§1Πῶς ἀφορίσαι δεῖ καὶ ποίοις τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν πρώτων θεωρίαν;
How and by what principles should one define the contemplation of first things?
ἡ γὰρ δὴ τῆς φύσεως πολυχουστέρα, καὶ ὥς γε δή τινές φασι ἀτακτοτέρα μεταβολὰς ἔχουσα παντοίας· ἡ δὲ τῶν πρώτων ὡρισμένη καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτά.
For that of nature is more manifold, and, as indeed some say, more disordered, having all kinds of changes; whereas that of first things is determinate and always in the same state.
διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐν νοητοῖς, οὐκ αἰσθητοῖς, αὐτὴν τιθέασιν ὡς ἀκινήτοις καὶ ἀμεταβλήτοις.
Therefore they place it among intelligible, not sensible, things, as being motionless and unchangeable.
καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ σεμνοτέραν καὶ μείζω νομίζουσιν αὐτήν.
And on the whole, they consider it to be more venerable and greater.
§2ἀρχὴ δὲ ποτέρα συναφή τις καὶ οἷον κοινωνία πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τε νοητοῖς καὶ τοῖς τῆς φύσεως, ἢ οὐδεμία, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἑκάτερα κεχωρισμένα συνεργοῦντα δέ πως εἰς τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν.
But as a starting point, is there some connection and, as it were, communion between intelligible things and those of nature, or is there none, but rather each is separated, yet cooperating in some way toward the whole of reality?
εὐλογώτερον οὖν εἶναί τινα συναφὴν καὶ μὴ ἐπεισοδιῶδες τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον τὰ μὲν πρότερα τὰ δὲ ὕστερα, καὶ ἀρχὰς τὰ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀΐδια τῶν φθαρτῶν.
It is therefore more reasonable that there is some connection, and that the universe is not episodic, but rather some things are prior and others posterior, some are principles and others subordinate to principles, just as eternal things are to destructible ones.
εἰ δ᾽ οὖν οὕτω, τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν ποίοις;
If this is so, what is their nature and in what things does it reside?
§3εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς μόνοις τὰ νοητὰ καθάπερ τινές φασιν, οὔτ᾽ ἄγαν εὔσημος ἡ συναφὴ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, οὔθ᾽ ὅλως ἀξιοχρέα φαίνεται παντός· οἷον γὰρ μεμηχανημένα δοκεῖ δι᾽ ἡμῶν εἶναι σχήματά τε καὶ μορφὰς καὶ λόγους περιτιθέντων, αὐτὰ δὲ δι᾽ αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν φύσιν.
For if, as some say, intelligible things are restricted to mathematical objects alone, the connection with sensible things is not very clear, nor does it seem at all adequate for the whole of things; for they seem as if devised through us, who attribute shapes, forms, and ratios to them, while they have no nature of their own.
εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐχ ὥστε συνάπτειν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ὥστ᾽ ἐμποιῆσαι καθάπερ ζωὴν καὶ κίνησιν αὐτοῖς.
And if they are not, they are not of such a kind as to connect with the things of nature so as to produce in them life and motion, as it were.
οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅνπερ δὴ πρῶτον καὶ κυριώτατόν τινες τιθέασιν.
For neither does number itself, which some indeed posit as the first and most sovereign thing, do so.
§4εἰ δὲ ἑτέρα τις οὐσία προτέρα καὶ κρείττων ἐστὶ ταύτην πειρατέον λέγειν, πότερον μία τις κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἢ κατʼ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ γένος.
If, however, there is some other substance, prior and superior, we must try to describe it, and say whether it is one in number, or in form, or in genus.
εὐλογώτερον δ᾽ οὖν ἀρχῆς φύσιν ἔχουσαν ἐν ὀλίγοις εἶναι καὶ περιττοῖς εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ πρώτοις καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ.
In any case, it is more reasonable that what has the nature of a principle exists in few and exceptional things, if indeed not in first things and in the First itself.
τίς δʼ οὖν αὕτη καὶ τίνες, εἰ πλείους, πειρατέον ἐμφαίνειν ἁμωσγέπως εἴτε κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν εἴτε κατʼ ἄλλην ὁμοίωσιν.
