea forces.
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τά τε οἰκεῖα φυλάττειν δυνατὸν καὶ τοὺς μακρὰν ἀφεστῶτας χειροῦσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀκολουθεῖ τις νέμεσις τῷ τολμήματι.
For it is not equally possible to guard one's own possessions and to subdue those far away, but a certain nemesis follows the bold attempt.
ἃ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γιγνώσκοντες οὐδὲν οὕτως ὡς τὰς διὰ πολλοῦ στρατείας φυλάττονται.
Which the Lacedaemonians also knowing, they guard against nothing so much as expeditions at a distance.
καὶ γάρ τοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δύνανται τὰς κατὰ μικρὸν πλεονεξίας συλλέγοντες.
And indeed, they have no small power among the Greeks by collecting small advantages.
εἰ δὲ δεῖ πάντων ἀποστάντα ἓν
But if it is necessary, having abandoned all, to...