Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Problems §29.1-29.12

Problems Concerning Justice, Injustice, and Judicial Practices

Passage 125 of 148 · Greek

Summary

This section explores the nature of justice and injustice, comparing withholding deposits with defaulting on loans, testaments versus kinship, why poverty seeks decent men, the injustice of educated humans, the blindness of wealth, the duty to defend the dead, the moral influence of associating with good people, the gravity of killing women, and the reasons for courtroom seating arrangements.

§29.1Διὰ τί μείζονος ὄντος ἀδικήματος, ἐάν τις βλάπτῃ εἰς τὸ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, τῆς δὲ τιμῆς οὔσης μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ἀδικία μᾶλλον δοκεῖ, καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι μᾶλλον εἶναι δοκοῦσι περὶ τὰ χρήματα;
Why is it that, although it is a greater injustice if one causes harm in respect of a greater good, and honor is a greater good (than wealth), injustice in respect of wealth seems more so, and unjust people seem to be more concerned with wealth?
ἢ διότι αἱροῦνται τὰ χρήματα μᾶλλον τῆς τιμῆς, καὶ πᾶσίν ἐστι κοινότατον, ἡ δὲ τιμὴ ὀλίγοις, καὶ ὀλιγάκις συμβαίνει ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς.
Is it because people choose wealth more than honor, and wealth is most common to all, whereas honor belongs to few, and its use occurs but rarely?
§29.2Διὰ τί παρακαταθήκην δεινότερον ἀποστερεῖν ἢ δάνειον;
Why is it more terrible to withhold a deposit than a loan?
ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν ἀδικεῖν φίλον.
Is it because it is disgraceful to wrong a friend?
ὁ μὲν οὖν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερῶν φίλον ἀδικεῖ· οὐδεὶς γὰρ παρακατατίθεται μὴ πιστεύων.
Now, he who withholds a deposit wrongs a friend; for no one makes a deposit without trusting the other.
οὗ δὲ τὸ χρέος, οὐ φίλος· οὐ γὰρ δανείζει, ἐὰν ᾖ φίλος, ἀλλὰ δίδωσιν.
But the person to whom the debt is owed is not a friend; for if he were a friend, he would not lend, but give.
ἢ ὅτι μεῖζον τὸ ἀδίκημα·
Or is it because the injustice is greater?
πρὸς γὰρ τῇ ζημίᾳ καὶ τὴν πίστιν παραβαίνει, δι’ ἥν, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον. δεῖ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.
For in addition to the loss, he also violates trust, because of which, if for nothing else, one ought to abstain from wronging.
ἔτι τὸ μὴ τοῖς ἴσοις ἀμύνεσθαι φαῦλον· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔδωκεν ὡς φίλῳ, ὁ δὲ ἀπεστέρησεν ὡς ἐχθρόν· ὁ δὲ δανείζων οὐχ ὡς φίλος ἔδωκεν.
Furthermore, it is base not to return like for like; for the one gave as to a friend, but the other withheld as from an enemy; whereas the lender did not give as to a friend.
ἔτι τῶν μὲν ἡ δόσις φυλακῆς καὶ ἀποδόσεως χάριν, τῶν δὲ καὶ ὠφελείας· ἧττον δὲ ἀγανακτοῦμεν ἀποβάλλοντες, εἰ κέρδος θήρεύομεν, οἷον οἱ ἁλιεῖς τὰ δελέατα· προφανὴς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος.
Furthermore, the giving of the former is for the sake of safekeeping and return, while that of the latter is also for the sake of benefit; and we are less angry when we lose something if we are hunting for profit, as fishermen do with bait, for the risk is obvious.
ἔτι παρακατατίθενται μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι καὶ ἀτυχοῦντες, δανείζουσι δὲ οἱ εὐποροῦντες· δεινότερον δέ ἐστι τὸν ἀτυχοῦντα ἢ τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα ἀδικεῖν.
Furthermore, those who make deposits are for the most part those who are plotted against and unfortunate, whereas those who lend are the well-to-do; and it is more terrible to wrong the unfortunate than the fortunate.
§29.3Διὰ τί ἐνίοις δικαστηρίοις τοῖς γένεσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς διαθήκαις ψηφιοῦνται;
Why is it that in some courts of law they vote in favor of kinship rather than testaments?
ἢ ὅτι γένους μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καταψεύσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὂν ἀποφαίνειν· διαθῆκαι δὲ πολλαὶ ψευδεῖς ἤδη ἐξηλέγχθησαν οὖσαι.
Is it because it is impossible to lie about kinship, but it displays what is actual, whereas many testaments have already been proven to be false?
§29.4Διὰ τί ἡ πενία παρὰ τοῖς χρηστοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἢ παρὰ τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστίν;
Why is poverty found more among good men than among bad men?
ἢ διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων μισεῖσθαι καὶ ἐξελαύνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καταφεύγει, οἰομένη μάλιστα παρὰ τούτοις σωτηρίας τυχεῖν καὶ διαμεῖναι· εἰ δὲ πρὸς πονηροὺς ἔλθοι, οὐκ ἂν διαμεῖναι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ ἢ κλέπτειν ἢ ληΐζεσθαι, ὧν γινομένων οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἶναι αὐτὴν παρ’ αὐτοῖς.
Is it because, being hated and driven away by all, she flees to the decent and reasonable men, thinking that she will especially find safety and remain with them; whereas if she went to the wicked, they would not remain in the same state, but would either steal or plunder, and if these things happened, she would no longer exist among them?
ἢ ὅτι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς οἴεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄριστα ἂν αὐτῇ χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν ὑβρισθῆναι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν.
Or because she thinks that the decent among men would treat her best, and that she would be least insulted by them?
καθάπερ οὖν τὰς τῶν χρημάτων παρακαταθήκας πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς τιθέμενα, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς διατάττεται.
