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Aristotle · Rhetoric §3.2.10-3.2.15

Selection of Metaphors, Epithets, and Use of Diminutives

Passage 75 of 98 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle discusses how metaphors and epithets must be chosen from appropriate and beautiful sources within the same genus to elevate or disparage a subject, refuting Bryson's sophistry on obscene language, and finally explains the effects and proper use of diminutives.

§3.2.10(ὁὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πρέπει ἐσθής), καὶ ἐάν τε κοσμεῖν βούλῃ, ἀπὸ τῶν βελτίστων τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει φέρειν τὴν μεταφοράν, ἐάν τε ψέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων·
(for the same clothing is not appropriate for both). And whether you wish to adorn, you must bring the metaphor from the best things in the same genus, and if you wish to censure, from the worse.
λέγω δʼ οἷον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, τὸ φάναι τὸν μὲν πτωχεύοντα εὔχεσθαι τὸν δὲ εὐχόμενον πτωχεύειν, ὅτι ἄμφω αἰτήσεις, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς καὶ Ἰφικράτης Καλλίαν μητραγύρτην ἀλλʼ οὐ δᾳδοῦχον, ὁ δὲ ἔφη ἀμύητον αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δᾳδοῦχον· ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον.
I mean, for example, since contraries are in the same genus, saying that a beggar "prays" or that one who prays "begs", because both are requests, is to do what has been said; as also Iphicrates called Callias a "begging-priest" instead of a "torch-bearer", but Callias said that he was uninitiated, for otherwise he would not have called him a begging-priest, but a torch-bearer; for both are concerned with a god, but the one is honorable and the other dishonorable.
καὶ ὁ μὲν διονυσοκόλακας, αὐτοὶ δʼ αὑτοὺς τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν (ταῦτα δʼ ἄμφω μεταφορά, ἡ μὲν ῥυπαινόντων ἡ δὲ τοὐναντίον), καὶ οἱ μὲν λῃσταὶ αὑτοὺς ποριστὰς καλοῦσι νῦν (διὸ ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν, τὸν δʼ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορίσασθαι).
And one person calls them "Dionysus-flatterers", but they themselves call themselves "artists" (both of these are metaphors, the former of people defiling, the latter the opposite); and robbers call themselves "purveyors" nowadays (wherefore it is possible to say that one who has done wrong "made a mistake", and that one who made a mistake "did wrong", and that one who stole both "took" and "purveyed").
τὸ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος Εὐριπίδου φησίν, " κώπης ἀνάσσων κἀποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν, " ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μεῖζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἢ κατʼ ἀξίαν· οὐ κέκλεπται οὖν.
And what the Telephus of Euripides says, "ruling the oar and disembarking into Mysia," is inappropriate, because "ruling" is too grand for the merit of the action; therefore it is not disguised.
§3.2.11ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἁμαρτία, ἐὰν μὴ ἡδείας ᾖ σημεῖα φωνῆς, οἷον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραυγὴν Καλλιόπης τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἄμφω φωναί· φαύλη δὲ ἡ μεταφορὰ †ταῖς ἀσήμοις φωναῖσ†.
There is also error in the syllables, if they are not signs of a pleasant sound, for example, Dionysius the Bronze in his elegies addresses poetry as "the clangor of Calliope", because both are sounds; but the metaphor is poor †due to meaningless sounds†.
§3.2.12ἔτι δὲ οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὠνομασμένως ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι συγγενές (ὁἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκιμοῦντι " ἄνδρʼ εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπʼ ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα· " ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δʼ ἄμφω πρόσθεσίς τις· κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆςσικύας προσβολήν), καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὖ ᾐνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικεῖς· μεταφοραὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι εὖ μετενήνεκται.
Furthermore, one must not transfer from afar, but from things related and of the same species to things that are nameless, in a named way, so that what is said is clearly related, (as in the famous riddle: "I saw a man glue bronze upon a man with fire"; for the application has no name, but both are a kind of putting on; so he called the application of a cupping-glass "gluing"), and generally from good riddles one can obtain appropriate metaphors; for metaphors make riddles, so that it is clear that they have been transferred well.
§3.2.13καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν· κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως.