In any case, we must try to make clear somehow, whether by analogy or by some other comparison, what this is and who they are, if there are more than one.
ἀνάγκη δʼ ἴσως δυνάμει τινὶ καὶ ὑπεροχῇ τῶν ἄλλων λαμβάνειν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν θεόν· θεία γὰρ ἡ πάντων ἀρχὴ διʼ ἧς ἅπαντα καὶ ἔστι καὶ διαμένει.
And perhaps we must apprehend it by a certain power and pre-eminence over other things, as we would God; for the principle of all things is divine, through which all things both exist and endure.
τάχα μὲν οὖν ῥᾴδιον τὸ οὕτως ἀποδοῦναι, χαλεπὸν δὲ σαφεστέρως ἢ πειστικωτέρως.
Now, to state it thus is perhaps easy, but to do so more clearly or more persuasively is difficult.
§5τοιαύτης δʼ οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπείπερ συνάπτει τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἡ δὲ φύσις ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐν κινήσει καὶ τοῦτʼ αὐτῆς τὸ ἴδιον, δῆλον ὡς αἰτίαν θετέον ταύτην τῆς κινήσεως·
Since the principle is of this character, inasmuch as it connects with sensible things, and since nature, simply speaking, is in motion, and this is its proper characteristic, it is clear that we must posit this principle as the cause of motion.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀκίνητος καθʼ αὐτὴν φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ κινεῖσθαι τοῖς τῆς φύσεως αἰτία ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν ἄλλῃ τινὶ δυνάμει κρείττονι καὶ προτέρᾳ·
But since it is motionless in itself, it is manifest that it would not be the cause of motion for the things of nature by being moved itself, but rather by some other, superior and prior power.
τοιαύτη δʼ ἡ τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ φύσις, ἀφʼ ἧς ἡ κυκλικὴ ἡ συνεχὴς καὶ ἄπαυστος.
And such is the nature of the object of desire, from which arises the circular, continuous, and unceasing motion.
ὥστε κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνο λύοιτο ἂν τὸ μὴ εἶναι κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ εἰ κινούμενον κινήσει.
Thus, in that respect, the problem would be solved that either there is no principle of motion, or, if there is, it must move by another motion.
§6μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων οἷον ἄρτιος ὁ λόγος ἀρχήν τε ποιῶν μίαν πάντων καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αποδιδούς, ἔτι δὲ μὴ διαιρετὸν μηδὲ ποσόν τι λέγων ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἐξαίρων εἰς κρείττω τινὰ μερίδα καὶ θειοτέραν οὕτω γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀποδοτέον ἢ τὸ διαιρετὸν καὶ μεριστὸν ἀραιρετέον·
Up to this point, then, the argument is, as it were, complete, making the principle of all things one, and assigning to it both activity and substance, and moreover saying that it is neither divisible nor any quantity, but simply raising it to a superior and more divine portion. For it is more appropriate to attribute properties to it in this way than that the divisible and partible should be removed.
ἅμα γὰρ ἐν ὑψηλοτέρῳ τε καὶ ἀληθινωτέρῳ λόγῳ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡ ἀπόφασις.
For at the same time, negation belongs to those who speak in a higher and truer discourse.
§7τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἤδη λόγου δεῖται πλείονος περὶ τῆς ἐφέσεως, ποία καὶ τίνων.
But the next step already requires more discussion concerning the desire, what kind it is and of what things.
ἐπειδὴ πλείω τὰ κυκλικὰ καὶ αἱ φοραὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὑπεναντίαι, καὶ τὸ ἀνήνυτον καὶ οὗ χάριν ἀφανές.
Since there are several circular movements and their motions are in a way contrary to one another, both the endlessness and that for the sake of which they move are obscure.
εἴτε γὰρ ἓν τὸ κινοῦν, ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ πάντα τὴν αὐτήν· εἴτε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἕτερον αἵ τ᾽ ἀρχαὶ πλείους ὥστε τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶν εἰς ὄρεξιν ἰόνκ τῶν τὴν ἀρίστην οὐδαμῶς φανερόν.
For if that which moves is one, it is absurd that all do not perform the same movement; whereas if there is a different mover for each, and the principles are more than one, their harmony as they move toward the best desire is in no way clear.