Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Politics §1.1255a

Conventional Slavery by Law and Natural Slavery

Passage 6 of 155 · Greek

Summary

While affirming the existence of natural slaves, the text examines the controversy over legal and war-induced slavery, analyzing the arguments of both sides to show that they ultimately appeal to a distinction based on virtue and vice.

§1.1255aὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερόν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν.
It is clear, then, that there are by nature some who are free and others who are slaves, for whom to be a slave is both beneficial and just.
ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τἀναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.
But it is not difficult to see that those who assert the contrary also speak correctly in a certain way.
διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ ὁ δοῦλος.
For "to be a slave" and "slave" are spoken of in two ways.
ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων·
For there is also someone who is a slave and in slavery according to law.
ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναί φασιν.
For the law is a kind of agreement under which they say that what is conquered in war belongs to the conquerors.
τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γράφονται παρανόμων, ὡς δεινὸν ὂν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἔσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον τὸ βιασθέν.
Indeed, many of those versed in the laws indict this "justice" as they would a rhetorician for unconstitutional proposals, on the ground that it is a terrible thing if that which is forced is to be a slave and subject to that which is capable of using force and is superior in power.
καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ τοῖς δʼ ἐκείνως, καὶ τῶν σοφῶν.
And some think this way, others that way, even among the wise.
αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν ἄνοια δοκεῖν τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν)· ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἅτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.
The cause of this dispute, and what makes the arguments overlap, is that in a way virtue, when it obtains equipment, is also best able to use force, and that which conquers is always in superiority of some good, so that force seems not to be without virtue, but the dispute is only about what is just. (For because of this, some think that justice is folly, while others think that this very thing is justice, namely that the superior should rule.) For if these arguments are separated and stand apart, the other arguments have nothing strong or persuasive in them to the effect that that which is better in virtue ought not to rule and master.
ὅλως δʼ ἀντεχόμενοί τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος δίκαιόν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν, ἅμα δʼ οὔ φασιν·
But on the whole, some, clinging as they think to a kind of justice (for the law is a kind of justice), assert that slavery resulting from war is just, yet at the same time they deny it.
τήν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι·
For it is possible that the beginning of wars is not just, and no one would ever say that a person who is undeserving of being a slave is a slave.
εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας.
Otherwise, it will turn out that those who are thought to be of the most noble birth are slaves and descendants of slaves, if they happen to be captured and sold.
διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους.
For this reason they do not wish to call themselves slaves, but rather the barbarians.
καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν·
And yet when they say this, they are seeking nothing other than the "slave by nature" which we spoke of at the beginning.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δʼ οὐδαμοῦ.
For it is necessary to say that some are slaves everywhere, and others nowhere.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ εὐγενείας· αὑτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρʼ αὑτοῖς εὐγενεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἴκοι μόνον, ὡς ὄν τι τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς εὐγενὲς καὶ ἐλεύθερον τὸ δʼ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησὶ " θείων δʼ ἀπʼ ἀμφοῖν ἔκγονον ῥιζωμάτων τίς ἂν προσειπεῖν ἀξιώσειεν λάτριν;
And the same manner holds also concerning noble birth; for they regard themselves as noble not only among themselves but everywhere, but the barbarians only at home, as though there were something that is noble and free absolutely, and something that is not so absolutely, just as Theodectes' Helen says: "Of divine roots on both sides descended, who would deem it worthy to call her a servant?
" ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθενὶ ἀλλʼ ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διορίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον, καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς δυσγενεῖς.
"And when they say this, they distinguish the slave and the free, and those of noble and low birth, by nothing other than virtue and vice.

Notes

  1. ross_section_6τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γράφονται παρανόμων — The middle-voice verb `γράφονται` ("to indict") with the genitive `παρανόμων` refers to the Athenian legal procedure for indicting an unconstitutional proposal (γραφή παρανόμων). The clause constructs a metaphor where this "justice" (`τοῦτο ... τὸ δίκαιον`) is treated as the object of indictment, as though it were a politician (`ῥήτορα`) who proposed an illegal decree, challenged by many of those versed in the laws (`τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις`).
  2. ross_section_6διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν ἄνοια δοκεῖν τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι — There is a major textual variant here between `ἄνοια` (folly) and `εὔνοια` (goodwill). Following the display text's reading `ἄνοια`, it implies that "justice is folly" (reminiscent of Thrasymachus' view in Plato's Republic). If one adopts `εὔνοια`, which is preferred in many modern editions, the text would mean "justice is goodwill," framing the dispute as whether justice is mutual benevolence or simply the rule of the stronger.
  3. ross_section_6ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων — A genitive absolute construction using the participle `διαστάντων`. The main clause is `οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἅτεροι λόγοι` (the other arguments have nothing strong or persuasive), where the appositive clause introduced by `ὡς` (`ὡς οὐ δεῖ...`) specifies the content of `ἅτεροι λόγοι` ("namely, that the superior in virtue should not rule").

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Politics §1.1255a. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:1.1255a

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