§2.9.1ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν· τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικείμενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις.
What most opposes pity is what they call indignation; for to be pained at undeserved bad fortune is in a way opposed to, and proceeds from the same character as, being pained at undeserved good fortune.
καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ·
And both emotions belong to a good character.
§2.9.2δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν· ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον·
For we ought to feel sympathy and pity for those who fare ill undeservedly, but to feel indignation at those who fare well; for what happens contrary to desert is unjust.
διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νεμεσᾶν.
Wherefore we also attribute indignation to the gods.
§2.9.3δόξειε δʼ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, ἔστι δʼ ἕτερον·
And envy also might seem to oppose pity in the same way, as being close to and the same as indignation, but it is different.
λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁμοίου.
For envy is also a turbulent pain and is felt at good fortune, but not of the undeserved person, rather of one's equal and peer.
τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ διʼ αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν φθόνος, τὸ δὲ νέμεσις, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας.
But the feature of 'not because something else will happen to oneself, but on account of the neighbor himself' must belong to all of them alike; for it will no longer be envy on the one hand and indignation on the other, but fear, if the pain and turbulence exist because of this, namely that some evil will happen to oneself from the other's good fortune.
§2.9.4φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δʼ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι κατʼ ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ αὑτῷ.
And it is clear that the opposite emotions will also follow upon these; for he who is pained at those who suffer undeservedly will rejoice or be free from pain at those who suffer under opposite circumstances; for example, no good man would be pained when parricides and murderers meet with punishment; for we ought to rejoice at such things, and likewise at those who fare well according to desert; for both are just, and make the decent man rejoice; for he must expect that what belongs to his equal will belong to himself as well.
§2.9.5καὶ ἔστιν τοῦαὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφʼ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν· διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτʼ ἐστί, διαφέρει δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.
And all these belong to the same character, and the opposites to the opposite character; for the same person is malicious and envious; for whenever one is pained at something coming into being and existing, one must necessarily rejoice at its deprivation and destruction; wherefore all these are preventive of pity, though they differ for the reasons stated, so that they are all alike useful for making things not pitiable.
§2.9.6πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσιν τε νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
First, then, let us speak of indignation, whom they feel indignation at, and at what things, and in what state they themselves are; and then after these, of the other emotions.
§2.9.7φανερὸν δʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νεμεσᾶν· §2.9.8οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νεμεσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων εἰσίν), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες ἀγαθά, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.
And this is clear from what has been said; for if to feel indignation is to be pained at apparent undeserved good fortune, first of all it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good things; for if someone is just or courageous, or if he is to obtain virtue, one will not feel indignation at him (nor indeed is there pity for the opposites of these), but at wealth and power and such things, of which, to speak simply, good men are worthy, and those who possess natural goods, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such things.