§2.3Ἔτι ἐὰν πολλαχῶς λέγηται, κείμενον δὲ ᾖ ὡς ὑπάρχει ἢ ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει, θάτερον δεικνύναι τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων, ἐὰν μὴ ἄμφω ἐνδέχηται.
Furthermore, if an expression is used in multiple senses, and it is posited to belong or not to belong, one should show one of the multiple senses, if it is not possible to show both.
Χρηστέον δ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν λανθανόντων· ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ λανθάνῃ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, ἐνστήσεται ὅτι οὐ διείλεκται ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἠπόρει, ἀλλὰ θάτερον.
This must be used in cases where the multiplicity is unnoticed; for if the multiple senses are not unnoticed, the opponent will object that he has not discussed the point about which he himself was in doubt, but the other.
Οὗτος δ᾿ ὁ τόπος ἀντιστρέφει καὶ πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσαι καὶ ἀνασκευάσαι.
This topic converts for both establishing and refuting.
Κατασκευάζειν μὲν γὰρ βουλόμενοι δείξομεν ὅτι θάτερον ὑπάρχει, ἐὰν μὴ ἄμφω δυνώμεθα· ἀνασκευάζοντες δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει θάτερον δείξομεν, ἐὰν μὴ ἄμφω δυνώμεθα.
For if we wish to establish, we shall show that one of them belongs, if we cannot show both; and if we are refuting, we shall show that one of them does not belong, if we cannot show both.
Πλὴν ἀνασκευάζοντι μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἐξ ὁμολογίας διαλέγεσθαι, οὔτ᾿ εἰ παντὶ οὔτ᾿ εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται· ἐὰν γὰρ δείξωμεν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὁτῳοῦν, ἀνῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα τὸ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν ἑνὶ δείξωμεν ὑπάρχον, ἀναιρήσομεν τὸ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν.
However, for the one who refutes, there is no need to argue from agreement, whether it has been said to belong to all or to none; for if we show that it does not belong to any whatsoever, we shall have demolished its belonging to all, and similarly if we show it belongs to even one, we shall demolish its belonging to none.
Κατασκευάζουσι δὲ προδιομολογητέον ὅτι εἰ ὁτῳοῦν ὑπάρχει παντὶ ὑπάρχει, ἂν πιθανὸν ᾖ τὸ ἀξίωμα.
But those who establish must obtain a prior agreement that if it belongs to any whatsoever, it belongs to all, provided that the premise is plausible.
Οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι παντὶ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐφ᾿ ἑνὸς διαλεχθῆναι, οἷον εἰ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, διότι ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος, ὥστε προομολογητέον ὅτι εἰ ἡτισοῦν ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, πᾶσα ἀθάνατος.
For it is not sufficient for showing that it belongs to all to argue in the case of one instance, for example, if the soul of man is immortal, because every soul is immortal; so that one must obtain a prior agreement that if any soul whatsoever is immortal, every soul is immortal.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐκ ἀεὶ ποιητέον, ἀλλ᾿ ὅταν μὴ εὐπορῶμεν κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάντων ἕνα λόγον εἰπεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ γεωμέτρης ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει.
But this must not always be done, but only when we are not well off to state one common reason for all, just as the geometer says that a triangle has its angles equal to two right angles.
Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, διελόμενον. ὁσαχῶς λέγεται, καὶ ἀναιρεῖν καὶ κατασκευάζειν.
But if the multiple senses are not unnoticed, one should distinguish the number of senses in which it is spoken, and both refute and establish.
Οἷον εἰ τὸ δέον ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἢ τὸ καλόν, πειρατέον ἄμφω κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀναιρεῖν περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου, οἷον ὅτι καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον, ἢ ὅτι οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε συμφέρον.
For example, if "what ought to be done" is "the expedient" or "the noble," one must try to establish or refute both in the case of the object before us, for instance, that it is both noble and expedient, or that it is neither noble nor expedient.
Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχηται ἀμφότερα, θάτερον δεικτέον, ἐπισημαινόμενον ὅτι τὸ μὲν τὸ δ᾿ οὔ.
But if both are not possible, one must show one of them, pointing out that the one is so, but the other is not.
