§4.1296bἀλλʼ ἢ ἄρχειν ζητεῖν ἢ κρατουμένους ὑπομένειν.
but either to seek to rule or to endure being ruled.
τίς μὲν οὖν ἀρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· τῶν δʼ ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ἐπειδὴ πλείους δημοκρατίας καὶ πλείους ὀλιγαρχίας φαμὲν εἶναι, ποίαν πρώτην θετέον καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐχομένην τῷ τὴν μὲν εἶναι βελτίω τὴν δὲ χείρω, διωρισμένης τῆς ἀρίστης οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.
From these things, therefore, it is clear which constitution is best, and for what cause; and as for the other constitutions, since we say that there are multiple democracies and multiple oligarchies, it is not difficult to see which one we must place as first, and second, and so on in succession, in that one is better and another worse, now that the best has been defined.
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι βελτίω τὴν ἐγγύτατα ταύτης, χείρω δὲ τὴν ἀφεστηκυῖαν τοῦ μέσου πλεῖον, ἂν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνῃ τις.
For it is always necessary that the one nearest to this best is better, and the one further removed from the middle is worse, unless one judges with reference to a particular hypothesis.
λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις, οὔσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἱρετωτέρας, ἐνίοις οὐδὲν κωλύει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.
And I mean "with reference to a hypothesis" because, although there is often another constitution more desirable, nothing prevents another constitution from being more advantageous for some.
τίς δὲ πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποία συμφέρει ποίοις, ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν.
Next after what has been said, it is to be discussed which constitution is advantageous for which people, and what kind of constitution for what kind of people.
ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον περὶ πασῶν καθόλου ταὐτόν· δεῖ γὰρ κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ βουλόμενον μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν.
First, then, we must grasp one and same general principle concerning all: for that part of the city which wishes the constitution to remain must be stronger than the part which does not wish it.
ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ.
And every city consists of both quality and quantity.
λέγω δὲ ποιὸν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν.
By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, and noble birth; by quantity, the superiority of numbers of the multitude.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν, οἷον πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων τοὺς ἀγεννεῖς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λείπεται τῷ ποιῷ.
And it is possible that quality belongs to one part of the parts from which the city is constituted, and quantity to another part; for example, that the ignoble are more numerous than the noble, or the poor than the rich, yet they do not exceed in quantity as much as they are surpassed in quality.
διὸ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκριτέον.
Therefore, these must be compared with one another.
ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου, οἷον ἐὰν μὲν τὸ τῶν γεωργῶν ὑπερτείνῃ πλῆθος, τὴν πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαρνούντων, τὴν τελευταίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς μεταξὺ τούτων·
Where, then, the multitude of the poor exceeds the aforesaid proportion, there a democracy naturally exists, and each form of democracy according to the superiority of each kind of common people; for example, if the multitude of husbandmen exceeds, the first democracy, and if that of mechanics and wage-earners, the last, and similarly also the others between these.
ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων μᾶλλον ὑπερτείνει τῷ ποιῷ ἢ λείπεται τῷ ποσῷ, ἐνταῦθα ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους.
But where the part of the well-off and notable exceeds more in quality than it is surpassed in quantity, there an oligarchy exists, and in the same way each form of oligarchy according to the superiority of the oligarchic multitude.
δεῖ δʼ ἀεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μέσους· ἄν τε γὰρ ὀλιγαρχικοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθῇ, στοχάζεσθαι χρὴ τῶν μέσων, ἐάν τε δημοκρατικούς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτους.
And the legislator must always in the constitution include the middle class; for whether he establishes oligarchic laws, he must aim at the middle class, or whether democratic, he must bring these into the laws.
ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων ὑπερτείνει πλῆθος ἢ συναμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἢ καὶ θατέρου μόνον, ἐνταῦθʼ ἐνδέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον.
And where the multitude of the middle class exceeds either both of the extremes together or even only one of them, there a lasting constitution is possible.
§4.1297aοὐθὲν γὰρ φοβερὸν μή ποτε συμφωνήσωσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τούτους· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἅτεροι βουλήσονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑτέροις, κοινοτέραν δʼ, ἂν ζητῶσιν, οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης.
For there is no fear that the rich will ever agree with the poor against these; for neither will ever wish to be slaves to the other, and if they seek a more common one, they will find no other constitution than this.
ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητὴς δʼ ὁ μέσος.
For they would not endure to rule in turn because of their distrust toward one another; and everywhere the arbitrator is most trusted, and the arbitrator is the middle class.
ὅσῳ δʼ ἂν ἄμεινον ἡ πολιτεία μειχθῇ, τοσούτῳ μονιμωτέρα.
