§1.1## ΤΟΠΙΚΩΝ Α.
Ἡ ΜΕΝ πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν, ἀφ᾿ ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μηθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον.
TOPICS Book I The purpose of this treatise is to find a method by which we shall be able to syllogize from reputable opinions on any problem proposed to us, and when standing up to an argument ourselves, to say nothing contradictory.
Πρῶτον οὖν ῥητέον τί ἐστι συλλογισμὸς καὶ τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί, ὅπως ληφθῇ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός· τοῦτον γὰρ ζητοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην πραγματείαν.
First, then, we must state what a syllogism is and what its differences are, so that the dialectical syllogism may be grasped; for this is what we are seeking in the present treatise.
Ἔστι δὴ συλλογισμὸς λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν κειμένων.
Now, a syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things being posited, something different from the things laid down results of necessity because of these things.
Ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾖ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἃ διά τινων πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν·
It is a demonstration, then, when the syllogism is from premises that are true and primary, or from premises of such a kind that they have grasped the starting-point of their knowledge through certain primary and true premises.
διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος.
A dialectical syllogism, on the other hand, is one that syllogizes from reputable opinions.
Ἔστι δὲ ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ μὴ δι᾿ ἑτέρων ἀλλὰ δι᾿ αὑτῶν ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν· οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, ἀλλ᾿ ἑκάστην τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτὴν καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν εἶναι πιστήν.
Those things are true and primary which get their credibility not through other things but through themselves; for in the case of scientific starting-points, one must not seek the "why," but each of the starting-points must be credible in itself.
Ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις.
Reputable opinions are those which seem so to everyone, or to the majority, or to the wise—and of the wise, to all, or to the majority, or to those who are most notable and reputable.
Ἐριστικὸς δ᾿ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δέ, καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἢ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων φαινόμενος.
An eristic syllogism is one that is from opinions that seem to be reputable but are not, or one that, being from reputable opinions or opinions that seem to be reputable, only seems to syllogize.
Οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἔνδοξον καὶ ἔστιν ἔνδοξον.
For not everything that seems to be reputable is actually reputable.
Οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνδόξων ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, καθὰ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων ἀρχὰς συμβέβηκεν ἔχειν· παραχρῆμα γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς καὶ μικρὰ συνορᾶν δυναμένοις κατάδηλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ ψεύδους ἐστὶ φύσις.
For none of the so-called reputable opinions has an appearance that is completely superficial, as happens to be the case with the starting-points of eristic arguments; for in these latter, immediately and for the most part, even to those who are capable of perceiving even a little, the nature of the falsehood in them is obvious.
Ὁ μὲν οὖν πρότερος τῶν ῥηθέντων ἐριστικῶν συλλογισμῶν καὶ συλλογισμὸς λεγέσθω, ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς ἐριστικὸς μὲν συλλογισμός, συλλογισμὸς δ᾿ οὔ, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεται μὲν συλλογίζεσθαι, συλλογίζεται δ᾿ οὔ.
Of the mentioned eristic syllogisms, then, let the former be called a syllogism as well, but the remaining one is an eristic syllogism, but not a syllogism, since it seems to syllogize but does not.
Ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἅπαντας συλλογισμοὺς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περί τινας ἐπιστήμας οἰκείων γινόμενοι παραλογισμοί, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς γεωμετρίας καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ συγγενῶν συμβέβηκεν ἔχειν.
Further, besides all the syllogisms mentioned, there are the paralogisms that arise from premises peculiar to certain sciences, as happens to be the case in geometry and sciences akin to it.
Ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ τρόπος οὗτος διαφέρειν τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογισμῶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων συλλογίζεται ὁ ψευδογραφῶν, οὔτ᾿ ἐξ ἐνδόξων.
For this manner of reasoning seems to differ from the syllogisms mentioned; for the person who draws a false figure does not syllogize from true and primary premises, nor from reputable opinions.
Εἰς γὰρ τὸν ὅρον οὐκ ἐμπίπτει· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ πᾶσι δοκοῦντα λαμβάνει οὔτε τὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οὔτε τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις οὔτε τὰ πᾶσιν οὔτε τοῖς πλείστοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐνδοξοτάτοις, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων μὲν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ λημμάτων, οὐκ ἀληθῶν δὲ τὸν συλλογισμὸν ποιεῖται.
For he does not fall under the definition: he does not take what seems so to everyone, nor to the majority, nor to the wise—and of these, neither to all, nor to the majority, nor to the most reputable—but he makes his syllogism from premises peculiar to the science, yet not true.
Τῷ γὰρ ἢ τὰ ἡμικύκλια περιγράφειν μὴ ὡς δεῖ, ἢ γραμμάς τινας ἄγειν μὴ ὡς ἂν ἀχθείησαν, τὸν παραλογισμὸν ποιεῖται.
For he makes his paralogism by describing semicircles not as they should be, or by drawing certain lines not as they would be drawn.
Εἴδη μὲν οὖν τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν, ἔστω τὰ εἰρημένα.
Let the mentioned types of syllogisms, then, be accepted in outline.
Καθόλου δ᾿ εἰπεῖν περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένων, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν διωρίσθω, διότι περὶ οὐδενὸς αὐτῶν τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον ἀποδοῦναι προαιρούμεθα, ἀλλ᾿ ὅσον τύπῳ περὶ αὐτῶν βουλόμεθα διελθεῖν, παντελῶς ἱκανὸν ἡγούμενοι κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην μέθοδον τὸ δύνασθαι γνωρίζειν ὁπωσοῦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν.
Generally speaking, regarding all those that have been mentioned and those that will be mentioned hereafter, let it be determined for us up to this point: because we do not propose to give an exact account of any of them, but only wish to go through them in outline, deeming it completely sufficient for our present method to be able to recognize each of them in some way or other.