§8.7#2ἔτι χρόνῳ πρώτην· τοῖς γὰρ ἀϊδίοις
μόνον ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι ταύτην.
Further, it is first in time; for it is possibleonly for eternal entities to be moved with this motion.
ἀλλʼ ἐφʼ ἑνὸς μὲν ὁτουοῦν τῶν ἐχόντων γένεσιν τὴν φορὰν ἀναγκαῖον ὑστάτην εἶναι τῶν κινήσεων· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ γενέσθαι πρῶτον ἀλλοίωσις καὶ αὔξησις, φορὰ δʼ ἤδη τετελειωμένων κίνησίς ἐστιν. ἀλλ᾿ ἕτερον ἀνάγκη κινούμενον εἶναι κατὰ φορὰν πρότερον, ὃ καὶ τὴς γενέσεως αἴτιον ἔσται τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οὐ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὸ γεννῆσαν τοῦ γεννηθέντος, ἐπεὶ δόξειέ γʼ ἂν ἡ γένεσις εἶναι πρώτη τῶν κινήσεων διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι γενέσθαι δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα πρῶτον.
But in the case of any single entity that undergoes generation, locomotion must necessarily be the last of motions; for after generation, alteration and growth come first, whereas locomotion is the motion of things that are already completed.But there must be some other prior entity already moving in respect of locomotion, which will also be the cause of generation for the things that come to be, itself not undergoing generation—just as that which generates is prior to that which is generated—since generation might indeed seem to be the first of motions for this reason, that the thing mustfirst come to be.
τὸ δʼ ἐφʼ ἑνὸς μὲν ὁτουοῦν τῶν γιγνομένων οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον πρότερόν τι κινεῖσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων ὂν αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ γιγνόμενον, καὶ τούτου ἕτερον πρότερον.
Now, in the case of any single thing that comes to be, this is so; but some other prior entity among those that come to be must necessarily be in motion, being itself existent and not undergoing generation, and another prior to this.
ἐπεὶ δὲ γένεσιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι πρώτην (πάντα γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ κινούμενα φθαρτά, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν ἐφεξῆς κινήσεων οὐδεμία προτέρα· λέγω δʼ ἐφεξῆς αὔξησιν, εἶτʼ ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ φθίσιν καὶ φθοράν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ὕστεραι γενέσεως, ὥστʼ εἰ μηδὲ γένεσις προτέρα φορᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμία μεταβολῶν.
And since it is impossible for generation to be first (for then all moving things would be destructible), it is clear that none of the successive motions isprior either; and by "successive" I mean growth, then alteration, decay, and destruction; for all these are subsequent to generation, so that if not even generation is prior to locomotion, neither is any of the other changes.
ὅλως τε φαίνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀτελὲς καὶ ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ἰόν, ὥστε τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ φύσει πρότερον εἶναι.
And in general, that which is coming to be appears to be incomplete and proceeding toward a principle, so that what is subsequent in generation is prior in nature.
τελευταῖον δὲ φορὰ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐν γενέσει.
And lastof all, locomotion belongs to all things that are in the process of generation.
διὸ τὰ μὲν ὅλως ἀκίνητα τῶν ζώντων διʼ ἔνδειαν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ πολλὰ γένη τῶν ζῴων, τοῖς δὲ τελειουμένοις ὑπάρχει.
Therefore, some living things are entirely motionless owing to a lack of capacity, such as plantsand many genera of animals, while it belongs to those that are being completed.
ὥστʼ εἰ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει φορὰ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἀπειληφόσιν τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἡ κίνησις αὕτη πρώτη τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἴη κατʼ οὐσίαν, διά τε ταῦτα καὶ διότι ἥκιστα τῆς οὐσίας ἐξίσταται τὸ κινούμενον τῶν κινήσεων ἐν τῶ φέρεσθαι· κατὰ μόνην γὰρ οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει τοῦ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἀλλοιουμένου μὲν τὸ ποιόν, αὐξανομένου δὲ καὶ φθίνοντος τὸ ποσόν.
So that, if locomotion belongs more to those that have received their nature to a greater degree, then this motion would be first of the others in substance, both for these reasons and because the moving objectdeparts least from its substance in being carried along; for in respect of this motion alone, nothing of its being changes, whereas in alteration the quality changes, and in growth and decay the quantity.
μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ κινοῦν αὐτὸ αὐτὸ μάλιστα ταύτην κινεῖ κυρίως, τὴν κατὰ τόπον· καίτοι φαμὲν τοῦτο εἶναι τῶν κινουμένων καὶ κινούντων ἀρχὴν καὶ πρῶτον τοῖς κινουμένοις, τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν.
And it is most clear that that which moves itself moves in this way, namely in respect of place, in the most sovereign and proper sense; and yet we say that that which moves itself is theprinciple of things moved and moving, and first among things in motion.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τῶν κινήσεων ἡ φορὰ πρώτη, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· τίς δὲ φορὰ πρώτη, νῦν δεικτέον.
