§1#1## ΠΕΡΙ ΥΠΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΕΓΡΗΓΟΡΣΕΩΣ.
Περὶ δὲ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως σκεπτέον, τίνα τε τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ πότερον ἴδια τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοῦ σώματος ἢ κοινά, κἂν ᾖ κοινά, τίνος μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοῦ σώματος· καὶ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις· καὶ πότερον ἅπαντα κεκοινώνηκεν αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέρων, ἢ τὰ μὲν ὕπνου τὰ δὲ θατέρου μόνον, ἢ τὰ μὲν οὐδετέρου τὰ δ’ ἀμφοτέρων· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί ἐστι τὸ ἐνύπνιον, καὶ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν οἱ καθεύδοντες ὁτὲ μὲν ὀνειρώττουσιν ὁτὲ δ’ οὔ· ἢ συμβαίνει μὲν ἀεὶ τοῖς καθεύδουσιν ἐνυπνιάζειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μνημονεύουσιν· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο γίνεται, διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν γίνεται· καὶ πότερον ἐνδέχεται τὰ μέλλοντα προορᾶν, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· καὶ τίνα τρόπον, εἰ ἐνδέχεται· καὶ πότερον τὰ μέλλοντα ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπου πράσσεσθαι μόνον, ἢ καὶ ὧν τὸ δαιμόνιον ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ φύσει γίνεται ἢ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου.
## ON SLEEP AND WAKING. We must consider sleep and waking, what they happen to be, and whether they are peculiar to the soul or to the body, or common, and if they are common, to which part of the soul or of the body they belong; and for what cause they belong to animals; and whether all animals participate in both of them, or some in sleep only and others in the other alone, or some in neither and others in both; and in addition to these, what a dream is, and for what cause those who sleep sometimes dream and sometimes do not; or whether it always happens to those who sleep to dream, but they do not remember it; and if this happens, for what cause it happens; and whether it is possible to foresee the future, or not possible; and in what way, if it is possible; and whether only future things to be done by human beings [can be foreseen], or also those of which the divine has the cause and which happen by nature or spontaneously.
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦ ζῴου ἥ τε ἐγρήγορσις ὑπάρχει καὶ ὁ ὕπνος· ἀντίκεινται γάρ, καὶ φαίνεται στέρησίς τις ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ἐγρηγόρσεως·
First, then, this at least is clear: that both waking and sleep belong to the same part of the animal; for they are contraries, and sleep appears to be a certain privation of waking.
ἀεὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δεκτικῷ φαίνεται γινόμενα καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντα πάθη, λέγω δ’ οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ νόσος, καὶ κάλλος καὶ αἶσχος, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ ἀσθένεια, καὶ ὄψις καὶ τυφλότης, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ κωφότης.
For contraries, both in other things and in natural objects, are always seen to occur in the same receptive subject and to be affections of the same thing; I mean, for example, health and disease, beauty and ugliness, strength and weakness, sight and blindness, hearing and deafness.
Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.
Moreover, it is also clear from the following.
Ὦι γὰρ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα γνωρίζομεν, τούτῳ καὶ τὸν ὑπνοῦντα· τὸν γὰρ αἰσθανόμενον ἐγρηγορέναι νομίζομεν καὶ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα πάντα ἢ τῶν ἔξωθέν τινος αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ κινήσεων.
For by that by which we recognize the waking person, by this we also recognize the sleeping person; for we think that the person who perceives is awake, and that everyone who is awake perceives either some external thing or the movements within himself.
Εἰ τοίνυν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι ἐν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἐστὶν ἢ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, δῆλον ὅτι ᾧπερ αἰσθάνεται, τούτῳ καὶ ἐγρήγορε τὰ ἐγρηγορότα καὶ καθεύδει τὰ καθεύδοντα.
If, then, being awake is in nothing else than in perceiving, it is clear that by whatever it perceives, by this the waking things are awake and the sleeping things sleep.
Ἐπεὶ δ’ οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σώματος (οὗ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις, τούτου καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἡ δὲ λεγομένη αἴσθησις, ὧς ἐνέργεια, κίνησίς τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστί), φανερὸν ὡς οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἴδιον, οὔτ’ ἄψυχον σῶμα δυνατὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι.
But since perceiving is peculiar neither to the soul nor to the body (for of that of which there is the potentiality, of this also is the activity; and the so-called perception, as an activity, is a certain movement of the soul through the body), it is clear that neither is the affection peculiar to the soul, nor is an inanimate body capable of perceiving.
Διωρισμένων δὲ πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις περὶ τῶν λεγομένων ὡς μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τοῦ μὲν θρεπτικοῦ χωριζομένου τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι σώμασι ζωήν, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἄνευ τούτου, δῆλον ὡς ὅσα μὲν αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως μετέχει μόνον τῶν ζώντων, ὅτι τούτοις οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὕπνος οὐδ’ ἐγρήγορσις, οἷον τοῖς φυτοῖς· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν μόριον, οὔτ’ εἰ χωριστόν ἐστιν οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ χωριστόν· τῇ γὰρ δυνάμει καὶ τῷ εἶναι χωριστόν ἐστιν.
Now, since it has been determined previously in other works concerning the so-called parts of the soul, and that the nutritive part is separated from the others in those bodies that have life, but none of the others can exist without this, it is clear that of living things, those which share only in growth and decay do not possess sleep or waking, such as plants; for they do not have the sensitive part, whether it is separable or inseparable; for in potentiality and in being it is separable.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ ἀεὶ ἐγρήγορεν ἢ ἀεὶ καθεύδει, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων ἀμφότερα τὰ πάθη ταῦτα· οὔτε γὰρ εἴ τί ἐστι ζῷον ἔχον αἴσθησιν, τοῦτ’ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε καθεύδειν οὔτ’ ἐγρηγορέναι· ἄμφω γάρ ἐστι τὰ πάθη ταῦτα περὶ αἴσθησιν τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ.
And likewise also that there is nothing which is always awake or always asleep, but both of these affections belong to the same animals; for if there is any animal having perception, it is not possible for this neither to sleep nor to wake; for both of these affections are concerned with perception, belonging to the primary sensitive organ.