§2.4.19ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ταῦτα δρᾷ.
For the good man does these things.
καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνοντας τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἢ σπουδάζουσιν· μαχητικοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι.
And those who do not oppose them when they are angry or in earnest; for such people are combative.
καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας, οἷον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπουδαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς, §2.4.20καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἃ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἢ θαυμάζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἡδεῖς.
And those who are seriously disposed towards them in some way, as, for instance, those who admire them, consider them to be excellent, and take pleasure in them, and especially those who have been thus affected regarding those things in which they themselves most wish either to be admired, or to seem excellent, or to be pleasant.
§2.4.21καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντας, ἐὰν μὴ παρενοχλῶσι μηδʼ ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ ᾖ ὁ βίος· γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ
"
κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ. " §2.4.22καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας, ὧν ἐνδέχεται ἅμα μετέχειν αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὸ καὶ οὕτω συμβαίνει.
And those who are similar to them and engage in the same pursuits, provided they do not annoy them or make their living from the same source; for in that case it becomes 'potter against potter.' And those who desire the same things, if it is possible for them to share them at the same time; otherwise, the same thing happens in this case too.
§2.4.23καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, μὴ καταφρονοῦντες.
And those towards whom they are in such a relation that they do not feel shame regarding matters of opinion, provided they do not do so out of contempt.
§2.4.24καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.
And those before whom they feel shame regarding truth.
καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὑφʼ ὧν ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ φιλοῦσιν ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι.
And those with whom they compete, or by whom they wish to be emulated and not envied, these they either love or wish to be friends with.
§2.4.25καὶ οἷς ἂν τἀγαθὰ συμπράττωσιν, ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω κακά.
And those with whom they cooperate in doing good, unless greater evils are likely to result to themselves.
§2.4.26καὶ οἳ ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς παρόντας φιλοῦσιν· διὸ καὶ τοὺς περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν.
And those who love their friends both in their absence and in their presence in the same way; wherefore everyone loves those who are thus disposed towards the dead.
καὶ ὅλως τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθούς.
And generally, those who are very fond of their friends and do not abandon them; for among good things, they especially love those who are good at loving.
§2.4.27καὶ τοὺς μὴ πλαττομένους πρὸς αὐτούς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τὰ ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες·
And those who do not play a part before them; and such are those who speak of their own weaknesses too.
εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα·
For it has been said that before friends we do not feel shame regarding matters of opinion.
εἰ οὖν ὁ αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι ἔοικεν.
If, therefore, he who feels shame does not love, he who does not feel shame is like one who loves.
καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ.
And those who are not fearful, and in whom we have confidence; for no one loves one whom he fears.
§2.4.28εἴδη δὲ φιλίας ἑταιρεία οἰκειότης συγγένεια καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.
The kinds of friendship are companionship, intimacy, kinship, and the like.
ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις §2.4.29καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος ποιῆσαι καὶ τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλῶσαι· αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἕνεκα φαίνεται καὶ οὐ διά τι ἕτερον.
The things that produce friendship are doing a favor, and doing it unasked, and not making it known when one has done it; for in this way it appears to be for his sake and not for any other reason.
§2.4.30περὶ δʼ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστι θεωρεῖν.
Concerning enmity and hating, it is clear that they may be observed from their opposites.
ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασμός, διαβολή.
The things that produce enmity are anger, spiteful treatment, and calumny.
§2.4.31ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, μισοῦμεν.
Now anger arises from matters concerning oneself, but enmity can arise even without matters concerning oneself; for if we think someone is of a certain character, we hate him.
καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας.
And while anger is always directed against particulars, for instance, against Callias or Socrates, hatred is also directed against classes; for everyone hates the thief and the informer.
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν χρόνῳ, τὸ δʼ ἀνίατον.
And the former is curable by time, but the latter is incurable.
καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δʼ οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
And the former is a desire for [causing] pain, but the latter is for [causing] evil; for the angry man wishes his pain to be felt, but to the hater this makes no difference.
ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ παρουσία τῆς κακίας.
And all painful things are felt, but the greatest evils are least felt, such as injustice and folly; for the presence of vice causes no pain.
καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δʼ οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ.
And the former is accompanied by pain, but the latter is not accompanied by pain; for he who is angry feels pain, but he who hates does not.
καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δʼ οὐδενός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.
And the former might feel pity if many things happened [to his enemy], but the latter would feel pity for no one; for the former wishes the one he is angry with to suffer in return, but the latter wishes him not to exist.
§2.4.32φανερὸν οὖν ἐν τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας διαλύειν, καὶ διʼ ὀργὴν ἢ διʼ ἔχθραν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφʼ ὁποτέραν ἂν προαιρῆταί τις ἄγειν.
It is clear, therefore, from these things that it is possible to prove that people are enemies and friends, and to make them such when they are not, and to refute those who claim to be, and to bring those who are disputing through anger or enmity to whichever of the two one chooses.