Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Topics §1.15#1

Methods for Detecting the Multiplicity of Meanings

Passage 8 of 94 · Greek

Summary

This section discusses the methods for examining the multiplicity of meanings of terms. Various criteria are presented to determine whether a word is used in multiple senses or a single sense, through looking at the multiplicity of its contrary, differences in sensory perception, the presence or absence of a contrary, and the presence or number of intermediate states.

§1.15#1Περὶ μὲν οὖν προτάσεως ἱκανὰ τὰ προειρημένα· τὸ δὲ ποσαχῶς, πραγματευτέον μὴ μόνον ὅσα λέγεται καθ᾿ ἕτερον τρόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν πειρατέον ἀποδιδόναι, οἷον μὴ μόνον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καθ᾿ ἕτερον μὲν τρόπον λέγεται δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ καὶ ὑγιεινὸν καθ᾿ ἕτερον, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι καὶ τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτὰ ποιά τινα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιητικά τινος καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιὰ αὐτά τινα εἶναι.
Concerning the proposition, then, what has been said before is sufficient; but as for the multiplicity of senses, one must treat not only how many things are said in a different way, but one must also try to render their definitions, for example, not only that justice and courage are said to be "good" in one way, and that which produces a good habit and that which is healthy in another way, but also that the former are so by being themselves of a certain quality, and the latter by being productive of something and not by being themselves of a certain quality.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And similarly also for the others.
Πότερον δὲ πολλαχῶς ἢ μοναχῶς τῷ εἴδει λέγεται, διὰ τῶνδε θεωρητέον.
Whether a term is said in many ways or in a single way in species must be investigated by means of the following.
Πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου σκοπεῖν εἰ πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἐάν τε τῷ εἴδει ἐάν τε τῷ ὀνόματι διαφωνῇ.
First, in the case of the contrary, one must examine if it is said in many ways, whether it differs in species or in name.
Ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἕτερά ἐστιν, οἷον τῷ ὀξεῖ ἐν φωνῇ μὲν ἐναντίον τὸ βαρύ, ἐν ὄγκῳ δὲ τὸ ἀμβλύ.
For some things are different even in their names right away, for example, the contrary to "sharp" is "flat" in voice, but "dull" in magnitude.
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ὀξεῖ πολλαχῶς λέγεται.
It is clear, then, that the contrary to "sharp" is said in many ways.
Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ὀξύ· καθ᾿ ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἐκείνων ἕτερον ἔσται τὸ ἐναντίον.
And if this is so, "sharp" is too; for in the case of each of those, the contrary will be different.
Οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὀξὺ ἔσται τῷ ἀμβλεῖ καὶ τῷ βαρεῖ ἐναντίον, ἑκατέρῳ δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ ἐναντίον.
For the same "sharp" will not be the contrary to the "dull" and to the "flat", yet "sharp" is the contrary to each of them.
Πάλιν τῷ βαρεῖ ἐν φωνῇ μὲν τὸ ὀξὺ ἐναντίον, ἐν ὄγκῳ δὲ τὸ κοῦφον, ὥστε πολλαχῶς τὸ βαρὺ λέγεται, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον.
Again, the contrary to "flat" is "sharp" in voice, but "light" in magnitude, so that "flat" is said in many ways, since its contrary also is.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῷ καλῷ τῷ μὲν ἐπί τοῦ ζῴου τὸ αἰσχρόν, τῷ δ᾿ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας τὸ μοχθηρόν, ὥστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ καλόν.
Similarly also in the case of "beautiful": the contrary in the case of an animal is "ugly", but in the case of a house, "mean", so that "beautiful" is homonymous.
Ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὀνόμασιν οὐδαμῶς διαφωνεῖ, τῷ δ᾿ εἴδει κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐθέως ἡ διαφορά ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος.
In some cases, however, they do not differ in their names at all, but the difference in species is immediately manifest in them, for example, in the case of "white" and "black".
Φωνὴ γὰρ λευκὴ καὶ μέλαινα λέγεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ χρῶμα.
For a voice is said to be white and black, and similarly also a color.
Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲν διαφωνεῖ, τῷ δ᾿ εἴδει κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς εὐθέως ἡ διαφορά· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τό τε χρῶμα λευκὸν λέγεται καὶ ἡ φωνή.
In their names, then, they do not differ at all, but the difference in species is immediately manifest in them; for color and voice are not said to be "white" in the same way.
Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως· τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν τῷ εἴδει ἡ αὐτὴ αἴσθησις, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τοῦ χρώματος οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ αἰσθήσει κρίνομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὄψει, τὸ δ᾿ ἀκοῇ.
This is also clear through sensation; for of things that are the same in species, there is the same sensation, but we do not judge the white in voice and that in color by the same sensation, but the one by sight, and the other by hearing.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ ἐν χυμοῖς καὶ ἐν ὄγκοις· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἁφῇ, τὸ δὲ γεύσει.
Similarly also with "sharp" and "dull" in juices and in magnitudes; but the one is judged by touch, the other by taste.
Οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα διαφωνεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὔτ᾿ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῶν οὔτ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἀμβλὺ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑκατέρῳ.
For neither do these differ in their names, either in themselves or in their contraries; for "dull" is the contrary to each.
Ἔτι εἰ τῷ μέν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον τῷ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς μηδέν, οἷον τῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν ἡδονῇ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ διψῆν λύπη ἐναντίον, τῇ δ᾿ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ὅτι ἡ διάμετρος τῇ πλευρᾷ ἀσύμμετρος οὐδέν, ὥστε πλεοναχῶς ἡ ἡδονὴ λέγεται.
Further, if there is a contrary to one but to the other absolutely nothing, for example, to the pleasure of drinking, the pain of thirst is contrary, but to the pleasure of contemplating that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side, nothing is contrary, so that "pleasure" is said in many ways.
Καὶ τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖν ὁμώνυμον.
Also, to "loving" in the sense of intellect, "hating" is contrary, but to "loving" in the sense of bodily activity, nothing is contrary; so it is clear that "loving" is homonymous.
Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον, εἰ τῶν μέν ἐστί τι ἀνὰ μέσον, τῶν δὲ μηδέν, ἢ εἰ ἀμφοῖν μέν ἐστι, μὴ ταὐτὸν δέ, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος ἐν χρώμασι μὲν τὸ φαιόν, ἐν φωνῇ δ᾿ οὐδέν, ἢ εἰ ἄρα, τὸ σομφόν, καθάπερ τινές φασι σομφὴν φωνὴν ἀνὰ μέσον εἶναι, ὥσθ᾿ ὁμώνυμον τὸ λευκόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μέλαν.
Further, in the case of intermediates, if there is an intermediate for one pair but nothing for the other, or if there is for both but not the same, for example, between white and black, "grey" is the intermediate in colors, but in voice nothing, or if there is indeed, it is the "husky" (as some say that a husky voice is intermediate), so that "white" is homonymous, and similarly also "black".
Ἔτι εἰ τῶν μὲν πλείω τὰ ἀνὰ μέσον, τῶν δὲ ἕν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν χρωμάτων πολλὰ τὰ ἀνὰ μέσον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς φωνῆς ἓν τὸ σομφόν.
Further, if there are more intermediates for one and only one for the other, as in the case of white and black; for in colors the intermediates are many, but in voice there is only one, the "husky".

