§2#1Διὰ τί δὲ καθεύδει καὶ ἐγρήγορε, καὶ διὰ ποίαν τιν’ αἴσθησιν ἢ ποίας, εἰ διὰ πλείους, σκεπτέον.
Why it sleeps and wakes, and on account of what kind of perception, or what perceptions, if on account of several, must be investigated.
Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔνια μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἔχει τὰς αἰσθήσεις πάσας, ἔνια δ’ οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οἷον ὄψιν, τὴν δ’ ἁφὴν καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἅπαντ’ ἔχει, πλὴν εἴ τι τῶν ζῴων ἀτελές (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς), ἀδύνατον δ’ ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς ὁποιανοῦν αἴσθησιν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ καθεῦδον ζῷον, φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ ὕπνῳ· εἰ γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῇ δὲ μή, ταύτῃ καθεῦδον αἰσθήσεται, τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύνατον.
Since some animals have all the senses, and others do not have some, such as sight, but all have touch and taste, except if there is some imperfect animal (and about them it has been said in the treatises On the Soul), and since it is impossible for a sleeping animal to perceive simply any perception whatsoever, it is clear that it is necessary for the same affection to belong to all in what is called sleep; for if it were asleep in one sense but not in another, it would perceive with this latter while sleeping, but this is impossible.
Ἐπεὶ δ’ ὑπάρχει καθ’ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν τὸ μέν τι ἴδιον τὸ δέ τι κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν οἷον τῇ ὄψει τὸ ὁρᾶν, τῇ δ’ ἀκοῇ τὸ ἀκούειν, ταῖς δ’ ἄλλαις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἔστι δέ τις καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ᾗ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει καὶ αἰσθάνεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ.
Since, however, there belongs to each sense something that is peculiar and something that is common, peculiar, for instance, to sight is seeing, and to hearing is listening, and to the others in the same manner; and there is also a certain common power accompanying them all, by which one also perceives that one sees and hears and perceives; for surely it is not by sight that one sees that one sees.
Καὶ κρίνει δὴ καὶ δύναται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερα τὰ γλυκέα τῶν λευκῶν, οὔτε γεύσει οὔτε ὄψει οὔτ’ ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά τινι κοινῷ μορίῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἁπάντων.
And indeed it judges, and is able to judge, that sweet things are different from white things, neither by taste nor by sight, nor by both, but by some common part of all the sense organs.
Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ μία αἴσθησις, καὶ τὸ κύριον αἰσθητήριον ἕν· τὸ δ’ εἶναι αἰσθήσει τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου ἕτερον, οἷον ψόφου καὶ χρώματος.
For there is one perception, and the primary sense organ is one; but its being as a perception is different for each class, as for instance of sound and of color.
Τοῦτο δ’ ἅμα τῷ ἁπτικῷ μάλισθ’ ὑπάρχει· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ χωρίζεται τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τούτου ἀχώριστα.
And this belongs especially together with the touch organ; for this indeed is separated from the other sense organs, but the others are inseparable from this.
Εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρήμασιν.
But about them it has been said in the investigations On the Soul.
Φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τούτου ἐστὶ πάθος ἡ ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος.
It is clear, then, that waking and sleep are affections of this.
Διὸ καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ μόνη πᾶσιν.
Wherefore they also belong to all animals; for touch alone belongs to all.
Εἰ γὰρ τῷ πάσας τι πεπονθέναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐγίνετο τὸ καθεύδειν, ἄτοπον εἰ αἷς οὔτ’ ἀνάγκη οὔτε δυνατὸν τρόπον τινὰ ἐνεργεῖν ἅμα, ταύτας ἀναγκαῖον ἀργεῖν ἅμα καὶ ἀκινητίζειν· τοὐναντίον γὰρ εὐλογώτερον συνέβαινεν ἂν αὐταῖς τὸ μὴ ἅμα ἠρεμεῖν.
For if sleeping occurred by all the senses suffering something, it would be strange if those which have neither the necessity nor, in a certain way, the capability to be active at the same time, must necessarily be inactive and immobilized at the same time; for, on the contrary, it would happen more reasonably to them not to rest at the same time.
Ὡς δὲ νῦν λέγομεν, εὐλόγως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τούτων· τοῦ γὰρ κυρίου τῶν ἄλλων πάντων αἰσθητηρίου καὶ πρὸς ὃ συντείνει τἆλλα, πεπονθότος τι συμπάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, ἐκείνων δέ τινος ἀδυνατοῦντος οὐκ ἀνάγκη τοῦτ’ ἀδυνατεῖν.
But as we are now saying, it is reasonable also regarding these things; for when the primary sense organ of all the others, and to which the others contribute, suffers something, it is necessary that all the rest suffer with it, whereas if one of those becomes powerless, it is not necessary for this one to become powerless.
Φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ πολλῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀργεῖν καὶ μὴ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς ὁ ὕπνος, οὐδ’ ἐν τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι.
And it is clear from many things that sleep does not consist in the senses being inactive and not using them, nor in not being able to perceive.
Καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς λιποψυχίαις τοιοῦτον συμβαίνει· ἀδυναμία γὰρ αἰσθήσεων ἡ λιποψυχία.
For indeed in fainting fits such a thing happens; for fainting is an incapacity of the senses.
Γίνονται δὲ καὶ ἔκνοιαί τινες τοιαῦται.
And some such states of unconsciousness also occur.
Ἔτι δ’ οἱ τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐχένι φλέβας καταλαμβανόμενοι ἀναίσθητοι γίνονται.
Furthermore, those whose veins in the neck are compressed become unconscious.
Ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἡ ἀδυναμία τῆς χρήσεως μήτ’ ἐν τῷ τυχόντι αἰσθητηρίῳ μήτε δι’ ἣν ἔτυχεν αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἴρηται νῦν, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ᾧ αἰσθάνεται πάντων· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἀδυνατήσῃ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις πᾶσιν ἀδυνατεῖν αἰσθέσθαι· ὅταν δ’ ἐκείνων τι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τούτῳ.
But [sleep occurs] when the incapacity of use is neither in an arbitrary sense-organ nor due to an arbitrary cause, but, as has just been said, in the primary thing by which one perceives all things; for when this becomes powerless, it is necessary also for all the sense-organs to be powerless to perceive; but when one of those becomes powerless, it is not necessary for this.
Δι’ ἣν δ’ αἰτίαν συμβαίνει τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ ποῖόν τι τὸ πάθος ἐστί, λεκτέον.
But on account of what cause sleeping happens, and what kind of affection it is, must be told.