§47.1Fr. 47
Εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ὅτι οὔτε τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐστὶ τοὐλάχιστον ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔλασσον ἀεὶ, οὔτε τὸ μέγιαε στον, ὡς καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ λέξις τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου δηλοῖ, καὶ μέντοι Θ. ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου δευτέρῳ τάδε γράφων· "ἔπειτα τὸ διὰ τοῦτο λέγειν πάντα ἐν παντὶ, διότι καὶ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐν σμικρότητι ἄπειρα, καὶ οὔτε τὸ ἐλάχιστον οὔτε τὸ μέγιστον ἔστι λαβεῖν, οὐχ ἱκανὸν πρὸς πίστιν," ἅμα μὲν ἀναιρεῖ τοῦτο ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κ. τ. λ.
Fr. 47 Since Anaxagoras said that of the small there is no least, but there is always a smaller, nor is there a greatest—as the very wording of Anaxagoras shows—and indeed, Theophrastus writing as follows in the second book of his *On Anaxagoras*: "Next, to say that all things are in all things for this reason, because they are infinite both in greatness and in smallness, and it is not possible to grasp either the least or the greatest, is not sufficient for conviction," Aristotle at the same time refutes this, etc.