Notes

  1. ¦p.272¦τὸ δὲ ποσαχῶς — The phrase `τὸ δὲ ποσαχῶς` at the beginning is an accusative of topic or a substantivized phrase referring to the second instrument ("in how many senses each expression is used") introduced in the previous chapter, serving as the object of `πραγματευτέον` or an absolute accusative meaning "as for the multiple senses."
  2. ¦p.272¦τῷ μὲν τῷ αὐτὰ ποιά τινα εἶναι — A dative of cause or means containing an articular infinitive (`τῷ` + infinitive). `τῷ αὐτὰ [sc. justice and courage] ποιά τινα εἶναι` means "by their being themselves of a certain quality," which is contrasted with `τῷ ποιητικά τινος` ("by their being productive of something").
  3. ¦p.272¦ἐάν τε τῷ εἴδει ἐάν τε τῷ ὀνόματι διαφωνῇ — A conditional clause subordinate to the infinitive `σκοπεῖν`, where the subject is `τὸ ἐναντίον` (the contrary). It means "whether it (the contrary) differs in species or in name," introducing the two cases where different words (names) are used for different species (e.g., flat and dull for sharp), and where the same word is used for different species (e.g., white of voice and white of color).
  4. ¦p.273¦τὸ σομφόν — The neuter substantivized adjective meaning "porous," "spongy," or "husky/hoarse." Here, in the domain of voice, it is used to denote the intermediate between "white (clear) voice" and "black (dark/muffled) voice," referring to a husky or hoarse voice.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Topics §1.15#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg044.humanitext-grc1:1.15%231

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