Just as deposits of wealth are placed with the decent, so she too disposes of herself.
ἢ ὅτι θήλεια οὖσα ἀπορωτέρα ἐστίν, ὥστε τῶν ἐπιεικῶν δεῖται.
Or is it because, being female, she is more helpless, so that she needs decent men?
ἢ ὅτι αὐτὴ κακὸν οὖσα πρὸς τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι.
Or because, being herself an evil, she would not go to evil?
εἰ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν ἕλοιτο, παντάπασιν ἂν δυσίατον εἴη.
For if she chose evil, she would be altogether incurable.
§29.5Διὰ τί οὐχ ὁμοίως αἱ ἀδικίαι μείζους περὶ τὰ ῥήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οἷον ὁ μικρὸν εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν καὶ τὸ ἀπόρρητον εἴποι, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἕνα προδοὺς καὶ πόλιν, ὥσπερ ὁ ὀβολὸν ἀποστερήσας καὶ τάλαντον;
Why is it that injustices in respect of words and other things do not increase in the same way—for example, a person who has spoken of a small matter would not necessarily speak of a secret, whereas he who has betrayed one person would also betray a city, just as he who has withheld an obol would also withhold a talent?
ἢ ὅτι ἀπὸ μείζονος ἀδικίας ἔνια ἐλάττω ἐστὶ δι’ ἀδυναμίαν.
Is it because some lesser wrongs arise from a greater injustice due to inability?
§29.6Διὰ τί παρακαταθήκην αἰσχρὸν ἀποστερῆσαι μικρὰν ἢ πολὺ δανεισάμενον;
Why is it shameful to withhold a small deposit rather than to borrow a large sum and not repay it?
ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερῶν τὸν ὑπολαβόντα εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐπιεικῆ ἐξαπατᾶται;
Is it because he who withholds the deposit deceives the one who assumed him to be a decent person?
ἢ ὅτι ὁ τοῦτο κἂν ἐκεῖνο ποιήσειεν;
Or because he who would do this would also do that?
§29.7Διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα παιδείας μετέχων ζῴων ἀπάντων ἀδικώτατόν ἐστιν;
Why is it that human, who participates most in education of all animals, is the most unjust?
ἢ ὅτι πλείστου λογισμοῦ κεκοινώνηκεν;
Is it because he shares in the greatest amount of reasoning?
μάλιστα οὖν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐξήτακεν· ταῦτα δ’ ἄνευ ἀδικίας οὐκ ἔστιν.
Therefore, he has especially examined pleasures and happiness, and these cannot exist without injustice.
§29.8Διὰ τί ὁ πλοῦτος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ παρὰ τοῖς φαύλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἐστίν;
Why is wealth for the most part found among the bad rather than the decent?
ἢ διότι τυφλὸς ὢν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐ δύναται κρίνειν οὐδὲ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ βέλτιστον;
Is it because, being blind, it cannot judge in its intellect nor choose what is best?
§29.9Διὰ τί δικαιότερον εἶναι νενόμισται τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν ἢ τοῖς ζῶσιν ἐπαμύνειν;
Why is it considered more just to defend the dead than the living?
ἢ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ζῶντες δύναιντ’ ἂν ἑαυτοῖς ἐπαρκέσαι, ὁ δὲ τετελευτηκὼς οὐκέτι;
Is it because the living can help themselves, whereas the dead can no longer do so?
§29.10Διὰ τί ὑγιαίνοντι μὲν ὁ συνὼν οὐδὲν ὑγιέστερος γίνεται, οὐδὲ ἰσχυρῷ ἢ καλῷ εἰς τὰς ἕξεις ἐπιδίδωσιν οὐθέν, δικαίῳ δὲ καὶ σώφρονι καὶ ἀγαθῷ;
Why is it that by associating with a healthy person one does not become any healthier, nor does one improve at all in physical habits by associating with a strong or beautiful person, whereas one does improve by associating with a just, temperate, and good person?
ἢ διότι τὰ μὲν ἀμίμητα, τὰ δὲ μιμητὰ τῇ ψυχῇ;
Is it because the former are inimitable, while the latter are imitable by the soul?
ἀγαθὸς δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ ὑγιὴς δὲ τῷ σώματι· ἐθίζεται οὖν χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ λυπεῖσθαι.
And being good is of the soul, whereas being healthy is of the body; therefore, one becomes accustomed to rejoice and grieve in the right way.
ὁ δὲ ὑγιεῖ συνὼν οὐκέτι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τισὶ χαίρειν ἢ μὴ ὁ ὑγιής· οὐθὲν γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν.
But he who associates with a healthy person does not experience this; for being healthy does not consist in rejoicing or not rejoicing in certain things; for none of these things produces health.
§29.11Διὰ τί δεινότερον γυναῖκα ἀποκτεῖναι ἢ ἄνδρα;
Why is it more terrible to kill a woman than a man?
καίτοι βέλτιον τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος φύσει.
And yet, the male is by nature better than the female.
ἢ διότι ἀσθενέστερον, ὥστε ἐλάττω ἀδικεῖ.
Is it because she is weaker, so that she does less injustice?
ἢ ὅτι οὐ νεανικὸν τὸ ἰσχυρίζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ πολὺ ἧττον;
Or because it is not manly to show force against that which is much inferior?
§29.12Διὰ τί ποτε τῷ φεύγοντι ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τὴν δεξιὰν στάσιν διδόασιν;
Why is it that in a court of law they give the position on the right to the defendant?
ἢ ὅτι ἐπανισοῦν βούλονται;
Is it because they wish to equalize things?
πλεονεκτοῦντος οὖν τοῦ διώκοντος τὴν στάσιν τῷ φεύγοντι διδόασιν.
Since, therefore, the prosecutor has the advantage, they give the position to the defendant.
εἶθ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἱ φεύγοντες παραφυλάττονται· ἐπὶ δεξιὰ δὲ ἡ φυλακὴ γίνεται, ἐὰν ὁ φεύγων ἔχῃ τὴν ἐν δεξιᾷ στάσιν.
Furthermore, for the most part, defendants are guarded; and the guarding is done on the right, if the defendant has the position on the right.

