§3.1277bἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἐστίν.
among whom the mechanical artisan is included.
διὸ παρʼ ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον.
For this reason, in some states, craftsmen did not share in offices in ancient times, before the extreme democracy came into being.
τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχομένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν μανθάνειν, εἰ μή ποτε χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν μὲν δεσπότην τὸν δὲ δοῦλον.
Therefore, the good man, the statesman, and the good citizen should not learn the tasks of those who are thus ruled, except perhaps for his own personal need; for otherwise it no longer happens that the one is master and the other is slave.
ἀλλʼ ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθʼ ἣν ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων.
But there is a certain rule according to which one rules over those who are equal in birth and free.
ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱππαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα.
For this we say is political rule, which the ruler must learn by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by being commanded in the cavalry, and to be a general by being commanded as a general, and having served as a colonel and a captain.
διὸ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα.
Therefore, this also is well said, that it is not possible to rule well without having been ruled.
τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα.
And although the virtue of these is different, the good citizen must know and be able both to be ruled and to rule, and this is the virtue of a citizen, to know the rule over free men in both aspects.
καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς.
And indeed, both belong to the good man, even if the temperance and justice of a ruler are of a different kind.
καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλʼ εἴδη ἔχουσα καθʼ ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία (δόξαι γὰρ ἂν εἶναι δειλὸς ἀνήρ, εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρεῖος εἴη ὥσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία, καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν).
For of a man who is free and yet ruled, the virtue of the good man would clearly not be one—such as justice—but would have different forms according to which he will rule and be ruled, just as the temperance and courage of a man and a woman are different. (For a man would seem to be a coward if he were only as courageous as a courageous woman, and a woman talkative if she were as modest as the good man; since indeed, the household management of a man and a woman is also different, for the task of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve).
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη.
But prudence is the only virtue peculiar to a ruler.
τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δʼ ἄρχων αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος.
For the others, it seems, must of necessity be common to both the ruled and the rulers, but prudence is certainly not the virtue of the ruled, but rather true opinion; for the ruled is like a flute-maker, but the ruler is the flute-player who uses it.
πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.
Whether, therefore, the virtue of a good man and of an excellent citizen is the same or different, and how it is the same and how different, is clear from these things.
περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι λείπεταί τις τῶν ἀποριῶν.
But concerning the citizen, there still remains one of the difficulties.
ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον;
For is he truly a citizen who has the right to share in office, or are the mechanical artisans also to be set down as citizens?
εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν, οὐχ οἷόν τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν (οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης)· εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέος ἕκαστος;
If indeed those who do not share in offices must also be set down as citizens, it is not possible for such virtue to belong to every citizen (for such a person is a citizen); but if no such person is a citizen, in what class must each be placed?
οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος.
For he is neither a resident alien nor a foreigner.
ἢ διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον;
Or shall we say that because of this argument no absurdity arises?