§85.1Fr. 85
Ὁ Θ. ἀντιλέγει τῷ Πλάτωνι περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ πάσας ἀληθεῖς.
Theophrastus argues against Plato regarding the point that pleasure is not true and false, but that all pleasures are true.
Εἰ γάρ ἐστί τις, φησὶν, ἡδονὴ ψευδὴς, ἔσται τις ἡδονή οὐχ ἡδονή·
For if, he says, there is some false pleasure, some pleasure will be non-pleasure.
ἢ μάλιστα μὲν οὐδὲν συμβήσεται τοιοῦτον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψευδὴς δόξα οὐδὲν ἧττον δόξα·
Or rather, no such thing will happen; for even false belief is no less belief.
εἰ δὲ καὶ συμβαίη τι ἄτοπον τὴν ἐσχάτην ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσαν εἶναι μὴ εἶναι ἡδονήν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὄντι ἄλλως οὐκ ὂν ἁπλῶς οἷον τὸ γεννητὸν οὐχ ὅπερ ὄν.
But even if some absurdity should result, namely that the extreme pleasure, which seems to be pleasure, is not pleasure; since even for that which exists in another way, it is not simply existing, just as that which is generated is not that which exists.
Καὶ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης τινὰς ἡδονὰς πρός τι εἶναι ἡδονὰς ἀξιοῖ καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, οἷον τὰς τῶν νοσούντων καὶ τῷ πικρῷ χρωμένων ὡς γλυκεῖ.
For Aristotle too claims that certain pleasures are pleasures relatively and not simply, such as those of people who are sick and experience the bitter as sweet.
Ἔτι φησὶν ὁ Θ. τριχῶς τὸ ψεῦδος· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἔθος ἐπίπλαστον ἢ ὡς λόγος ἢ ὡς πρᾶγμά τι ὄν.
Furthermore, Theophrastus says that the false is spoken of in three ways: either as a simulated character, or as speech, or as some object that exists but does not exist.
Κατὰ τί οὖν, φησὶν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ψευδής;
In respect of what, then, he says, is pleasure false?
οὔτε γὰρ ἦθος ἡδονὴ οὔτε λόγος οὔτε ὂν, οὐκ ὄν·
For pleasure is neither a character, nor speech, nor an object that exists but does not exist.
τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ψευδὲς ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι χαρακτηρζόμεν.
For such is the false object, characterized by non-existence.
Ἢ ῥητέον ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς τρεῖς διοριο. σμούς ἐστι ψευδὴς ἡ ἡδονή·
Or should we say that pleasure is false according to the three definitions?
καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπλαστος ἡ τοῦ ἐπιπλάστου ἤθους, καὶ ἄλογος ἡ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς εἰς τὸ ψεῦδος ἀποπλανηθεῖσα δόξα καὶ τούτῳ ἐφηδομένη· καὶ μὴ οὖσα ἡ κατὰ ἀπουσίαν τοῦ λυπηροῦ φανταζομένη ἡδονὴ καὶ ταῦτα μὴ παρόντος ἡδέος;
For that of a simulated character is also simulated, and the belief that has strayed into falsehood instead of truth, and rejoices in this, is irrational, and is not the pleasure imagined according to the absence of the painful non-existent, especially when no pleasant thing is present?