§58.1Fr. 58
Ὁ γοῦν Θ. ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Προτέρων Ἀναλυτικῶν λέγων περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου σημαινομένων οὕτως γράφει· "Τρίτον τὸ ὑπάρχον· ὅτε γὰρ ὑπάρχει τότε οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
Theophrastus, at any rate, in the first book of the Prior Analytics, speaking about the things signified by "the necessary," writes as follows: "Third, the actually existing; for when it actually exists, then it is impossible not to actually exist.
Ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου τὸ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὑποτίθεσθαι εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἂν λάβῃ τις εἶναι, οὐκ ἀδύνατόν τι ἀκολουθήσει.
But what is peculiar to the contingent is that what is not is assumed to be, since even if one should assume the necessary and the actually existing to be, nothing impossible will follow.
Καὶ ἔσται ἐφαρμόζων ὁ λόγος καὶ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ καὶ τῷ ὑπάρχοντι· διὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον αὐτὸ ὡς ὑπάρχον ὑποτεθὲν μηδὲν ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ἑπόμενον. "
And the definition will apply to both the necessary and the actually existing; therefore, what is peculiar to the contingent is that that which does not actually exist, when assumed itself to actually exist, has nothing impossible following it."