That, therefore, locomotion is first among motions is clear from these considerations; but which locomotion is first must now be shown.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν καὶ πρότερον ὑποτεθέν, ὅτι ἐνδέχεταί τινα κίνησιν εἶναι συνεχῆ καὶ ἀΐδιον, φανερὸν ἔσται τῇ αὐτῇ μεθόδῳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται συνεχῆ εἶναι, ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν.
And at the same time, the hypothesis now and previously assumed, that it is possible for some motion to be continuous and eternal, will become clear by the same method.Now, that none of the other motions can be continuous is clear from what follows.
ἅπασαι γὰρ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων εἰς ἀντικείμενά εἰσιν αἱ κινήσεις καὶ μεταβολαί, οἷον γενέσει μὲν καὶ φθορᾷ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὅροι, ἀλλοιώσει δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη, αὐξήσει δὲ καὶ φθίσει ἢ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης ἢ τελειότης μεγέθους καὶ ἀτέλεια· ἐναντίαι δʼ αἱ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία.
For all motions and changes are from opposites to opposites, as, for example, the limits for generation and destruction are being and non-being, for alteration they are contrary affections, and for growth and decay they are either magnitude andsmallness or completeness and incompleteness of magnitude; and motions into contraries are contrary motions.
τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰεὶ κινούμενον τήνδε τὴν κίνησιν, ὂν δὲ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη πρότερον ἠρεμεῖν.
But that which is not always in motion with this motion, butwas so previously, must necessarily have been at rest previously.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἠρεμήσει ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ μεταβάλλον.
It is clear, then, that the changing thing will be at rest in the contrary.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν· ἀντίκειται γὰρ φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῇ καθʼ ἕκαστον.
Likewise also in the case of changes; for absolute destruction and generation are opposed, and each particular one to each particular one.
ὥστʼ εἰ ἀδύνατον ἅμα μεταβάλλειν τὰς ἀντικειμένας, οὐκ ἔσται συνεχὴς ἡ μεταβολή, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ ἔσται αὐτῶν χρόνος.
So that, if it is impossiblefor opposed changes to occur simultaneously, the change will not be continuous, but there will be time between them.
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἐναντίας ἢ μὴ ἐναντίας εἶναι τὰς κατʼ ἀντίφασιν μεταβολάς, εἰ μόνον ἀδύνατον ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ παρεῖναι (τοῦτο γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ οὐδὲν χρήσιμον), οὐδʼ εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἠρεμῆσαι ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, μηδʼ ἐστὶν μεταβολὴ ἠρεμίᾳ ἐναντίον (οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ἠρεμεῖ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν), ἀλλʼ εἰ μόνον μεταξὺ γίγνεται χρόνος· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ μεταβολὴ συνεχής·
For it makes no difference whether the changes according to contradiction are contraries or not contraries, provided only that it is impossible for them to be present in the same thing at the same time (for this is of no use to the argument), nor does it matter if it is not necessary to be at restin the contradiction, nor if change is not contrary to rest (for perhaps non-being is not at rest, and destruction is into non-being), butonly if time comes between them; for in this way the change is not continuous.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ἡ ἐναντίωσις χρήσιμον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα ὑπάρχειν.
For not even in the previous cases was the contrarietyof use, but rather the impossibility of their coexisting at the same time.
οὐ δεῖ
δὲ ταράττεσθαι ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ πλείοσιν ἔσται ἐναντίον, οἷον ἡ κίνησις καὶ στάσει καὶ κινήσει τῇ εἰς τοὐναντίον, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦτο λαμβάνειν, ὅτι ἀντίκειταί πως καὶ τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῇ ἠρεμίᾳ ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἐναντία, καθάπερ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μέτριον τῷ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ τῷ ὑπερεχομένῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα τὰς ἀντικειμένας οὔτε κινήσεις οὔτε μεταβολὰς ὑπάρχειν.
And one mustnot be troubled by the fact that the same thing will be contrary to more than one thing—as, for example, a motion is contrary to both rest and to the motion in the contrary direction—but must only grasp this, that the contrary motion is opposed in a certain way to both the motion and the rest, just as the equal and the moderate are opposedto that which exceeds and that which is exceeded, and that it is impossible for opposed motions or changes to exist at the same time.
ἔτι δʼ ἐπί τε τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ παντελῶς ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ γενόμενον εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη φθαρῆναι καὶ μηδένα χρόνον διαμεῖναι.
And further, in the case of generation and destruction, it would seem to be utterly absurd if that which has come to be must immediately be destroyed and remain for no time.
ὥστε ἐκ τούτων ἂν ἡ πίστις γένοιτο ταῖς ἄλλαις· φυσικὸν γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίως ἔχειν ἐν ἀπάσαις.
So that from these casescredibility may be gained for the others; for it is natural to be in a similar state in all of them.