§7.1323aπερὶ δὲ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τίς αἱρετώτατος βίος.
He who intends to make the fitting inquiry into the best constitution must first determine what is the most choiceworthy life.
ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν· ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μή τι γίγνηται παράλογον.
For as long as this is unclear, the best constitution must also be unclear; for it is fitting that those who are governed in the best way, given their available resources, should fare best, unless something contrary to expectation occurs.
διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος βίος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος.
Therefore, it is first necessary to agree what is, so to speak, the most choiceworthy life for all, and after this, whether it is the same or different both in common and for the individual separately.
νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.
Believing, then, that enough has been said about the best life even in our popular discussions, we must use them now as well.
ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρός γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἂν ὡς οὐ, τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή.
For, in truth, as regards at least one division, no one would dispute that, there being three parts—external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul—all of these must belong to the happy.
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηθὲν μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρείας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηθενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἕνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς φιλτάτους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινόμενον.
For no one would call a man happy who has no particle of courage, temperance, justice, or wisdom, but who is afraid of the flies flying past him, and abstains from none of the most extreme actions if he desires to eat or drink, and destroys his dearest friends for the sake of a farthing, and likewise in matters of intellect is so foolish and deceived as if he were a child or a madman.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα πάντες ἂν συγχωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δʼ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.
But while all would agree to these statements when they are made, they differ about the quantity and the degree of superiority.
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὁποσονοῦν, πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.
For they think that any amount of virtue, however small, is enough, but of wealth, property, power, reputation, and all such things they seek an excess without limit.
ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ῥᾴδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων λαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνα ταύταις, §7.1323bκαὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτʼ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτʼ ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτʼ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ ἦθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκεῖνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐλλείπουσιν·
But we shall tell them that it is easy to get conviction about these matters even from actual deeds, seeing that people do not acquire and preserve virtues by external goods, but those goods by virtues, and that happy living, whether it consists for men in joy or in virtue or in both, belongs more to those who are cultivated to excess in their character and intellect, but are moderate in the acquisition of external goods, than to those who possess more of the latter than is useful, but are deficient in the former.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις εὐσύνοπτόν ἐστιν.
Nevertheless, it is also easy to see for those who examine it by reason.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι, (πᾶν τε τὸ χρήσιμον εἴς τι), ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηθὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῖς ἔχουσιν, τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῳ περ ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον.
For external goods have a limit, like an instrument (and everything useful is for something), the excess of which must either harm or be of no benefit to those who possess them; whereas of each of the goods concerning the soul, the more it exceeds, the more useful it must be, if indeed we must ascribe to these too not only nobility but also utility.
ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἥνπερ εἴληχε ταῦτα ὧν φαμεν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις.
And in general, it is clear that we shall say that the best disposition of each thing follows the relation to one another according to the same superiority that those things obtain of which we say these are dispositions.
ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμιώτερον καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν.
So that if the soul is more honorable than both property and the body, both absolutely and to us, the best disposition of each must necessarily have a relation analogous to these.
ἔτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἱρετὰ καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχήν.
And further, these things are by nature desirable for the sake of the soul, and all sensible men ought to choose them, but not the soul for the sake of those things.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, διʼ οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ διʼ αὑτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτʼ ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιον ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δʼ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστίν)· ἐχόμενον δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς.
That, therefore, to each person there falls just so much of happiness as of virtue and wisdom and of acting in accordance with them, let it be agreed by us, using as a witness God, who is happy and blessed, yet not through any of external goods, but through himself and by being of a certain quality by nature; since for these reasons it is also necessary that good fortune be different from happiness (for of goods external to the soul, the cause is chance and luck, but no one is just or temperate from luck or through luck); and it is adjacent and requires the same arguments that the best city is happy and acts well.
ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν· οὐθὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὔτʼ ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρεία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφὴν ὧν μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων.
But it is impossible to act well for those who do not do noble deeds; and there is no noble deed, either of a man or of a city, apart from virtue and wisdom; and the courage, justice, and wisdom of a city have the same power and form, by participating in which each individual human being is called just, wise, and temperate.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφροιμιασμένα τῷ λόγῳ· οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους, ἑτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα·
However, let these matters be prefaced to our discourse to this extent; for it is neither possible not to touch upon them, nor is it permitted to go through all the appropriate arguments, for these are the work of another leisure.
νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν,
But for now, let this much be assumed as a premise: that the best life, both for each individually and in common for cities, [is...]