§5.7#2αὐτῶν εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστι δ᾿ ἴδιον φρονήσεως τὸ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι καλοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον φρονήσεως τὸ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι αἰσχροῦ.
by being the knowledge of each, but to be the knowledge of the beautiful is not the property of wisdom, to be the knowledge of the ugly would not be the property of wisdom.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἔστιν ἴδιον φρονήσεως τὸ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι καλοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἴδιον αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι αἰσχροῦ· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἴδιον.
And if to be the knowledge of the beautiful is the property of wisdom, to be the knowledge of the ugly would not be its property; for it is impossible for the same thing to be the property of more than one thing.
Κατασκευάζοντι δὲ οὐδὲν οὗτος ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ χρήσιμος· τὸ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἓν πρὸς πλείω συγκρίνεται.
But for establishing, this topic is of no use; for that which is related in the same way compares one thing to several things.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγόμενον μή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγομένου ἴδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ φθείρεσθαι τοῦ κατὰ τὸ φθείρεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοῦ κατὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι λεγομένου ἔσται ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if that which is said according to being is not the property of that which is said according to being; for neither will to be destroyed be the property of that which is said according to being destroyed, nor will to come to be be the property of that which is said according to coming to be.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ εἶναι ζῷον, οὐδ᾿ ἂν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον γίνεσθαι εἴη ἴδιον τὸ γίνεσθαι ζῷον· οὐδ᾿ ἂν τοῦ ἄνθρωπον φθείρεσθαι εἴη ἴδιον τὸ φθείρεσθαι ζῷον.
For instance, since to be an animal is not the property of man, neither would to come to be an animal be the property of the coming to be of a man, nor would to be destroyed as an animal be the property of the destruction of a man.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ φθείρεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φθείρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι, καθάπερ εἴρηται νῦν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι.
And in the same way one must take from coming to be to being and being destroyed, and from being destroyed to being and to coming to be, just as has been said now from being to coming to be and being destroyed.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τεταγμένου ἐστὶ τὸ κατ᾿ αὐτὸ τεταγμένον ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι λεγομένου ἔσται τὸ κατὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι λεγόμενον ἴδιον καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ φθείρεσθαι τὸ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποδιδόμενον.
And for establishing, if that which is ordered according to being is the property of that which is ordered according to it; for also that which is said according to coming to be will be the property of that which is said according to coming to be, and that which is assigned according to destruction will be the property of that which is ordered according to this.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ εἶναι βροτόν, καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἄνθρωπον εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τὸ γίνεσθαι βροτὸν καὶ τοῦ φθείρεσθαι ἄνθρωπον τὸ φθείρεσθαι βροτόν.
For instance, since to be mortal is the property of man, to come to be mortal would be the property of the coming to be of a man, and to be destroyed as mortal would be the property of the destruction of a man.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πρός τε τὸ εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, καθάπερ καὶ ἀνασκευάζοντι εἴρηται.
And in the same way one must take from coming to be and being destroyed both to being and to the things derived from them, just as has also been said for refuting.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ κειμένου, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τῇ ἰδέᾳ μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰ μὴ κατὰ τοῦτο καθ᾿ ὃ λέγεται τοῦτο οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀπεδόθη· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον.
Next, one must look at the idea of what is established; for refuting, if it does not belong to the idea, or if it does not belong in respect of that by virtue of which that of which the property was assigned is said; for the established property will not be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ αὐτοανθρώπῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ ᾗ ἰδέα, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ἠρεμεῖν.
For instance, since to be at rest does not belong to the 'man-itself' insofar as it is a man, but insofar as it is an idea, to be at rest would not be the property of man.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τῇ ἰδέᾳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει, ᾗ λέγεται κατ᾿ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου οὗ κεῖται μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if it belongs to the idea, and belongs in respect of that by virtue of which it is said of that very thing of which it is established not to be the property; for that which was established not to be the property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ αὐτοζῴῳ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι, καὶ ᾗ ζῷον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει τοῦτο, εἴη ἂν ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συγκεῖσθαι.
For instance, since to be composed of soul and body belongs to 'animal-itself', and this belongs to it insofar as it is an animal, to be composed of soul and body would be the property of animal.