§3.1281aτοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς.
And this, as we say, is living happily and finely.
τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ συζῆν.
Therefore, the political association must be assumed to exist for the sake of fine actions, and not for the sake of living together.
διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατʼ ἀρετὴν δʼ ὑπερεχομένοις.
Wherefore, those who contribute most to such an association have a greater share in the city than those who are equal or superior in freedom and birth but unequal in political virtue, or those who surpass in wealth but are surpassed in virtue.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
It is manifest, therefore, from what has been said, that all who dispute about constitutions speak of some part of justice.
ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.
But there is a difficulty as to what ought to be the sovereign of the city.
ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἕνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον.
For indeed it must be either the multitude, or the wealthy, or the respectable, or the one best of all, or a tyrant.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν.
But all of these appear to involve difficulty.
τί γάρ;
For what indeed?
ἂν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ πλείους εἶναι διανέμωνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτʼ οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;
If the poor, because they are more numerous, divide among themselves the property of the wealthy, is this not unjust?
"ἔδοξε γὰρ νὴ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως. "
τὴν οὖν ἀδικίαν τί χρὴ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην;
"No, by Zeus, for it seemed just to the sovereign." What then must we call the extreme of injustice?
πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἂν διανέμωνται, φανερὸν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν.
And again, when everything is taken, if the majority divide the property of the minority, it is manifest that they destroy the city.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἥ γʼ ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι δίκαιον.
Yet virtue does not destroy that which possesses it, nor is justice destructive of a city; so it is clear that this law also cannot be just.
ἔτι καὶ τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἔπραξεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας δικαίας· βιάζεται γὰρ ὢν κρείττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς πλουσίους.
Moreover, all the actions that a tyrant performs must also necessarily be just; for he uses force, being stronger, just as the multitude does against the wealthy.
ἀλλʼ ἆρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἄρχειν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους;
But is it just for the minority and the wealthy to rule?
ἂν οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρπάζωσι καὶ ἀφαιρῶνται τὰ κτήματα τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ δίκαιον·
If they then do these same things, and plunder and take away the possessions of the multitude, is this just?
καὶ θάτερον ἄρα.
Then the other must be so too.
ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ὅτι πάντα φαῦλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν·
It is manifest, then, that all these things are bad and not just.
ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄρχειν δεῖ καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων;
But ought the respectable to rule and be sovereign of all?
οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς· τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δʼ αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους.
In that case, it is necessary for all the others to be deprived of honor, not being honored with political offices; for we say that offices are honors, and if the same persons always rule, the others must necessarily be deprived of honor.
ἀλλʼ ἕνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν βέλτιον;
But is it better for the one most excellent to rule?
ἀλλʼ ἔτι τοῦτο ὀλιγαρχικώτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείους.
But this is still more oligarchical; for those deprived of honor are more numerous.
ἀλλʼ ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν.
But perhaps someone might say that it is a bad thing for a human being in general, rather than law, to be sovereign, since he at any rate possesses the passions that happen to affect the soul.
ἂν οὖν ᾖ νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἢ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἠπορημένων;
If, then, there is indeed law, but it is either oligarchical or democratic, what difference will it make regarding the difficulties that have been raised?
συμβήσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον.
For the things said before will happen in the same way.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος· ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ὀλίγους δέ, δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι καί τινʼ ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν.
Now concerning the other cases let there be some other discussion; but that the multitude ought to be sovereign rather than the few who are best, would seem to be resolved and to present some difficulty, and perhaps even some truth.
τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ,
For the many, of whom each is not an excellent man,