§30.6Διὰ τί ἀνθρώπῳ πειστέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ ζῴῳ;
Why should we trust a human being more than any other animal?
πότερον ὥσπερ Πλάτων Νεοκλεῖ ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι ἀριθμεῖν μόνον ἐπίσταται τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων;
Is it as Plato answered Neocles, because he alone of all other animals knows how to count?
ἢ ὅτι θεοὺς νομίζει μόνον;
Or because he alone believes in gods?
ἢ ὅτι μιμητικώτατον;
Or because he is the most imitative?
μανθάνειν γὰρ δύναται διὰ τοῦτο.
For it is because of this that he is able to learn.
§30.7Διὰ τί οὐ χαίρομεν θεώμενοι οὐδὲ ἐλπίζοντες ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς ἐντὸς γωνίας, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ τῇ θεωρίᾳ, αὕτη δὲ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἡδεῖα κἂν εἰ τρισὶν ὀρθαῖς ἢ πλείοσιν ἴσας ἔσχεν.
Why do we not rejoice either in contemplating or in expecting that a triangle has its internal angles equal to two right angles, nor in any other such thing, except in the contemplation itself? But this is equally pleasant even if it had angles equal to three right angles or more.
ἀλλ’ ὅτι Ὀλυμπίᾳ ἐνικῶμεν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι, χαίρομεν καὶ μεμνημένοι καὶ ἐλπίζοντες τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τἀναντία τοῖς τοιούτοις, [ἢ] ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοιούτοις χαίρομεν ὡς γενομένοις ἢ οὖσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ὡς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν θεωρίας ἡδονήν, ὡς ἔχει, μόνην ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ πράξεις τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.
On the other hand, we rejoice both in remembering and in expecting such things as our victory at Olympia and the naval battle at Salamis, but not the opposites of such things. Is it [or] because we rejoice in such things as having happened or as existing, whereas in the case of things that are by nature, the pleasure of contemplation according to the truth as it is, is the only one produced in us, while in the case of actions, the pleasure is that which comes from their results?
ἀνομοίων οὖν οὐσῶν τῶν πράξεων, καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γίνεται τὰ μὲν λυπηρά, τὰ δὲ ἡδέα· φεύγομεν δὲ καὶ διώκομεν καθ’ ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἅπαντα.
Therefore, since actions are diverse, their outcomes also become some painful and others pleasant; and we avoid and pursue all things according to pleasure and pain.
§30.8Διὰ τί μέχρι ὑγιείας πραγματεύονται οἱ ἰατροί;
Why do physicians treat patients only up to the point of health?
ἰσχναίναι γάρ, εἶτα ἐκ τούτου ξηραίνει, εἶτα ὑγείαν ἐποίησεν, εἶτα ἐνταῦθα ἔστη.
For they make them thin, then as a result of this dry them, then produce health, and then stop there.
πότερον οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν ἐκ τούτου γενέσθαι ἄλλο;
Is it not possible that something else should come from this?
ἢ εἰ δυνατόν, ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης, καὶ ἔσται ὅ τις ἐξ ὑγείας ποιήσει ἄλλο τι;
Or if it is possible, is it the province of another science, and will there be something which someone will produce as another thing out of health?
εἰ δὴ γίνεται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τῶν μεταξύ, δῆλον ὅτι ἀρρωστεῖ, ἢ ξηρότερος ἢ ὑγρότερος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον.
If indeed things arise from opposites and intermediates, it is clear that falling ill is to become drier or wetter or some such thing.
ποιεῖ δὴ ἐκ ψύχους ἧττον σφόδρα, καὶ τέλεον ὡδὶ θερμὸν καὶ ὡδὶ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν μεταβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἢ μεταξύ, ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, ὃ ἦν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν· ἔκ τε τούτου οὐ πέφυκεν ἄλλο τι ὂν ἢ τὸ μεταξύ.
So the physician makes the temperature less extreme starting from cold, and finally, transitioning from opposites or intermediates, makes the patient warm in this way, and dry or wet in this way, until he arrives at having this state, which was that of being healthy; and from this state, it is not in its nature to become anything else than itself or the intermediate.
δύναται μὲν οὖν ποιῆσαι ὁ ἔχων.
The person who possesses the art can indeed produce the opposite.
ὡς γὰρ ἦλθεν, ἀναλῦσαι δύναται καὶ ἀπελθεῖν, οὐ μὴν ἥ γε τέχνη τούτου ἐστίν.
For in the way he arrived at health, he can analyze and go back; however, the art itself is not for this purpose.
ἀεὶ γὰρ βέλτιον.
For it is always for the better.
ὥστε οὐδὲ ἄλλη, οὔτε αὐτὴ ποιήσει ἐξ ὑγείας ἄλλο τι· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐγίνετο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον τούτου, εἴπερ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη.
Therefore, neither any other art nor this art itself will produce anything else out of health; for nothing else would be produced than its opposite, if indeed it is the same science.
οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ οἰκίας οὐδὲν ποιήσειεν ἂν τοὐναντίον· οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῃ τέχνη ἐκ τούτου ποιήσουσα, πλὴν ὡς μέρους, οἷον ἡ σκυτικὴ ὑπόδημα ἐκ προσχίσματος.
So also in the case of a house, one would not produce the opposite; and there is no other art which will produce something out of this, except as from a part, just as the shoemaker's art makes a shoe from a cutting.
ἐξ ἑκατέρου γὰρ γίνεται διττῶς, ἢ συντιθεμένου ἢ φθειρομένου.
For from each of the two, things arise in two ways, either by being put together or by being destroyed.
§30.9Διὰ τί τὸν φιλόσοφον τοῦ ῥήτορος οἴονται διαφέρειν;
Why do people think that the philosopher differs from the rhetorician?
ἢ ὅτι ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος περὶ αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν πραγμάτων διατρίβει, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὰ μετέχοντα, οἷον ὁ μὲν τί ἐστιν ἀδικία, ὁ δὲ ὡς ἄδικος ὁ δεῖνα, καὶ ὁ μὲν τί ἡ τυραννίς, ὁ δὲ οἷόν τι ὁ τύραννος.
Or is it because the philosopher busies himself with the forms themselves of things, while the rhetorician deals with the things that participate in them, for instance, the former with what injustice is, and the latter with how so-and-so is unjust, and the former with what tyranny is, and the latter with what kind of thing a tyrant is?
§30.10Διὰ τί οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πονηροί εἰσιν;
Why are the artists of Dionysus for the most part of bad character?
ἢ ὅτι ἥκιστα λόγου σοφίας κοινωνοῦσι διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τέχνας τὸ πολὺ μέρος τοῦ βίου εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἀκρασίαις τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου εἰσίν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀπορίαις;
Or is it because they have very little share in the wisdom of reason, since the greater part of their life is spent in the necessary arts, and because they spend most of their life in lack of self-control, and some of it also in poverty?
ἀμφότερα δὲ φαυλότητος παρασκευαστικά.
And both of these are preparatory to baseness.