Notes

  1. §29.1μείζονος ὄντος ἀδικήματος, ἐάν τις βλάπτῃ εἰς τὸ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν — μείζονος ὄντος ἀδικήματος is a genitive absolute construction, followed by the conditional clause ἐάν τις βλάπτῃ... specifying the condition. The whole phrase carries a concessive force: 'although it is a greater injustice if one causes harm in respect of a greater good.'
  2. §29.2δι’ ἥν, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον, δεῖ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν — εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον is an idiomatic expression with an ellipsis, meaning 'even if there is nothing else' (omitting a verb like εἴη). The relative pronoun δι’ ἥν refers back to the antecedent πίστιν (trust) and governs the infinitive phrase ἀπέχεσθαι dependent on δεῖ.
  3. §29.4εἰ δὲ πρὸς πονηροὺς ἔλθοι, οὐκ ἂν διαμεῖναι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει αὐτούς — ἔλθοι is an optative expressing a potential or hypothetical condition. The following οὐκ ἂν διαμεῖναι is an infinitive with ἂν in indirect speech dependent on οἰομένη, representing οὐκ ἂν διαμένοιεν of direct discourse, with the accusative αὐτούς (the wicked) as its subject.
  4. §29.4θήλεια οὖσα — A personified expression based on the grammatical feminine gender of ἡ πενία (poverty). The participle οὖσα expresses cause ('being female'), mapping the grammatical gender of the noun onto the social/physical vulnerability associated with females in antiquity.
  5. §29.10οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τισὶ χαίρειν ἢ μὴ ὁ ὑγιής — The verb ἐστι is omitted. The phrase ἐν τῷ... χαίρειν ἢ μή ('consist in rejoicing or not in certain things') expresses definition or essence, with ὁ ὑγιής as the subject: 'for the healthy person is not defined by rejoicing or not in certain things.'

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Problems §29.1-29.12. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg036.humanitext-grc1:29.1-29.12

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