And also from beautiful things; and the beauty of a word, as Licymnius says, consists either in its sound or in its meaning, and its ugliness likewise.
ἔτι δὲ τρίτον ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ψεῦδος· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον, τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων.
And thirdly, there is that which refutes the sophistical argument; for it is not as Bryson said, that no one speaks obscenely, if indeed saying this instead of that means the same thing; for this is false; for one word is more proper than another, and more similar, and more akin, by placing the thing before one's eyes.
ἔτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἄλλου ἄλλο κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον θετέον· ἄμφω μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ᾗ αἰσχρόν· ἢ ταῦτα μέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
Furthermore, this and that do not signify the thing in the same state, so that in this way too, one word must be posited as more beautiful or uglier than another; for both signify the beautiful or the ugly, but not insofar as it is beautiful, or not insofar as it is ugly; or they do so, but to a greater or lesser degree.
τὰς δὲ μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει.
And metaphors must be brought from these sources: from things beautiful either in sound, or in power, or to the sight, or to some other sense.
διαφέρει δʼ εἰπεῖν, οἷον ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἠὼς μᾶλλον ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, ἢ ἔτι φαυλότερον ἐρυθροδάκτυλος.
And it makes a difference to say, for example, "rosy-fingered dawn" rather than "purple-fingered", or, even worse, "red-fingered".
§3.2.14καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ἔστιν μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, οἷον ὁ μητροφόντης, ἔστι δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος, οἷον ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ· καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν, ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμιόνους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δʼ ἱκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐποίησε " χαίρετʼ ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων· " καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν.
And in the case of epithets, it is possible to make the application from what is bad or ugly, as "the mother-slayer", or from what is better, as "the avenger of his father"; and Simonides, when the winner in the mule-race offered him a small reward, did not wish to write, as being displeased at writing on behalf of mules, but when he gave a sufficient sum, he wrote: "Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds!" although they were daughters of asses too.
ἔστιν αὖ τὸ ὑποκορίζεσθαι· §3.2.15ἔστιν δὲ ὁ ὑποκορισμὸς ὃ ἔλαττον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης σκώπτει ἐν τοῖς Βαβυλωνίοις, ἀντὶ μὲν χρυσίου χρυσιδάριον, ἀντὶ δʼ ἱματίου ἱματιδάριον, ἀντὶ δὲ λοιδορίας λοιδορημάτιον καὶ ἀντὶ νοσήματος νοσημάτιον.
There is, on the other hand, the use of diminutives; and a diminutive is that which makes smaller both the bad and the good, just as Aristophanes jests in the *Babylonians*, instead of "gold" using "little-gold", instead of "cloak", "little-cloak", instead of "abuse", "little-abuse", and instead of "sickness", "little-sickness".
εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.
But one must be cautious and observe moderation in both.

Notes

  1. 1405a20οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν — An expression of counterfactual condition in indirect discourse. Depending on the verb ἔφη, the particle ἄν goes with the infinitive καλεῖν, representing the counterfactual indicative οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκάλει ('for he would not have called him...') in direct speech.
  2. 1405b8οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν — The conjunction ὡς ('as') introduces a clause in which ἔφη ('said') is parenthetically inserted, governing the accusative and infinitive construction οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν. It means 'for it is not as Bryson said, namely that no one speaks obscenely.'
  3. 1405b15ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ᾗ αἰσχρόν — The relative adverb ᾗ is used here in the sense of 'insofar as, in respect of.' The phrase means 'but not insofar as it is beautiful, or not insofar as it is ugly,' showing that the evaluation of a word differs from the simple reference to the object.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Rhetoric §3.2.10-3.2.15. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.humanitext-grc2:3.2.10-3.2.15

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