§1.7.1ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁμολογοῦντες ἄμφω συμφέρειν περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον συμφέροντος.
But since people often agree that both things are expedient but dispute about which is more so, next in order we should speak of the greater good and the more expedient.
§1.7.2ἔστω δὴ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον, καὶ μεῖζον μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον πρὸς ἔλαττον, μέγα δὲ καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ μικρὸν ἐλλεῖπον, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως. §1.7.3ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τό τε αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ πάντʼ ἐφίεται, καὶ ὃ νοῦν ἂν καὶ φρόνησιν λαβόντα ἕλοιτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικόν, ἢ ᾧ ἕπεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, τέλος δέ ἐστιν οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τά γε πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερέχεται.
Let "that which exceeds" be defined as that which is as much and more, and "that which is exceeded" as that which is contained within it; and "greater" and "more" are always relative to "less," while "great" and "small," "much" and "few" are relative to the standard size of the many; and that which exceeds is "great," while that which falls short is "small," and similarly for "much" and "few." Since, then, we define as "good" that which is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, and that which all things aim at, and what any entity possessing intellect and practical wisdom would choose, and also that which is productive of or preservative of such things, or that which such things follow; and since "the end" is that for the sake of which other things exist, and the "good for each individual" is that which stands in this relation to him; it is necessary that a greater number of goods should be a greater good than one or a smaller number, if the one or the smaller number is co-reckoned with them; for the greater number exceeds, while that which is contained within it is exceeded.
§1.7.4καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχῃ, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅσα αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου· οἷον εἰ ὁ μέγιστος ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ἀνὴρ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς μεγίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπεροχαὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς.
Also, if the greatest of one class exceeds the greatest of another, then the classes themselves also exceed each other; and if the classes themselves exceed each other, the greatest of the one also exceeds the greatest of the other; for example, if the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman, then men in general are greater than women, and if men in general are greater than women, then the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman; for the superiority of the classes and of the greatest individuals in them are in proportion.
§1.7.5καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν τῷδε ἕπηται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτῳ μή, ἕπηται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἅμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις ἡ τοῦ ἑπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου.
And when one thing follows another, but the latter does not follow the former—whether the following is simultaneous, successive, or potential; for the use of the following thing is contained in that of the other.
ἕπεται δὲ ἅμα μὲν τῷ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν, τούτῳ δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὔ, ὕστερον δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας κἂν ἀποστερήσειεν.
And "living" follows "being healthy" simultaneously, but the latter does not follow the former; "knowing" follows "learning" successively; and "depriving" follows "temple-robbing" potentially, for one who has robbed a temple would also deprive.
§1.7.6καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι μείζω· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ μείονι.
Also, things which exceed the same thing by a greater amount are greater; for they must also exceed that which exceeds by a less amount.
§1.7.7καὶ τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μείζω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι.
And those things which are productive of a greater good are greater; for this was the meaning of being productive of a greater.
καὶ οὗ τὸ ποιητικὸν μεῖζον, ὡσαύτως· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ἡδονῆς μείζων.
And likewise, that of which the productive cause is greater; for if that which is healthy is more desirable than that which is pleasant and is a greater good, then health also is greater than pleasure.
§1.7.8καὶ αἱρετώτερον τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθʼ αὑτό, οἷον ἰσχὺς ὑγιεινοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ, ὅπερ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθόν.
And that which is desirable for its own sake is more desirable than that which is not so; for example, strength is more desirable than what is healthy, for the latter is not for its own sake, while the former is, which was the definition of the good.
§1.7.9κἂν ᾖ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ, οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα.
And if one is an end, and the other is not; for the latter is for the sake of something else, and the former for its own sake; as exercising is in relation to a good bodily condition.
§1.7.10καὶ τὸ ἧττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἑτέρων· αὐταρκέστερον γάρ· ἧττον δὲ προσδεῖται τὸ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ῥᾳόνων προσδεόμενον.
And that which is less in need of other things than the other is; for it is more self-sufficient; and that which needs fewer or easier things is less in need.
§1.7.11καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ ᾖ, ἢ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ γενέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τούτου, αὐταρκέστερον τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὥστε φαίνεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν.
And when one thing cannot exist or be produced without the other, but the other can exist without it; for the one that does not need the other is more self-sufficient, so that it appears to be a greater good.
§1.7.12κἂν ᾖ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, κἂν ᾖ αἴτιον, τὸ δʼ οὐκ αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ αὐτό· ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι.
And if one is a starting-point (principle) and the other is not, or if one is a cause and the other is not, it is for the same reason; for without a cause and a starting-point, existence or production is impossible.
καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος ἀρχῆς μεῖζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἰτίου μεῖζον.
And of two starting-points, that which comes from the greater starting-point is greater; and of two causes, that which comes from the greater cause is greater.
καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὲ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν ἡ τοῦ μείζονος ἀρχὴ μείζων, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἴτιον μεῖζον.
And conversely, of two things, the starting-point of the greater is greater, and of two things, the cause of the greater is greater.
§1.7.13δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀμφοτέρως μεῖζον ἔστιν φαίνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, δόξει μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ τέλος μεῖζον καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλιστράτου τὸν βουλεύσαντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πραχθῆναι μὴ βουλεύσαντος· πάλιν δὲ καὶ Χαβρίου, τὸν πράξαντα τοῦ βουλεύσαντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that a thing can be made to appear greater in both ways; for if it is a starting-point and the other is not, it will seem to be greater, and likewise if it is not a starting-point and the other is; for the end is greater and not the starting-point, just as Leodamas said when accusing Callistratus, that the one who devised the plot committed a greater injustice than the one who executed it, for it would not have been executed if he had not devised it; and again, in the case of Chabrias, that the one who executed it committed a greater injustice than the one who devised it, for it would not have happened if there had not been someone to execute it, since they plot for this very purpose, namely, that they may execute it.