§6.5Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἰπεῖν εἷς ἐστὶ τόπος τὸ μὴ διὰ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων ποιήσασθαι τὸν λόγον, μέρη δ᾿ αὐτοῦ τὰ εἰρημένα.
To speak generally, then, there is one topic: not to make the formula through things that are prior and more knowable, and the parts of it are those we have mentioned.
Δεύτερος, εἰ ἐν γένει τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος μὴ κεῖται ἐν γένει.
Second, if, when the thing is in a genus, it is not placed in a genus.
Ἐν ἅπασι δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁμάρτημά ἐστιν, ἐν οἷς οὐ πρόκειται τοῦ λόγου τὸ τί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τοῦ σώματος ὁρισμός, τὸ ἔχον τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἢ εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁρίσαιτο τὸ ἐπιστάμενον ἀριθμεῖν.
This sort of error occurs in all cases where the 'what it is' is not placed first in the formula, for example, the definition of body as 'that which has three dimensions', or if one were to define man as 'that which knows how to count'.
Οὐ γὰρ εἴρηται τί ὂν τρεῖς ἔχει διαστάσεις ἢ τί ὂν ἐπίσταται ἀριθμεῖν· τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν, καὶ πρῶτον ὑποτίθεται τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων.
For it has not been said what it is that has three dimensions, or what it is that knows how to count; and the genus intends to signify the 'what it is', and is posited as the first of the things spoken of in the definition.
Ἔτι εἰ πρὸς πλείω λεγομένου τοῦ ὁριζομένου μὴ πρὸς πάντα ἀποδέδωκεν, οἷον εἰ τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ γράψαι τὸ ὑπαγορευθέν· προσδεῖται γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦ γράψαι ἢ τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι ἀποδοὺς ὥρισται, ὥστ᾿ οὐδέτερος, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ ἄμφω ταῦτ᾿ εἰπών, ἐπειδὴ πλείους οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταὐτοῦ ὁρισμοὺς εἶναι.
Moreover, if, when the defined thing is said in relation to several things, he has not rendered it in relation to all, for example, if he defined grammar as the science of writing what is dictated; for it needs in addition 'and of reading'; for he has defined it no more by rendering it of writing than of reading, so that neither is the definition, but he who has mentioned both of these has given it, since it is not possible for there to be several definitions of the same thing.
Ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων μὲν οὖν κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν ἔχει καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δ᾿ οὔ, οἷον ἐφ᾿ ὅσων μὴ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ πρὸς ἄμφω λέγεται, καθάπερ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν ποιῆσαι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ καθ᾿ αὑτὴν λέγεται, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἁπλῶς γὰρ ἀλλότριον τῆς ἰατρικῆς τὸ νόσον ποιεῖν.
Now, in some cases it is in truth just as has been said, but in others not, for example, in all those where the thing is not said in itself in relation to both, just as medicine of producing disease and health; for it is said of the one in itself, but of the other by accident; for, simply, producing disease is foreign to medicine.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὥρισται ὁ πρὸς ἄμφω ἀποδοὺς τοῦ πρὸς θάτερον, ἀλλ᾿ ἴσως καὶ χεῖρον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁστισοῦν δυνατός ἐστι νόσον ποιῆσαι.
So he who has rendered it in relation to both has defined no more than he who has rendered it in relation to one, but perhaps even worse, since any other person whatsoever is also able to produce disease.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἀποδέδωκε, πλειόνων ὄντων πρὸς ἃ λέγεται τὸ ὁριζόμενον· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δύναμις τοῦ βελτίστου δοκεῖ εἶναι.
Moreover, if, when there are several things in relation to which the defined thing is said, he has rendered it not in relation to the better but to the worse; for every science and capacity seems to be of the best.
Πάλιν εἰ μὴ κεῖται ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ γένει τὸ λεχθέν, σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ γένη στοιχείων, καθάπερ πρότερον εἴρηται.
Again, if what is said is not placed in its proper genus, one must examine it from the elements concerning genera, just as has been said before.
Ἔτι εἰ ὑπερβαίνειν λέγει τὰ γένη, οἷον ὁ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἕξιν ἰσότητος ποιητικὴν ἢ διανεμητικὴν τοῦ ἴσου.
Moreover, if he speaks by leaping over the genera, for example, he who defines justice as 'a state productive of equality' or 'distributive of the equal'.
Ὑπερβαίνει γὰρ οὕτως ὁριζόμενος τὴν ἀρετήν.
For in defining it in this way, he leaps over virtue.
Ἀπολιπὼν οὖν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης γένος οὐ λέγει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἑκάστῳ μετὰ τοῦ γένους.
Leaving out, then, the genus of justice, he does not state the 'what it was to be'; for the essence belongs to each thing along with its genus.
Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν τῷ μὴ εἰς τὸ ἐγγυτάτω γένος θεῖναι· ὁ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐγγυτάτω θεὶς πάντα τὰ ἐπάνω εἴρηκεν, ἐπειδὴ πάντα τὰ ἐπάνω γένη τῶν ὑποκάτω κατηγορεῖται.
And this is the same as not placing it in the nearest genus; for he who has placed it in the nearest has stated all the ones above, since all the upper genera are predicated of the lower ones.
Ὥστ᾿ ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐγγυτάτω γένος θετέον, ἢ πάσας τὰς διαφορὰς τῷ ἐπάνω γένει προσαπτέον, δι᾿ ὧν ὁρίζεται τὸ ἐγγυτάτω γένος.
Therefore, either one must place it in the nearest genus, or one must attach to the upper genus all the differences by which the nearest genus is defined.
Οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη παραλελοιπώς, ἀλλ᾿ ἀντ᾿ ὀνόματος λόγῳ εἰρηκὼς ἂν εἴη τὸ ὑποκάτω γένος.
For in this way he would have omitted nothing, but would have stated the lower genus by a formula instead of a name.
Ὁ δ᾿ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ ἐπάνω γένος εἴπας οὐ λέγει καὶ τὸ ὑποκάτω γένος· ὁ γὰρ φυτὸν εἴπας οὐ λέγει δένδρον.
But he who has mentioned only the upper genus itself does not also state the lower genus; for he who has said 'plant' does not say 'tree'.