§2.23.17ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, οἷον ὁ Ἰφικράτης, τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, νεώτερον ὄντα τῆς ἡλικίας, ὅτι μέγας ἦν λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, εἶπεν ὅτι εἰ τοὺς μεγάλους τῶν παίδων ἄνδρας νομίζουσι, τοὺς μικροὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν παῖδας εἶναι ψηφιοῦνται, καὶ Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ Νόμῳ, ὅτι
πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οἷον Στράβακα καὶ Χαρίδημον, διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν· φυγάδας δʼ οὐ ποιήσεσθε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους; §2.23.18ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐὰν ᾖ ταὐτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν συμβαίνει ταὐτά· οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν·
Another is from the fact that these things happen analogously, for instance, when Iphicrates, when they forced his son to perform public services because he was large although he was younger than the age requirement, said that if they consider large children to be men, they will vote that small men are children, and Theodectes in his *Law*: "You make mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, citizens because of their decent character; and will you not make exiles of those among the mercenaries who have committed outrageous deeds?" Another is from the fact that if the consequence is the same, then the things from which it follows are also the same; as Xenophanes used to say that those who say the gods were born are as impious as those who say they die; for in both cases it follows that at some time the gods do not exist.
ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἑκάστου λαμβάνειν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεί· μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ Ἰσοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν
. καὶ ὅτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον.
And in general, to take the consequence of each as always the same: "You are going to judge not about Isocrates but about a way of life, whether one should practice philosophy." And that to give earth and water is to be enslaved, and to participate in the common peace is to do what is commanded.
ληπτέον δʼ ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον.
One must take whichever of the two is useful.
§2.23.19ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταὐτὸ ἀεὶ αἱρεῖσθαι ὕστερον καὶ πρότερον, ἀλλʼ ἀνάπαλιν, οἷον τόδε τὸ ἐνθύμημα,
ἦ φεύγοντες μὲν ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα; ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι ᾑροῦντο, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ μένειν.
Another is from the fact that people do not always choose the same thing later as before, but the reverse, for instance this enthymeme: "If indeed when we were in exile we fought in order to return, shall we, now that we have returned, flee in order not to fight?" For at one time they chose to remain instead of fighting, and at another time not to fight instead of not remaining.
§2.23.20ἄλλος τὸ οὗ ἕνεκʼ ἂν εἴη ἢ γένοιτο, τούτου ἕνεκα φάναι εἶναι ἢ γεγενῆσθαι, οἷον εἰ δοίη τίς τινι ἵνʼ ἀφελόμενος λυπήσῃ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἴρηται,
"
πολλοῖς ὁ δαίμων οὐ κατʼ εὔνοιαν φέρων
μεγάλα δίδωσιν εὐτυχήματʼ, ἀλλʼ ἵνα
τὰς συμφορὰς λάβωσιν ἐπιφανεστέρας.
Another is to claim that a thing exists or has come to be for the sake of that for which it would exist or come to be; for instance, if someone should give something to another in order to cause pain by taking it away.
"
καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος,
"
οὐχ ὡς κτάνωσι θῆρʼ, ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες
ἀρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς Ἑλλάδα. "
καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Αἴαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προείλετο Ὀδυσσέα οὐ τιμῶν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα ἥττων ᾖ ὁ ἀκολουθῶν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκα ποιῆσαι.
Whence this also has been said: "To many, the deity, bringing fortune not out of goodwill, gives great successes, but in order that they may receive more conspicuous misfortunes." And the line from the *Meleager* of Antiphon: "Not that they might kill the beast, but that they might become witnesses of Meleager's virtue to Greece." And that from the *Ajax* of Theodectes, that Diomedes chose Odysseus not to honor him, but in order that his companion might be inferior; for it is possible to do it for this reason.
§2.23.21ἄλλος, κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν, οἷον, εἰ δυνατὸν καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ φίλοις ἢ βλαβερὸν ἐχθροῖς, κἂν ᾖ ἐπιζήμιον, εἰ ἐλάττων ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ προτρέπονται ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέπονται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.
Another, common to both litigants and advisers, is to consider the incentives and deterrents, and the reasons for which they both act and avoid; for these are the things which, if they are present, one must do, but if they are not present, one must not do; for instance, if it is possible, easy, and beneficial either to oneself or to friends, or harmful to enemies, or even if it is disadvantageous, if the loss is less than the deed. And they exhort on the basis of these, and dissuade on the basis of their contraries.
ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται· ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν.
And on the basis of these same things they both accuse and defend; they defend on the basis of the deterrents, and accuse on the basis of the incentives.
ἔστι δʼ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἥ τε Παμφίλου καὶ ἡ Καλλίππου.
This topic is the entire "Art" both of Pamphilus and of Callippus.
§2.23.22ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγνεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔδοξαν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἢ ἐγγὺς ἦν.
Another is from things that are believed to happen but are incredible, because they would not have been believed unless they were true or nearly true.
καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον· ἢ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν·
And all the more so; for people believe either facts or probabilities.
εἰ οὖν ἄπιστον καὶ μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ διά γε τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν δοκεῖ οὕτως·
If, therefore, it is incredible and improbable, it must be true; for it is certainly not because of probability and persuasiveness that it is believed so.
οἷον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πιτθεὺς κατηγορῶν τοῦ νόμου, ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν αὐτῷ εἰπόντι,
δέονται οἱ νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἰχθύες ἁλός, καίτοι οὐκ εἰκὸς οὐδὲ πιθανὸν ἐν ἅλμῃ τρεφομένους δεῖσθαι ἁλός, καὶ τὰ στέμφυλα ἐλαίου, καίτοι ἄπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἔλαιον γίγνεται, ταῦτα δεῖσθαι ἐλαίου
.
For instance, Androcles of Pitthus said in accusing the law, when they clamored at his saying: "The laws need a law to correct them, for indeed fish need salt, although it is neither probable nor persuasive that those brought up in brine should need salt, and the pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that those from which oil comes should need oil."