Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Politics §3.1280a

Partial Conceptions of Justice and the True End of the Polis

Passage 51 of 155 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle reaffirms that the essential difference between oligarchy and democracy lies in wealth and poverty, and criticizes the partial and biased conceptions of justice held by both factions. He argues that the true purpose of a city-state is not mere survival or economic exchange, but living well and achieving virtue.

§3.1280aκαὶ ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον, ἄν τʼ ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου δʼ οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς.
And it is necessary, on the one hand, that where they rule on account of wealth, whether they are fewer or more, this is an oligarchy, and where the needy rule, it is a democracy; but it happens, as we said, that the former are few and the latter are many.
εὐποροῦσι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· διʼ ἃς αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.
For few are wealthy, but all share in freedom; and for these reasons both parties dispute over the constitution.
ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν.
First, we must grasp what definitions they give of oligarchy and democracy, and what is oligarchical and democratical justice.
πάντες γὰρ ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον.
For all lay hold of some justice, but they proceed only up to a certain point, and do not state the whole of what is sovereignly just.
οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις·
For example, justice seems to be equality, and it is, but not for all, only for equals; and inequality seems to be just, and indeed it is, but not for all, only for unequals.
οἱ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς.
But they remove this "for whom," and judge badly.
τὸ δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὑτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δʼ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων.
And the cause is that the judgment is about themselves; and almost most people are bad judges about their own affairs.
ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ διῄρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ αὑτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἑκατέρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἁπλῶς.
So since justice is for certain people, and is divided in the same way both in regard to things and to whom, as has been said before in the Ethics, they agree on the equality of the thing, but dispute on "for whom," most of all because of what was just said, because they judge badly in what concerns themselves, and next also because, by stating a certain justice up to a certain point, each party thinks they are stating justice absolutely.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατά τι ἄνισοι ὦσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἄνισοι εἶναι, οἱ δʼ ἂν κατά τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως ἴσοι.
For the one, if they are unequal in some respect, for example in money, think they are entirely unequal, while the others, if they are equal in some respect, for example in freedom, think they are entirely equal.
τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν.
But they do not state the most sovereign matter.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι τῆς πόλεως ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὥσθʼ ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενέγκαντα μίαν μνᾶν τῷ δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινομένων)·
For if they associated and came together for the sake of possessions, they would share in the city just as much as they do in possession, so that the argument of the oligarchs would seem to have strength (for it is not just that one who contributed one mina should share equally in the hundred minas with the one who gave all the rest, neither of the original sum nor of what accrued afterwards).
εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἕνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἦν πόλις· νῦν δʼ οὐκ ἔστι, διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἕνεκεν, ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους—καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἂν πολῖται πόλεως ἦσαν· εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας.
But if they did so neither for the sake of life alone, but rather for the sake of living well (for otherwise there would be a city of slaves and of other animals, but now there is not, because they do not share in happiness nor in living according to choice), nor for the sake of alliance, so that they should not be wronged by anyone, nor because of exchange and mutual use—for otherwise the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all who have treaties with one another, would be as citizens of a single city; at any rate, they have agreements concerning imports, treaties against wronging one another, and written documents concerning alliance.
ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις κοιναὶ καθεστᾶσιν,
But neither are offices common to all of them established for these purposes,

Notes

  1. 1280a14τὸ οἷς — The expression τὸ οἷς consists of the neuter singular article τὸ nominalizing the dative plural relative pronoun οἷς ('for whom', i.e., the persons to whom things are distributed). Aristotle uses this condensed phrase to indicate that justice (equality or inequality) must always be defined in relation to the specific persons involved.
  2. 1280a16ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν — In this subordinate clause introduced by ὥστʼ (so / therefore), a verb of existence (such as ἐστί or a verb like διανέμεται) is omitted after τὸ δίκαιον (justice). τισίν is the dative plural of the indefinite pronoun, meaning 'for certain people.' This highlights the premise that justice is essentially relational and exists in reference to specific individuals.
  3. 1280a31εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἕνεκεν — The long conditional clause starting with εἰ δὲ... (1280a31-36) negatively lists the purposes of the city with multiple μήτε ('neither for the sake of life alone...', 'nor for the sake of alliance...', 'nor because of exchange...'), but the main clause (apodosis) for this entire condition is not explicitly stated here. Contextually, an apodosis such as 'then the oligarchic argument fails, and the city must aim at virtue and the good life' is implied.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Politics §3.1280a. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:3.1280a

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