§5.1301aπερὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ὧν προειλόμεθα σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων·
Concerning, then, the other things which we proposed, almost all have been spoken of.
ἐκ τίνων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων, καὶ τίνες ἑκάστης πολιτείας φθοραί, καὶ ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται, ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαι τίνες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης εἰσίν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σῴζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστη, σκεπτέον ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
Next in order after what has been said, we must consider from what causes constitutions change, and how many and of what nature they are, and what are the destructions of each constitution, and from what to what they chiefly shift, further what are the means of preservation both in general and for each separately, and through what means each of the constitutions would be best preserved.
δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλαὶ γεγένηνται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατʼ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτου δʼ ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.
We must first grasp the starting point, that many constitutions have arisen because, while all agree on what is just and proportionally equal, they fail to achieve it, as has also been said before.
δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὁτιοῦν ὄντας οἴεσθαι ἁπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἁπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἕν τι ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατʼ οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες ἁπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι).
For democracy arose from thinking that those who are equal in any respect are absolutely equal (for because they are all equally free, they think they are absolutely equal), and oligarchy arose from assuming that those who are unequal in one respect are entirely unequal (for being unequal in property, they assume they are absolutely unequal).
εἶτα οἱ μὲν ὡς ἴσοι ὄντες πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσι μετέχειν· οἱ δʼ ὡς ἄνισοι ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον.
Then, the former, as being equal, claim to share equally in all things; the latter, as being unequal, seek to have more, for what is more is unequal.
ἔχουσι μὲν οὖν τι πᾶσαι δίκαιον, ἡμαρτημέναι δʼ ἁπλῶς εἰσιν.
Therefore, all constitutions have some justice, but absolutely they are in error.
καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἑκάτεροι τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας, στασιάζουσιν.
And for this reason, whenever they do not share in the constitution according to the assumption which each of the two happens to hold, they fall into faction.
πάντων δὲ δικαιότατα μὲν ἂν στασιάζοιεν, ἥκιστα δὲ τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ κατʼ ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες· §5.1301bμάλιστα γὰρ εὔλογον ἀνίσους ἁπλῶς εἶναι τούτους μόνον.
Those who excel in virtue would rebel most justly of all, but they do this least; for it is most reasonable that these alone are absolutely unequal.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων αὑτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος.
And there are some who, excelling in birth, do not think themselves worthy of equal things because of this inequality; for those to whom belong the virtue and wealth of ancestors are thought to be noble.
ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν αὗται καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεών εἰσιν, ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν· διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς·
These, so to speak, are the starting points and sources of factions, whence they rebel; wherefore also changes occur in two ways.
ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἄλλην μεταστήσωσιν, οἷον ἐκ δημοκρατίας ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ δημοκρατίαν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐκ τούτων, ἢ ταύτας ἐξ ἐκείνων, ὁτὲ δʼ οὐ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτήν, διʼ αὑτῶν δʼ εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἷον τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν·
Sometimes they are directed against the constitution, so as to change from the established one to another, as from democracy to oligarchy, or democracy from oligarchy, or constitutional government and aristocracy from these, or these from those; and sometimes not against the established constitution, but they prefer the same form of government, but wish to have it in their own hands, such as oligarchy or monarchy.
ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ἢ δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἧττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν, ἢ ἵνα ἐπιταθῶσιν ἢ ἀνεθῶσιν·
Further, concerning the more and the less: for instance, if it is an oligarchy, to make it more oligarchic or less, or if a democracy, to make it more democratic or less; and similarly in the case of the remaining constitutions, either to tighten them or loosen them.
ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας, οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί φασι Λύσανδρόν τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ Παυσανίαν τὸν βασιλέα τὴν ἐφορείαν, καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον (ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλὴν ἐποίησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκές ἐστιν ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐπιψηφίζηται ἀρχή τις, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ εἷς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ).
Further, to change some part of the constitution, such as to establish or abolish some office, as some say Lysander in Lacedaemon attempted to abolish the kingship, and Pausanias the king [attempted to abolish] the ephorate; and in Epidamnus also the constitution changed in a part (for they established a council instead of the tribe-leaders; but it is still compulsory for the citizens to go to the Heliaia when some magistrate holds a vote, and the single magistrate was also an oligarchic feature in this constitution).
πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἡ στάσις, οὐ μὴ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (ἀΐδιος γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐν ἴσοις)· ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν.
For everywhere faction is due to inequality, when there is no proportion to those who are unequal (for a lifelong kingship is unequal if it exists among equals); for generally it is in seeking equality that men rebel.
ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ κατʼ ἀξίαν ἐστίν.
But equality is twofold: for one is numerical, and the other is according to merit.
λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον, κατʼ ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατʼ ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἴσῳ τὰ τρία τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἑνός· ἴσον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῖν δυοῖν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἡμίση.
I mean by numerical what is the same and equal in multitude or size, and according to merit what is so in ratio; as for instance, numerically three exceeds two by an equal amount, and two exceeds one [by the same amount], but in ratio four exceeds two and two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four as one is of two, for both are halves.
ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἴσοι ὦσιν, ὅλως ἴσοι νομίζουσιν εἶναι, οἱ δʼ ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἄνισοι, πάντων ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς.
But while agreeing that absolute justice is according to merit, they differ, as was said before: some because, if they are equal in some respect, they think they are absolutely equal; others because, if they are unequal in some respect, they claim all things unequally.
διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία· εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν ὀλίγοις,
Wherefore also chiefly two constitutions arise: democracy and oligarchy; for nobility and virtue are among few,