Ὁ δ᾿ αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν πλείω ᾖ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται.
The same reasoning applies even if the parts into which it is divided are more.
Πάλιν ὅσα μὴ καθ᾿ ὁμωνυμίαν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ κατ᾿ ἄλλον τρόπον, οἷον ἐπιστήμη μία πλειόνων ἢ ὡς τοῦ τέλους καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγίειαν ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῦ διαιτῆσαι, ἢ ὡς ἀμφοτέρων τελῶν, καθάπερ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη (οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τέλος τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου), ἢ ὡς τοῦ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον καθ᾿ αὑτὸ μὲν ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἰσόπλευρον· ὅτι γὰρ συμβέβηκε τῷ τριγώνῳ ἰσοπλεύρῳ τριγώνῳ εἶναι κατὰ τοῦτο γνωρίζομεν ὅτι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει.
Again, as for all things that are spoken of in multiple senses not by homonymy, but in some other way—for example, when a single science is said to be of several things, either as of the end and of what is directed toward the end (as medicine is of producing health and of dieting), or as of both being ends (just as the same science is said to be of contraries, for the one is no more an end than the other), or as of what is essential and of what is accidental (for example, essentially that a triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, but accidentally that an equilateral triangle does; for because it has happened to the triangle to be an equilateral triangle, we recognize by this that it has its angles equal to two right angles).
Εἰ οὖν μηδαμῶς ἐνδέχεται τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι πλειόνων ἐπιστήμην, δῆλον ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἢ εἴ πως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται.
If, therefore, it is in no way possible for the same science to be of several things, it is clear that it is altogether impossible for it to be so, or if it is somehow possible, it is clear that it is possible.
Διαιρεῖσθαι δὲ ὁσαχῶς χρήσιμον.
And to divide in how many ways it is spoken of is useful.
Οἷον ἐὰν βουλώμεθα κατασκευάσαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα προοιστέον ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, καὶ διαιρετέον εἰς ταῦτα μόνον ὅσα καὶ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσαι· ἂν δ᾿ ἀνασκευάσαι, ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ παραλειπτέον.
For instance, if we wish to establish, we must bring forward such things as are possible, and divide only into those things which are also useful for establishing; but if we wish to refute, we must bring forward those which are not possible, and leave the rest aside.
Ποιητέον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων, ὅταν λανθάνῃ ποσαχῶς λέγεται.
This must also be done in these cases when the number of senses in which it is spoken of is unnoticed.
Καὶ εἶναι δὲ τόδε τοῦδε ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων κατασκευαστέον, οἷον ἐπιστήμην τήνδε τοῦδε ἢ ὡς τέλους ἢ ὡς τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἢ ὡς τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἢ πάλιν μὴ εἶναί τι κατὰ μηδένα τῶν ῥηθέντων τρόπων.
And that this is of that, or is not, must be established from the same topics; for example, that this science is of that, either as of an end, or as of what is directed toward the end, or as of the accidental, or again, that it is not in any of the stated ways.
Ὁ δ᾿ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα λέγεται πλειόνων.
The same reasoning holds also concerning desire, and whatever other things are spoken of in relation to several things.
Ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τούτου ἢ ὡς τέλους, οἷον ὑγιείας, ἢ ὡς τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον τοῦ φαρμακευθῆναι, ἢ ὡς τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ οἴνου ὁ φιλόγλυκυς οὐχ ὅτι οἶνος ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι γλυκύς ἐστιν.
For desire is of this, either as of an end (for example, of health), or as of what is directed toward the end (for example, of taking medicine), or as of the accidental (just as in the case of wine, the one who loves sweet things desires it not because it is wine, but because it is sweet.
Καθ᾿ αὑτὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γλυκέος ἐπιθυμεῖ, τοῦ δ᾿ οἴνου κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐὰν γὰρ αὐστηρὸς ᾖ, οὐκέτι ἐπιθυμεῖ.
For essentially he desires the sweet, but of the wine accidentally; for if it is dry, he no longer desires it.
Κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖ.
Therefore, he desires it accidentally).
Χρήσιμος δ᾿ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ἐν τοῖς πρός τι· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.
This topic is useful in the case of relatives; for nearly all such things are relatives.