§8.5#1Τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ οὐ δʼ αὐτὸ τὸ κινοῦν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἕτερον ὃ κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν, ἢ διʼ αὐτό, καὶ τοῦτο ἢ πρῶτον μετὰ τὸ ἔσχατον ἢ διὰ πλειόνων, οἶον ἡ βακτηρία κινεῖ τὸν λίθον καὶ κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῆς χειρὸς κινουμένης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀν. θρώπου, οὗτος δʼ οὐκέτι τῷ ὑπʼ ἄλλου κινεῖσθαι.
This happens in two ways: for either it is not through itself that the mover moves, but through something else which moves the mover, or it is through itself; and this latter either immediately after the last or through several mediators, for example, the staff moves the stone and is moved by the hand which is moved by the man, and this last no longer by being moved by something else.
ἄμφω δὴ κινεῖν φαμέν, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν κινούντῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πρῶτον· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ κινεῖ τὸ τελευταῖον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου τὸ τελευταῖον οὐ κινήσει, ἐκενο δʼ ἄνευ τούτου, οἶον ἡ βακτηρία οὐ κινήσει μὴ κινοῦντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
We say indeed that both move, both the last and the first of the movers, but rather the first; for that moves the last, but not this the first, and without the first the last will not move, but that without this, for example, the staff will not move unless the man moves it.
εἰ δὴ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινός τε κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ἢ ὑπὸ κινουμένου ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑπʼ ἄλλου, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι κινοῦν ὃ οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τοιοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη θάτερον (ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι τὸ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον ὑπʼ ἄλλου αὐτό· τῶν γὰρ ἀπείρων οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν πρῶτον—εἰ οὖν ἅπαν μὲν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινος κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον κινοῦν κινεῖται μέν, οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου δέ, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ὑφʼ αὐτοῦ κινεῖσθαι.
If, then, it is necessary that everything that is moved is moved by something, and either by something moved by another or not, and if indeed by another, there must be some first mover which is not moved by another, but if the first is such, the other is not necessary (for it is impossible for the mover and that which is itself moved by another to go on to infinity; for of infinite things there is no first—if, therefore, everything that is moved is moved by something, and the first mover is moved indeed, but not by another, it must be moved by itself).
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε τὸν αὐτὸν
τοῦτον λόγον ἔστιν ἐπελθεῖν.
Furthermore, one can also approach this same argument in the following way.
πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν τίτε κινεῖ καὶ τινί.
For everything that moves moves something and with something.
ἢ γὰρ αὐτῷ κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν ἢ ἄλλῳ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῇ βακτηρίᾳ, καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος κατέβαλεν ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ὁ λίθος ὃν ἔωσεν.
For either the mover moves by itself or by something else, for example, a man either himself or with the staff, and the wind threw down something either itself or the stone which it pushed.
ἀδύνατον δὲ κινεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ κινοῦντος τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ· ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ κινεῖ, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἄλλο εἶναι ᾧ κινεῖ, ἂν δὲ ᾖ ἕτερον τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔστιν τι ὃ κινήσει οὐ τινὶ ἀλλʼ αὐτῷ, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν.
But it is impossible for that with which it moves to move without that which moves by itself; and if indeed it moves by itself, there is no necessity for there to be another thing with which it moves; but if there is another thing with which it moves, there is something which will move not with something but by itself, or else it will go to infinity.
εἰ οὖν κινούμενόν τι κινεῖ, ἀνάγκη στῆναι καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι· εἰ γὰρ ἡ βακτηρία κινεῖ τῷ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς χειρός, ἡ χεὶρ κινεῖ τὴν βακτηρίαν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ ἄλλο κινεῖ, καὶ ταύτην ἕτερόν τι τὸ κινοῦν.
If, therefore, something moves while being moved, it must stop and not go to infinity; for if the staff moves by being moved by the hand, the hand moves the staff; and if indeed some other thing moves this too, there is some other thing moving this as well.
ὅταν δή τινι κινῇ ἀεὶ ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη εἶναι πρότερον τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ κινοῦν.
Whenever, then, one thing always moves with something, there must be prior to it that which moves by itself.
εἰ οὖν κινεῖται μὲν τοῦτο, μὴ ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κινοῦν αὐτό, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν· ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἤτοι εὐθὺς τὸ κινοῦ. μενον ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτὸ κινοῦντος κινεῖται, ἢ ἔρχεταί ποτε εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον.
If, then, this is indeed moved, but there is no other thing moving it, it must move itself; so that also according to this argument either that which is moved is immediately moved by that which moves itself, or it eventually arrives at something of this sort.
πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ὧδε σκοποῦσι ταὐτὰ
συμβήσεται ταῦτα, εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ κινουμένου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον πᾶν, ἤτοι τοῦτο ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥστε κινεῖν μὲν κινούμενον, οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι αὐτό, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καθʼ αὑτό.
In addition to what has been said, to those who consider it in the following way, these same results will follow. For if every moved thing is moved by something which is itself moved, either this belongs to things accidentally, so that it moves while being moved, yet not because of its being itself moved, or not, but essentially.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινοῦν.
First, then, if it is accidentally, it is not necessary for the mover to be moved.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὡς ἐνδέχεταί ποτε μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλʼ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι.
And if this is so, it is clear that it is possible for nothing among beings to be moved at some time; for the accidental is not necessary, but is capable of not being.
ἐὰν οὖν θῶμεν τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβήσεται, ψεῦδος δʼ ἴσως.
If, then, we assume that which is possible to be the case, nothing impossible will follow, though perhaps something false will.
ἀλλὰ τὸ κίνησιν μὴ εἶναι ἀδύνατον· δέδεικται γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι ἀνάγκη κίνησιν ἀεὶ εἶναι.
But for there to be no motion is impossible; for it has been shown before that it is necessary for motion to exist always.
καὶ εὐλόγως δὲ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν.
And this has happened reasonably.
τρία γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τό τε κινούμενον καὶ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ.
For there must be three things: that which is moved, the mover, and that with which it moves.
τὸ μὲν οὖν κινούμενον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖν δʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη· τὸ δʼ ᾧ κινεῖ, καὶ κινεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι (συμμεταβάλλει γὰρ τοῦτο ἃμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ κινουμένῳ ὄν· δῆλον δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τόπον κινούντων· ἄπτεσθαι γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἀνάγκη μέχρι τινός)· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν οῦτως ὥστʼ εἶναι μὴ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἀκίνητον.
Now that which is moved must be moved, but it is not necessary for it to move other things; while that with which it moves must both move and be moved (for this changes along with it, being at the same time and in the same respect as the moved; and this is clear in the case of things moving in place, for they must touch each other up to a certain point); and the mover in such a way that it is not that with which it moves, must be unmoved.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἔσχατον, ὃ κινεῖσθαι μὲν δύναται, κινήσεως δʼ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ὃ κινεῖται μέν, οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου δὲ ἀλλʼ ὑφʼ αὐτοῦ, εὔλογον, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἴπωμεν, καὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶναι ὃ κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὄν.
And since we see the last, which is capable of being moved but does not have a starting-point of motion, and that which is moved indeed, but not by another but by itself, it is reasonable, if we do not say "necessary", that there is also the third, which moves while being unmoved.
διὸ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν νοῦν ἀπαθῆ φάσκων καὶ ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε κινήσεως ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι ποιεῖ· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἂν κινοίη ἀκίνητος ὢν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμιγὴς ὤν.
Therefore Anaxagoras also speaks correctly when he says that Intellect is impassive and unmixed, since indeed he makes it a starting-point of motion; for only in this way could it cause motion while being unmoved, and rule while being unmixed.