§2.23.6ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν, οἷον ὡς Ἰφικράτης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον, ὅτι
εἰ πρὶν ποιῆσαι ἠξίουν τῆς εἰκόνος τυχεῖν ἐὰν ποιήσω, ἔδοτε ἄν· ποιήσαντι δʼ ἆρʼ οὐ δώσετε;
Another is from looking at the time, for instance as Iphicrates in his speech against Harmodius: "If, before doing it, I had demanded to obtain the statue on condition that I should do it, you would have granted it; will you then not grant it now that I have done it?
μὴ τοίνυν μέλλοντες μὲν ὑπισχνεῖσθε, παθόντες δʼ ἀφαιρεῖσθε
. καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαίους διιέναι Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς ἠξίου, ὑπέσχοντο ἄν· ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο καὶ ἐπίστευσεν μὴ διήσουσιν.
Do not, therefore, make promises when expecting benefits, and take them away once you have received them." And again, concerning the Thebans letting Philip pass into Attica, that if he had demanded it before helping them against the Phocians, they would have promised it; it is therefore absurd if they will not let him pass because he gave up his own position and trusted them.
§2.23.7ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθʼ αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ.
Another is from what has been said against oneself to the one who said it, as in the *Teucer*.
διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος ᾧ ἐχρήσατο Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερόμενος εἰ προδοίη ἂν τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν· οὐ φάσκοντος δέ, εἶτα εἶπεν
σὺ μὲν ὢν Ἀριστοφῶν οὐκ ἂν προδοίης, ἐγὼ δʼ ὢν Ἰφικράτης; δεῖ δὲ ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἂν δοκοῦντα ἀδικῆσαι ἐκεῖνον· εἰ δὲ μή, γελοῖον ἂν φανείη, οἷον εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα τοῦτό τις εἴπειεν ἄλλος πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου· ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· τοῦτʼ οὖν ἐξελέγχειν δεῖ.
But the method is different which Iphicrates used against Aristophon, asking him whether he would betray the fleet for money; and when Aristophon denied it, he said: "Then you, being Aristophon, would not betray it, but I, being Iphicrates, would?" But the opponent must be the one who seems more likely to commit the injustice; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, for instance if someone said this against Aristides when he was accusing them, in order to discredit the accuser; for in general the accuser wishes to be better than the defendant, and this is what one must disprove.
καθόλου δὲ ἄτοπός ἐστιν, ὅταν τις ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλοις ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσειεν ἂν, ἢ προτρέπῃ ποιεῖν ἃ αὐτὸς μὴ ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιήσειεν ἄν.
In general, it is absurd when someone censures in others what he himself does or would do, or urges others to do what he himself does not do and would not do.
§2.23.8ἄλλος ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ, οἷον τί τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστιν·
Another is from definition, for instance: what is the "divine"?
ἆρα θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον;
"Is it not either a god or the work of a god?
καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης, ὅτι γενναιότατος ὁ βέλτιστος· καὶ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖόν τι πρᾶξαι.
Yet whoever thinks it is the work of a god must of necessity think that gods also exist." And as Iphicrates said, that the noblest is the best; for even to Harmodius and Aristogeiton nothing noble belonged before they did something noble.
καὶ ὅτι συγγενέστερος αὐτός· τὰ γοῦν ἔργα συγγενέστερά ἐστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἢ τὰ σά
. καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὅτι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν τοὺς μὴ κοσμίους οὐχ ἑνὸς σώματος ἀγαπᾶν ἀπόλαυσιν.
And that he himself is more nearly related: "At any rate, my deeds are more nearly related to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than yours are." And as in the *Alexander*, that all would agree that the incontinent are not satisfied with the enjoyment of a single body.
καὶ διʼ ὃ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως καὶ εὖ παθόντας ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς.
And the reason why Socrates said he would not go to Archelaus; for he said it was an insult not to be able to requite benefits in the same way as injuries.
πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὁρισάμενοι καὶ λαβόντες τὸ τί ἐστι συλλογίζονται περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν.
For all these, having defined and grasped what the thing is, syllogize about the things they speak of.
§2.23.9ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς.
Another is from the different senses of a word, as in the *Topics* concerning the word "rightly".
§2.23.10ἄλλος ἐκ διαιρέσεως, οἷον εἰ πάντες τριῶν ἕνεκεν ἀδικοῦσιν (ἢ τοῦδε γὰρ ἕνεκα ἢ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε), καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδʼ αὐτοί φασιν. §2.23.11ἄλλος ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οἷον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας, ὅτι περὶ τῶν τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ διορίζουσι τἀληθές· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Μαντίᾳ τῷ ῥήτορι ἀμφισβητοῦντι πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέφηνεν ἡ μήτηρ, τοῦτο δὲ Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου καὶ Στίλβωνος ἀμφισβητούντων ἡ Δωδωνὶς ἀπέδειξεν Ἰσμηνίου τὸν υἱόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θετταλίσκον Ἰσμηνίου ἐνόμιζον.
Another is from division, for instance: "If all commit injustice for three reasons (either for this, or for this, or for this), and because of two of them it is impossible, while because of the third, not even they themselves claim it." Another is from induction, as from the case of the woman of Peparethus, that concerning children women everywhere decide the truth; for on the one hand, at Athens, when the orator Mantias was disputing with his son, the mother declared this, and on the other hand, at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing, the woman of Dodona proved that the son belonged to Ismenias, and for this reason they considered Thessaliscus to be the son of Ismenias.
καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ Νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου,
εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπιμεληθεῖσι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόασι τοὺς οἰκείους, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψασι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς τὰς οἰκείας, οὐκοῦν εἰ ὁμοίως ἐφʼ ἁπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν σωτηρίαν
. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν· Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χῖοι Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην, καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καίπερ γυναῖκα οὖσαν, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα καὶ τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα φιλόλογοι ὄντες, καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσι ἔτι καὶ νῦν, καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις χρησάμενοι εὐδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου, καὶ Θήβησιν ἅμα οἱ προστάται φιλόσοφοι ἐγένοντο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ πόλις
.
And again from the *Law* of Theodectes: "If they do not hand over their own horses to those who have cared badly for others' horses, nor their own ships to those who have capsized others' ships, then if the same holds in all cases, one must not employ those who have badly guarded another's safety for one's own safety." And as Alcidamas said, that all honor the wise: "At any rate, the Parians have honored Archilochus although he was a slanderer, and the Chians Homer although he was not a citizen, and the Mytilenaeans Sappho although she was a woman, and the Lacedaemonians Chilon and made him one of their elders although they are the least fond of learning, and the Italiotes Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes buried Anaxagoras although he was a foreigner and honor him even now, and the Athenians became happy by using the laws of Solon and the Lacedaemonians those of Lycurgus, and at Thebes, as soon as the leaders became philosophers, the city became happy."