§6.8Ἐὰν δ᾿ ᾖ πρός τι τὸ ὁριζόμενον ἢ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ἢ κατὰ τὸ γένος, σκοπεῖν εἰ μὴ εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ κατὰ τὸ γένος, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὡρίσατο ὑπόληψιν ἀμετάπειστον ἢ τὴν βούλησιν ὄρεξιν ἄλυπον.
If the term to be defined is a relative, either in itself or in virtue of its genus, one must examine whether there has been omitted in the definition the relation to that which it is said to be related, either in itself or in virtue of its genus; for example, if one defined knowledge as 'a belief that cannot be shaken by persuasion', or wish as 'painless desire'.
Παντὸς γὰρ τοῦ πρός τι ἡ οὐσία πρὸς ἕτερον, ἐπειδὴ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρός τι τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν.
For the essence of every relative is in relation to another, since for each of the relatives, to be is the same as to be related to something in some way.
Ἔδει οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἰπεῖν ὑπόληψιν ἐπιστητοῦ καὶ τὴν βούλησιν ὄρεξιν ἀγαθοῦ.
Therefore, one ought to have said that knowledge is 'a belief in what is knowable', and wish 'a desire for what is good'.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὴν γραμματικὴν ὡρίσατο ἐπιστήμην γραμμάτων· ἔδει γὰρ ἢ πρὸς ὃ αὐτὸ λέγεται ἢ πρὸς ὅ ποτε τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ ἀποδίδοσθαι.
Likewise also if one defined grammar as 'knowledge of letters'; for either that to which the thing itself is related, or that to which its genus is related, ought to have been rendered in the definition.
Ἢ εἰ πρός τι εἰρημένον μὴ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀποδέδοται.
Or, if a relative is mentioned, whether it has not been rendered in relation to its end.
Τέλος δ᾿ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἢ οὗ χάριν τἆλλα.
And the end in each case is the best, or that for the sake of which other things are.
Ῥητέον δὴ ἢ τὸ βέλτιστον ἢ τὸ ἔσχατον, οἷον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν οὐχ ἡδέος ἀλλ᾿ ἡδονῆς· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ αἱρούμεθα.
One must, then, state either the best or the ultimate; for example, desire should be said to be not of 'what is pleasant' but of 'pleasure'; for it is for the sake of this that we choose also what is pleasant.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ γένεσίς ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἀποδέδωκεν ἢ ἐνέργεια· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων τέλος· μᾶλλον γὰρ τὸ ἐνηργηκέναι καὶ γεγενῆσθαι τέλος ἢ τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν.
One must also examine whether that to which he has rendered the relation is a process of generation or an activity; for none of these is an end, since having completed the activity and having been generated are more of an end than generating and being active.
Ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀληθὲς τὸ τοιοῦτον·
Or is this sort of thing not true in all cases?
σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἥδεσθαι μᾶλλον βούλονται ἢ πεπαῦσθαι ἡδόμενοι, ὥστε τὸ ἐνεργεῖν μᾶλλον τέλος ἂν ποιοῖντο τοῦ ἐνηργηκέναι.
For almost most people prefer to enjoy themselves rather than to have ceased enjoying themselves, so that they would make being active the end rather than having completed the activity.
Πάλιν ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων εἰ μὴ διώρικε τοῦ πόσου ἢ ποίου ἢ ποῦ ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, οἷον φιλότιμος ὁ ποίας καὶ ὁ πόσης ὀρεγόμενος τιμῆς·
Again, in the case of some things, whether he has failed to define the quantity, quality, place, or other differences; for example, what kind of honor and how much honor the ambitious man desires.
πάντες γὰρ ὀρέγονται τιμῆς, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἀπόχρη φιλότιμον εἰπεῖν τὸν ὀρεγόμενον τιμῆς, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τὰς εἰρημένας διαφοράς.
For all men desire honor, so that it is not sufficient to say that an ambitious man is one who desires honor, but one must add the aforementioned differences.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φιλοχρήματος ὁ πόσων ὀρεγόμενος χρημάτων ἢ ἀκρατὴς ὁ περὶ ποίας ἡδονάς· οὐ γὰρ ὁ ὑφ᾿ οἱασποτοῦν ἡδονῆς κρατούμενος ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ ὑπό τινος.
Likewise also, the lover of money is one who desires how much money, or the incontinent man is one who is concerned with what kind of pleasures; for a man is not called incontinent because he is mastered by just any pleasure, but by some particular kind.
Ἢ πάλιν, ὡς ὁρίζονται τὴν νύκτα σκιὰν γῆς, ἢ τὸν σεισμὸν κίνησιν γῆς, ἢ τὸ νέφος πύκνωσιν ἀέρος, ἢ τὸ πνεῦμα κίνησιν ἀέρος· προσθετέον γὰρ πόσου καὶ ποίου καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος.
Or again, as they define night as 'the shadow of the earth', or an earthquake as 'the movement of the earth', or a cloud as 'the condensation of air', or wind as 'the movement of air'; for one must add how much, of what kind, and by what.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων· ἀπολείπων γὰρ διαφορὰν ἡντινοῦν οὐ λέγει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
Likewise also in the case of other such things; for he who leaves out any difference whatsoever does not state the essence.
Δεῖ δ᾿ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιχειρεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν γῆς κινηθείσης οὐδ᾿ ὁποσησοῦν σεισμὸς ἔσται, ὁμοίως δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἀέρος ὁπωσοῦν οὐδ᾿ ὁποσουοῦν κινηθέντος πνεῦμα.
And one must always direct the attack against the deficiency; for an earthquake will not occur if the earth is moved in just any way or by just any amount, nor likewise will there be wind if the air is moved in just any way or by just any amount.
Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων εἰ μὴ πρόσκειται τὸ φαινόμενον, καὶ ἐφ᾿ ὅσων ἄλλων ἁρμόττει, οἷον ὅτι ἡ βούλησις ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, ἡ δ᾿ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις ἡδέος, ἀλλὰ μὴ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδέος.
Moreover, in the case of desires, whether the word 'apparent' has not been added, and in all other cases where this is appropriate; for example, that wish is 'a desire for the good', and appetite 'a desire for the pleasant', instead of 'the apparent good' or 'the apparent pleasant'.
Πολλάκις γὰρ λανθάνει τοὺς ὀρεγομένους ὅ τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ ἐστιν, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον μόνον.
For it often escapes those who desire what is good or pleasant, so that it is not necessary for it to be good or pleasant, but only apparently so.
Ἔδει οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιήσασθαι.
Therefore, the definition ought to have been rendered in this way.
Ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἀποδῷ τὸ εἰρημένον, ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδη ἀκτέον τὸν τιθέμενον ἰδέας εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἰδέα φαινομένου οὐδενός, τὸ δ᾿ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, οἷον αὐτὴ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ ἡδέος καὶ αὐτὴ βούλησις αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
But if he does render it as stated, the person who posits that there are Ideas must be led to the Forms; for there is no Idea of anything apparent, and the Form is thought to be said in relation to the Form; for example, appetite itself is of the pleasant itself, and wish itself is of the good itself.
Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ οὐδὲ φαινομένου ἡδέος· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ.
It is not, therefore, of the apparent good or of the apparent pleasant; for it would be absurd for the Form itself to be an apparent good or pleasant.