Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Topics §5.8#2

Properties from the Fourth Degree and Equal Presence

Passage 55 of 94 · Greek

Summary

The author explains the fourth case of topics from the 'more' and 'less', and then analyzes three topics from things 'similarly present' for both refuting and establishing, defining its difference from things 'similarly related'.

§5.8#2Τέταρτον δ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ ἴδιον μή ἐστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἧττον αὐτοῦ ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον.
Fourthly, for refuting, if that which is more its property is not its property; for neither will that which is less its property be its property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἢ τὸ μεριστόν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ζῴου τὸ μεριστὸν ἴδιον.
For instance, since to be perceptible is more the property of animal than to be divisible, and to be perceptible is not the property of animal, to be divisible would not be the property of animal.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τὸ ἧττον αὐτοῦ ὂν ἴδιον ἔστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ ὂν ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if that which is less its property is its property; for also that which is more its property will be its property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ἧττόν ἐστιν ἴδιον ζῴου τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ ζῆν, ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον, εἴη ἂν τοῦ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν ἴδιον.
For instance, since to perceive is less the property of animal than to live, and to perceive is the property of animal, to live would be the property of animal.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ὑπαρχόντων πρῶτον μὲν ἀνασκευάζοντα εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον μή ἐστιν ἴδιον τούτου οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον τούτου οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον.
Next, from things that are similarly present; first, for refuting, if that which is similarly a property is not the property of that of which it is similarly a property; for neither will that which is similarly a property be the property of that of which it is similarly a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ λογιστικοῦ τὸ λογίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι δ᾿ ἴδιον ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον λογιστικοῦ τὸ λογίζεσθαι.
For instance, since to desire is similarly the property of the desiring part and to reason of the reasoning part, and to desire is not the property of the desiring part, to reason would not be the property of the reasoning part.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον ἔστι τούτου ἴδιον οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον τούτου ἴδιον οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if that which is similarly a property is the property of that of which it is similarly a property; for also that which is similarly a property will be the property of that of which it is similarly a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον λογιστικοῦ τὸ πρῶτον φρόνιμον καὶ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τὸ πρῶτον σῶφρον, ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἴδιον τὸ πρῶτον φρόνιμον, εἴη ἂν τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἴδιον τὸ πρῶτον σῶφρον.
For instance, since to be primarily prudent is similarly the property of the reasoning part and to be primarily temperate of the desiring part, and to be primarily prudent is the property of the reasoning part, to be primarily temperate would be the property of the desiring part.
Δεύτερον δ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον μή ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίως ὂν ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον αὐτοῦ.
Secondly, for refuting, if that which is similarly a property is not its property; for neither will that which is similarly a property be its property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἔστι δ᾿ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ὁρᾶν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ἀκούειν.
For instance, since to see and to hear are similarly the property of man, and to see is not the property of man, to hear would not be the property of man.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τὸ ὁμοίως αὐτοῦ ὂν ἴδιον ἔστιν ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίως αὐτοῦ ὂν ἴδιον ἔσται ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if that which is similarly its property is its property; for also that which is similarly its property will be its property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐπιθυμητικὸν εἶναι καὶ λογιστικὸν πρώτου, ἔστι δὲ ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς εἶναι ἐπιθυμητικὸν πρώτου, εἴη ἂν ἴδιον ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς εἶναι λογιστικὸν πρώτου.
For instance, since to have its desiring part exist primarily and to have its reasoning part exist primarily are similarly the property of soul, and to have its desiring part exist primarily is the property of soul, to have its reasoning part exist primarily would be the property of soul.
Τρίτον δ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον, μή ἐστιν ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον, ἔσται ἴδιον.
Thirdly, for refuting, if it is not the property of that of which it is similarly a property; for neither will it be the property of that of which it is similarly a property.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἐκείνου ἐστὶν ἴδιον, οὐκ ἔσται θατέρου ἴδιον.
And if it is the property of the former, it will not be the property of the latter.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ καίειν φλογὸς καὶ ἄνθρακος, οὐκ ἔστι δ᾿ ἴδιον φλογὸς τὸ καίειν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον ἄνθρακος τὸ καίειν.
For instance, since to burn is similarly the property of flame and of coal, and to burn is not the property of flame, to burn would not be the property of coal.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἐστὶ φλογὸς ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄνθρακος ἴδιον.
And if it is the property of flame, it would not be the property of coal.
Κατασκευάζοντι δὲ οὐδὲν οὗτος ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ χρήσιμος.
But for establishing, this topic is of no use.
Διαφέρει δ᾿ ὁ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἐχόντων τοῦ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ὑπαρχόντων, ὅτι τὸ μὲν κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν λαμβάνεται, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τι θεωρούμενον, τὸ δ᾿ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τι συγκρίνεται.
But the topic from things that are similarly related differs from that from things that are similarly present, because the former is taken by analogy, not being considered on the basis of something's being present, whereas the latter is compared on the basis of something's being present.

Notes

  1. §5.8#2τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ ἴδιον — The pronoun αὐτοῦ refers to the same subject under discussion (e.g., a subject noun such as ζῷον). While the preceding section (§5.8#1, the third topic) compared how one property belongs more to one subject than to another, this section (the fourth topic) compares which of two different properties belongs more to the same subject (αὐτοῦ).
  2. §5.8#2πρώτου — This genitive functions adverbially to mean 'primarily' or 'in the first place' (not in terms of time or space, but in terms of essential attribution). It modifies the infinitival clause, indicating that the temperate or prudent character belongs directly and primarily to the respective part of the soul (ψυχῆς).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Topics §5.8#2. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg044.humanitext-grc1:5.8%232

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