§1.13.1τὰ δʼ ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν.
Let us classify all injustices and acts of justice, beginning first from here.
ὥρισται δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρός τε νόμους δύο καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἐστι διχῶς.
Right and wrong have been defined in relation to two kinds of law and in relation to those whom they affect in a twofold way.
§1.13.2λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἄγραφον, τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν.
By law, I mean on the one hand that which is particular, and on the other hand that which is common; particular law being that which has been defined by each people for themselves, and this is partly unwritten and partly written; common law is that which is according to nature.
ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ μαντεύονται πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ μηδὲ συνθήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένου θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει ὂν τοῦτο δίκαιον· "
οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλʼ ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ τοῦτο, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη· "
καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δʼ οὐ δίκαιον,
"
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τʼ εὐρυμέδοντος
αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τʼ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς· "
καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας,
ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν
. §1.13.3πρὸς οὓς δέ, διώρισται δίχα· ὥρισται γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς ἕνα τῶν κοινωνούντων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν·
For there is a certain natural, common right and wrong which all people divine, even if there is no association or agreement between them; as Sophocles' Antigone clearly says, that it is right to bury Polyneices, even though it has been forbidden, since this is naturally right: "For this is not of today or yesterday, but lives forever, and no one knows whence it appeared." And as Empedocles says concerning not killing that which has life; for this is not right for some and not right for others, "but that which is the law for all is stretched continuously through the wide-ruling air and through the infinite light." And as Alcidamas says in his Messenian speech, "God has set all men free; nature has made no one a slave." In relation to those whom they affect, they are divided into two; for what one ought to do and not to do has been defined in relation to the community or in relation to one of its members.
διὸ καὶ τἀδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινα τῶν ὡρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν.
Therefore, both injustices and acts of justice can be committed and done in two ways: either against one definite person or against the community; for he who commits adultery or assaults someone wrongs a definite individual, while he who evades military service wrongs the community.
§1.13.4ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διῃρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.
Now that all injustices have been divided, some being against the community and others against another person or persons, let us resume and state what it is to be wronged.
§1.13.5ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἑκούσιον εἶναι.
To be wronged is to suffer injustice at the hands of one who acts voluntarily; for committing injustice has been defined previously as being voluntary.
§1.13.6ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἑκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἴρηται καθʼ αὑτὰ πρότερον καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες,
And since it is necessary that the person wronged should be harmed, and harmed voluntarily, the harms are clear from what has been said before; for goods and evils have been spoken of previously in themselves, and also voluntary actions, as being all those done knowingly.
§1.13.7ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος.
So it is necessary that all charges are either against the community or against an individual, and are done either by one who is ignorant and acts involuntarily, or by one who is voluntary and acts knowingly; and of these, some are done from choice and others from passion.
§1.13.8περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες εἴρηται πρότερον.
Now concerning anger, it will be discussed in the section on the passions; but what things people choose, and in what state of mind, has been said before.
§1.13.9ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλʼ οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐ δημοσίαν, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλʼ οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον.
And since people often admit that they have done the deed, but do not admit the indictment, or do not admit the object concerning which the indictment is made—for instance, they admit they took something but not that they stole it, or that they struck first but not that they insulted, or that they had intercourse but not that they committed adultery, or that they stole but did not commit sacrilege (for it was not something belonging to a god), or that they encroached but not on public land, or that they conversed with the enemy but did not betray—for these reasons, it would be necessary to have definitions about these matters as well: what is theft, what is insult, what is adultery, so that whether we wish to show that the charge exists or does not exist, we may be able to make the justice of the case clear.