§8.14#2Ἔτι τὸν ἕνα λόγον πολλοὺς ποιεῖν ἐθιστέον, ὡς ἀδηλότατα κρύπτοντας.
Further, one must accustom oneself to making one argument many, hiding them as obscurely as possible.
Εἴη δ᾿ ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τις ὅτι πλεῖστον ἀφισταίη τῆς συγγενείας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος.
And such a thing would be possible, if one were to move as far as possible away from the relationship of the things about which the argument is.
Ἔσονται δὲ δυνατοὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ μάλιστα καθόλου τοῦτο πάσχειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μία πλειόνων ἐπιστήμη· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ συστοίχων ἐστίν.
And those of the arguments will be capable of undergoing this which are most universal, for instance, that there is not one science of several things; for in this way it is so both in the case of relatives, and in the case of contraries, and in the case of coordinates.
Δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀπομνημονεύσεις καθόλου ποιεῖσθαι τῶν λόγων, κἂν ᾖ διειλεγμένος ἐπὶ μέρους· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πολλοὺς ἐξέσται τὸν ἕνα ποιεῖν.
And one must also make the memorizing of arguments universal, even if one has argued in a particular case; for in this way it will be possible to make one argument many.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ῥητορικοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων.
Similarly also in rhetorics in the case of enthymemes.
Αὐτὸν δ᾿ ὅτι μάλιστα φεύγειν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου φέρειν τοὺς συλλογισμούς.
But oneself must avoid as much as possible bringing deductions to the universal.
Ἀεί τε δεῖ σκοπεῖν τοὺς λόγους, εἰ ἐπὶ κοινῶν διαλέγονται· πάντες γὰρ οἱ ἐν μέρει καὶ καθόλου διειλεγμένοι εἰσί, καὶ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ κατὰ μέρος ἡ τοῦ καθόλου ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι συλλογίσασθαι μηδὲν ἄνευ τοῦ καθόλου.
And one must always examine the arguments, whether they are discussing on common grounds; for all particular arguments are also argued universally, and the proof of the universal is present in the particular, because it is not possible to deduce anything without the universal.
Τὴν δὲ γυμνασίαν ἀποδοτέον τῶν μὲν ἐπακτικῶν πρὸς νέον, τῶν δὲ συλλογιστικῶν πρὸς ἔμπειρον.
And one must assign training in inductive arguments to a young person, and that in deductive arguments to an experienced person.
Πειρατέον δὲ λαμβάνειν παρὰ μὲν τῶν συλλογιστικῶν τὰς προτάσεις, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἐπακτικῶν τὰς παραβολάς· εν τούτοις γὰρ ἑκάτεροι γεγυμνασμένοι εἰσίν.
And one must try to obtain premises from the deductive, and comparisons from the inductive; for in these each of them has been trained.
Ὅλως δ᾿ ἐκ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι διαλεγόμενον πειρατέον ἀποφέρεσθαι ἢ συλλογισμὸν περί τινος ἢ λύσιν ἢ πρότασιν ἢ εἰ ὀρθῶς τις ἤρετο ἢ εἰ μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος, καὶ παρὰ τί ἑκάτερον.
In general, from training by arguing, one must try to carry away either a deduction about something, or a solution, or a premise, or whether someone asked correctly or not correctly, whether oneself or another, and owing to what each of the two happened.
Ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἡ δύναμις, τὸ δὲ γυμνάζεσθαι δυνάμεως χάριν, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τὰς προτάσεις καὶ ἐνστάσεις· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς ὁ προτατικὸς καὶ ἐνστατικός.
For the capability comes from these, and training is for the sake of capability, and especially concerning premises and objections; for to speak simply, the dialectician is the one who proposes premises and who objects.
Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν προτείνεσθαι ἓν ποιεῖν τὰ πλείω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ὅλῳ ληφθῆναι πρὸς ὃ ὁ λόγος), τὸ δ᾿ ἐνίστασθαι τὸ ἓν πολλά· ἢ γὰρ διαιρεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδοὺς τὸ δ᾿ οὒ τῶν προτεινομένων.
And to propose is to make the many one (for the object against which the argument is must be taken as a whole), whereas to object is to make the one many; for the objector either divides or refutes, granting one of the proposed premises and not the other.
Οὐχ ἅπαντι δὲ διαλεκτέον, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα γυμναστέον.
But one must not argue with everyone, nor practice with any chance person.
Ἀνάγκη γὰρ πρὸς ἐνίους φαύλους γίνεσθαι τοὺς λόγους· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πάντως πειρώμενον φαίνεσθαι διαφεύγειν δίκαιον μὲν πάντως πειρᾶσθαι συλλογίσασθαι, οὐκ εὔσχημον δέ.
For with some low people the arguments must become base; for against one who tries by all means to appear to escape, it is just indeed to try by all means to deduce, but it is not seemly.
Διόπερ οὐ δεῖ συνεστάναι εὐχερῶς πρὸς τοὺς τυχόντας· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πονηρολογίαν συμβαίνειν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ γυμναζόμενοι ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι μὴ ἀγωνιστικῶς.
Therefore one must not readily join with any chance persons; for it is necessary that evil-speaking results; for indeed those who practice are unable to abstain from arguing contentiously.
Δεῖ δὲ καὶ πεποιημένους ἔχειν λόγους πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν προβλημάτων, ἐν οἷς ἐλαχίστων εὐπορήσαντες πρὸς πλεῖστα χρησίμους ἕξομεν.
And one must also have prepared arguments against those kinds of problems in which, having been well provided with the fewest things, we shall have them useful for the most things.
Οὗτοι δ᾿ εἰσὶν οἱ καθόλου, καὶ πρὸς οὓς πορίζεσθαι χαλεπώτερον ἐκ τῶν παρὰ πόδας.
And these are the universal arguments, and those for which it is more difficult to provide from what is ready at hand.