And the better the constitution is mixed, so much more lasting it is.
διαμαρτάνουσι δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας, οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ πλεῖον νέμειν τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ παρακρούεσθαι τὸν δῆμον.
But many, even of those who wish to make aristocratic constitutions, make a mistake, not only in assigning more to the well-off, but also in deceiving the common people.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὲ ἐκ τῶν ψευδῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀληθὲς συμβῆναι κακόν· αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύασι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου.
For it is necessary that in time a true evil arises from false goods; for the encroachments of the rich ruin the constitution more than those of the common people.
ἔστι δʼ ὅσα προφάσεως χάριν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις σοφίζονται πρὸς τὸν δῆμον πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, περὶ ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, περὶ δικαστήρια, περὶ ὅπλισιν, περὶ γυμνασίαν·
And there are five in number the devices which they practice in the constitutions against the common people for the sake of pretense, concerning the assembly, concerning the offices, concerning the courts, concerning possession of arms, and concerning gymnastic training.
περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν τὸ ἐξεῖναι ἐκκλησιάζειν πᾶσι, ζημίαν δὲ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοῖς εὐπόροις ἐὰν μὴ ἐκκλησιάζωσιν, ἢ μόνοις ἢ μείζω πολλῷ, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τίμημα μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἐξόμνυσθαι, τοῖς δʼ ἀπόροις ἐξεῖναι, καὶ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια τοῖς μὲν εὐπόροις εἶναι ζημίαν ἂν μὴ δικάζωσι, τοῖς δʼ ἀπόροις ἄδειαν, ἢ τοῖς μὲν μεγάλην τοῖς δὲ μικράν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρώνδου νόμοις.
Concerning the assembly, that it is permitted for all to attend the assembly, but a fine is imposed on the well-off if they do not attend, either on them alone or a much greater one; concerning the offices, that those who have a property qualification are not permitted to excuse themselves on oath, while the poor are permitted; and concerning the courts, that there is a fine for the well-off if they do not serve as jurors, but impunity for the poor, or a large fine for the former and a small one for the latter, as in the laws of Charondas.
ἐνιαχοῦ δʼ ἔξεστι μὲν πᾶσιν ἀπογραψαμένοις ἐκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἀπογραψάμενοι μήτʼ ἐκκλησιάζωσι μήτε δικάζωσιν, ἐπίκεινται μεγάλαι ζημίαι τούτοις, ἵνα διὰ μὲν τὴν ζημίαν φεύγωσι τὸ ἀπογράφεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀπογράφεσθαι μὴ δικάζωσι μηδʼ ἐκκλησιάζωσιν.
And in some places, it is permitted for all who have registered to attend the assembly and to serve as jurors, but if they register and neither attend the assembly nor serve as jurors, heavy fines are imposed on them, so that through the fine they may avoid registering, and through not registering they may not serve as jurors nor attend the assembly.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὅπλα κεκτῆσθαι καὶ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι νομοθετοῦσιν.
And in the same way they legislate also concerning the possession of arms and gymnastic training.
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις ἔξεστι μὴ κεκτῆσθαι, τοῖς δʼ εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον μὴ κεκτημένοις, κἂν μὴ γυμνάζωνται, τοῖς μὲν οὐδεμία ζημία, τοῖς δʼ εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον, ὅπως οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν ζημίαν μετέχωσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μετέχωσιν.
For it is permitted for the poor not to possess arms, but for the well-off there is a penalty if they do not possess them; and if they do not train, there is no fine for the former, but a penalty for the well-off, so that the latter may participate because of the fine, and the former may not participate because they have no fear.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχικὰ σοφίσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας· ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἀντισοφίζονται.
These, then, are oligarchic devices of legislation; and in democracies they practice counter-devices against these.
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις μισθὸν πορίζουσιν ἐκκλησιάζουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν, τοῖς δʼ εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν τάττουσι ζημίαν.
For they provide pay for the poor when they attend the assembly and serve as jurors, but they impose no fine on the well-off.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι εἴ τις βούλεται μιγνύναι δικαίως, δεῖ τὰ παρʼ ἑκατέροις συνάγειν καὶ τοῖς μὲν μισθὸν πορίζειν τοῖς δὲ ζημίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν κοινωνοῖεν ἅπαντες, ἐκείνως δʼ ἡ πολιτεία γίγνεται τῶν ἑτέρων μόνον.
So it is clear that if one wishes to mix justly, one must bring together the rules of both and provide pay for the former and a fine for the latter; for in this way all would share, whereas in the other way the constitution comes about for one of the two parties alone.