§31εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦθ᾽ ἕνεκά του, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ληπτέον τινὰς ὅρους καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ἁπλῶς θετέον·
But if this is not for the sake of something, we must also grasp certain limits with respect to the best, and not posit it absolutely of all things.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἔχει τινὰ διστασμὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς λέγομεν ἃ καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον.
Since even things of this sort have a certain doubt, and we speak both absolutely and of each case.
ἁπλῶς μὲν ὅτι τὴν φύσιν ἐν ἅπασιν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐνδέχεται μεταδιδόναι τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ τεταγμένου· ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ὁμοίως· ὅπου γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ βέλτιον ἐνταῦθα οὐδαμοῦ παραλείπει, οἷον τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τὴν φάρυγγα τοῦ οἰσοφάγου, τιμιώτερον γὰρ, καὶ ἐν τῇ μέσῃ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀρίστην, ὅτι τὸ μέσον τιμιώτατον.
Absolutely, indeed, that nature in all things desires the best and, where it is possible, imparts of the eternal and the ordered; and likewise also in the case of animals; for where the better is possible, there she nowhere fails, as for instance the pharynx in front of the esophagus, for it is more honorable, and the best mixture in the middle cavity of the heart, because the middle is most honorable.
§32ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα κόσμου χάριν εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις οὕτως· ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐμφαίνει διότι πολὺ τὸ οὐχ ὑπακοῦον οὐδὲ δεχόμενον τὸ εὖ, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλῷ πλεῖον· ὀλίγον γάρ τι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἄπειρον δὲ τὸ ἄψυχον· καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀκαριαῖον· καὶ βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι· τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον σπάνιόν τε καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος τὸ κακόν.
And likewise also with respect to all that is for the sake of order; for if indeed the desire is thus, yet at least that reveals that much is that which does not obey nor receive the good, or rather far more; for the animate is a small thing, while the inanimate is infinite; and of the animate themselves, an instant; and to exist is better; but as a whole, the good is both rare and in few things, while the bad is a great multitude.
οὐκ εἰ ἀοριστία δὲ μόνον καὶ οἷον ὕλης εἴδη καθάπερ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἀμαθεστάτου.
And it is not only if there is indeterminacy and, as it were, forms of matter such as belong to the most ignorant nature.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ οἱ περὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας λέγοντες ὥσπερ Σπεύσιππος σπάνιόν τι τὸ τίμιον ποιεῖ τὸ περὶ τὴν τού μέσου χώραν· τὰ δ᾽ ἄκρα καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν.
For even those who speak about the whole substance, like Speusippus, make the honorable a rare thing, that which is around the region of the middle; and the extremes and on either side are not so.
τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄντα καλῶς ἔτυχεν ὄντα.
So, existing things happen to exist well.
§33Πλάτων δὲ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μακρὰν τὴν ἀπόστασιν ἐπιμιμεῖσθαί γε θέλειν ἅπαντα· καίτοι καθάπερ ἀντίθεσίν τινα ποιοῦσι τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· ἐν ᾗ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἄτακτον καὶ πᾶσα ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀμορφία καθ᾽ αὑτήν.
But Plato and the Pythagoreans hold that, though the distance is great, all things at least wish to imitate the One; and yet they make a sort of opposition of the indefinite dyad and the One; in which are both the infinite and the unordered and, so to speak, all shapelessness in itself.
ὅλως δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ταύτης τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἰσομοιρεῖν ἢ καὶ ὑπερέχειν τὰς ἑτέρας ἢ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας.
But in general, the nature of the whole is not possible without this, but it is as if the other things have an equal share, or even exceed, or indeed the principles are contrary.
διὸ καὶ οὐδὲ τὸν θεὸν, ὅσοι τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπτουσι, δύνασθαι πάντ᾽ εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἄγειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται· τάχα δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν προέλοιτ᾽ εἰπερ ἀναιρεῖσθαι συμβήσεται τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ἐξ ἐναντίων γε καὶ ἐν ἐναντίοις οὖσαν.
Wherefore not even God, as many as attribute the cause to God, is able to lead all things to the best, but if at all, only so far as is possible; and perhaps he would not even choose to, if it should happen that the whole substance is destroyed, being indeed composed of contraries and existing in contraries.
§34φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐπιθεωρούμενα πολλὰ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς τῆς γῆς λεχθέντα μεταβολάς· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον οὔτε τὸ τίνος χάριν ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἀνάγκῃ τινὶ κατακολουθεῖν· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις.
And many things are seen to be observed as happening by chance even among the first things, for instance what was said about the changes of the earth; for there is neither the better nor the 'for the sake of what', but if anything, they follow a certain necessity; and many such things are also in the air and in other things.
μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τὰ οὐράνια τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ πρότερα τούτων τὰ μαθηματικά· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ πᾶν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τούτοις πλέον τὸ τεταγμένον· πλὴν εἴ τις τοιαύτας λαμβάνοι τὰς μορφὰς οἵας Δημόκριτος ὑποτίθεται τῶν ἀτόμων.
And of sensible things, the heavenly bodies would seem especially to have order, and of the others, unless indeed the mathematical objects are prior to them; for even if not all, yet in these the ordered is more abundant; unless indeed one were to assume such shapes as Democritus posits of the atoms.
ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτων μὲν πέρι σκεπτέον.
But indeed, concerning these we must investigate.
ὃ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέχθη πειρατέον τινὰ λαμνβάνειν ὅρον καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ σύμιπαντος οὐσίᾳ καὶ τοῦ ἕνεκά του καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ βέλτιον ὁρμῆς.
And what was said from the beginning: we must try to grasp some limit, both in nature and in the substance of the whole, of the 'for the sake of something' and of the impulse toward the better.
αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος θεωρίας, ἐν τίσι τὰ ὄντα καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα
For this is the principle of the contemplation of the whole, in what things existing things are and how they are related to one another.